Posted by Adam Gordon on Apr 22, 2010 in all, decision-making, leadership, management, strategic foresight
The strategy world has mourned the sudden passing of C.K. Prahalad, Professor of Business Administration at the Ross School, University of Michigan, this week.
Front page 'Competing for the Future' Hamel & Prahalad, HBR 1994
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As many have commented, Prahalad made great strides in getting business to see the potential in emerging markets and ‘poor’ consumers, in The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid and allied work.
In our rush for the new and latest, early work often gets buried. So I would like, as my take on the passing of Prahalad, to go back to his fundamental testimony to the role of and need for foresight in management, which is to be found in his co-authored piece (with Gary Hamel) ‘Competing for the Future,’ Harvard Business Review, 1994, which became a very famous book of the same name. Sixteen years on and now in the wake of the credit crunch, this piece remains as relevant as it ever was:
“Ask yourself: Do senior managers in my company have a clear and shared understanding of how the industry may be different ten years from now? Is my company’ point of view about the future unique among competitors?
“On average managers devote less than 3% of their time building a corporate perspective on the future.
“The painful upheavals in so many companies in recent years reflect the failure of one-time industry leaders to keep up with the accelerating pace of industry change… Those companies were run by managers, not leaders, by maintenance engineers, not architects.
“If the future is not occupying senior managers, what is? Restructuring and reegineering. While both are legitimate and important tasks, they have more to do with shoring up today’s business than with building tomorrow’s industries. Any company that is a bystander on the road to the future will watch its structure, values, and skills become progressively less attuned to industry realities.
(therefore) “Most layoffs at large US companies have been the fault of managers who fell asleep at the wheel and missed the turnoff for the future.
“If senior executives don’t have reasonably detailed answers to the ‘future’ questions, and if the answers they have are not significantly different of the ‘today’ answers, there is little chance that their companies will remain market leaders.
“The Quest for Foresight: Why do we talk of foresight rather than vision? Vision connotes a dream or an apparition, and there is more to industry foresight than a blinding flash of insight. Industry foresight is based on deep insights into trends in technology, demographics, regulations, and lifestyles, which can be harnessed to rewrite industry rules and create new competitive space.”
Footnote: this from the FT: The last time CK spoke to the FT he was buzzing with intellectual energy. “Really, in all my career I have been interested in ‘next practices’, and not merely ‘best practices’,” he said.
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Apr 20, 2010 in all, decision-making, failed predictions, Future Savvy, managing uncertainty, Perils of Prediction
I had a chat the other day to Stephan Magus for his Abenteuer Zukunft (Future Adventures) podcast channel, taking about the rationale behind making a stand for quality in foresight. That is, what’s under the hood of Future Savvy, and why.
The podcast is up at the Abenteuer Leben site, playable via the buttons on the right hand side.
Alternatively it can be accessed directly at
http://media1.roadkast.com/abenteuerzukunft/DAZ71_120410_6tt6.mp3
(If you don’t speak German, you need to fast forward through the first 3 minutes.)
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Apr 14, 2010 in all, forecast filtering, Future Savvy, managing uncertainty, Perils of Prediction, scenario planning, strategic foresight
I couldn’t resist reposting this yesterday’s bit o’ fluff from the cleantech news portal Greenbang, itself reproduced from Forum for the Future, first, well because it cites yours truly; but even more agonizingly because the headline is exactly what I should have called Future Savvy if I knew the first thing about marketing, which I obviously don’t.
So may I say, this is what I was trying to say: When trying to predict the future, watch for dog poop!
Or perhaps: apparently helpful guides to the future are often dog poop disguised as chocolate, and here’s how to know the difference.
Something like that.
Note that this Greenbang story, below, is damaged by letting the most extreme predictions (the howlers) stand in for the general item. Prediction howler-spotting is sobering, but misses how many people got the future right, or right enough to make excellent decisions, and therefore overly damages the foresight field.
Also, howlers are actually the low-hanging fruit. Being future savvy is ultimately about the more subtle job of correcting weighing apparently very credible and well-founded predictions, some of which are excellent, but others of which are far flimsier than they appear.
There are various other minor problems such as not knowing the difference between the Gartner Hype Cycle and Zeitgeist bias, etc. And I would never call myself, not even in my most self-deprecating moments, a “futurologist.” But anyway, as I said, just a bit of fun:
Greenbang (13th April 2010) by Trish Lorenz & Martin Wright: Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.” Niels Bohr’s words are a wise warning to reckless forecasters.
“Combining a nuclear reactor with a home boiler is no longer a problem. It would heat and cool the house, provide unlimited hot water and melt the snow from sidewalks and driveways. All that could be done for six years on a single charge of fissionable material costing about $300.” — Robert Ferry, US Institute of Boiler and Radiator Manufacturers, 1955
“Nuclear-powered vacuum cleaners will probably be a reality in ten years.” — Alex Lewyt, President of vacuum cleaner company Lewyt Corp, also 1955
Lewyt and Ferry both stumbled into a risky habit of all amateur futurists: extrapolating from present trends. In this case, they were caught up in the surge of excitement over the rise of nuclear power. They were not alone. In the tech-fuelled optimism of the ’50s, magazines, radio and the infant TV were buzzing with predictions of flying cars and lunar settlements.
They had fallen victim to what later became known as the Gartner Hype Cycle. This maps the enthusiasm and subsequent disillusionment typical in the introduction of new technology — a useful reality check for those caught up in “irrational optimism.”
By contrast, there are those whose feet are too firmly rooted in present realities, and fail to see how innovation can combine with social changes to speed the widespread adoption of new technology.
“The Americans need the telephone, but we do not. We have plenty of messenger boys.” — Sir William Preece, Chief Engineer, Royal Mail, 1878
“The horse is here to stay, but the automobile is only a novelty, a fad.” — President of the Michigan Savings Bank, advising Henry Ford’s lawyer not to invest in Ford Motors, 1903
It is difficult to consider any factor that doesn’t apparently exist at the time of making a prediction, but that’s essentially what looking ahead requires. It wasn’t all that long ago when people were predicting a bright future for teletext and fax machines. Few would have anticipated that both would be made almost obsolete by the internet and email. And yet the weak signals were there for those who chose to hear them. A fax machine, after all, is simply a modem with a rather complex print interface attached. It only evolved as it did because people were unused to reading information solely on screen, and computers were too big to carry around with them. Once laptops took off in the early ’90s, the fax was doomed.
“There is no reason why anyone would want a computer in their home.” — Ken Olson, Chairman, Digital Equipment Corp, 1977
Australian Senator Dr Russell Trood sums it up neatly when he says: ” ‘Nowism’ is a serious occupational hazard for those in the prediction game.”
Today’s futurologists no longer try to predict a single outcome for the future; instead they map a variety of scenarios. For Adam Gordon of Future Savvy, scenario-based thinking gives people “permission to think through alternative outcomes without necessarily predicting them.” Instead of trying to forecast precisely what might happen, he says, “we can ask ‘What if it does?,’ and then explore the outcomes and our responses.” Such thinking characterises much of the strategy adopted by forward-looking governments on tackling climate change.
James Goodman, head of Futures at Forum for the Future, agrees: “People think it’s the output that’s important, but actually it’s the process.” And, he adds, “All future planning has uncertainty at its heart.”
Or as Martin Raymond, Strategy and Insight Director at The Future Laboratory, says, “We always try to spot the dog
poop in our forecast.”
Greenbang Editor’s note: This was a guest article by Trish Lorenz and Martin Wright at Forum for the Future. This piece originally appeared in Green Futures, which is published by Forum for the Future and is the leading magazine on environmental solutions and sustainable futures. Its aim is to demonstrate that a sustainable future is both practical and desirable — and can be profitable, too.
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Apr 6, 2010 in all, horizon scanning, management, managing uncertainty, strategic foresight
As of writing, Blockbuster clings to business life, with $1 billion in debt, unprofitable stores and continued losses, and it looks inevitable that it will file for bankruptcy protection. In Q4 ’09 the company posted a loss of $434.9m on revenue of $1.08bn. The stock price has fallen is $0.26 per share, down from lofty levels of over $15 in the early part of the decade. That’s a lot of shareholder value down the drain. *
Reading analysis by John Tamny in Forbes, I lighted on the following paragraph — as perfect an encapsulation of why looking to the future in timely and in a high-quality way is essential, and how quality horizon scanning is integral to it:
“As often happens as companies grow, Blockbuster concentrated on perfecting its existing service while beating competitors offering the same instead of looking into ways that outsiders might destroy its business model altogether… For Blockbuster, the “disrupter” in question was Netflix. Indeed, popular as the Blockbuster brand was, getting to the video store in order to take advantage of its services was a hassle for customers–as was returning videos on time to avoid paying late fees. The rise of Netflix from well outside the traditional retail space meant these problems were solved in one fell swoop.” (my italics)
Change that matters, that is, relatively sudden and acutely disruptive to incumbent business-model success, always comes from outside an industry. Britannica wasn’t beaten by another encyclopedia. Eastman Kodak was beaten by digital photo startups, not by Fuji. And so on, and so on, through industry failure, whether it leads merely to value hemorrhage or all the way to Chapter 11.
Looking vs seeing
Sure there are companies that lose because they are simply outcompeted, that is, are less capable than the competition in doing the same thing. Hertz is currently in this category. But when a clear market leader, with brand and capital and customers galore comes totally unstuck, it is always new technology and/or new business model coming from the outside that has done it. In these cases, as with Blockbuster, companies fall to industry entrants that change ways of doing things, solving pain or trade-offs that buyers suffer, or otherwise provide consumers with more value.
These are always, theoretically, innovations incumbents could have done themselves if they were ready to think ahead (and brave enough, when required, to cannabalize existing products that stood in the way of important future steps) and therein lies a conundrum about looking at new, external competitors. It’s seldom that the incumbent can’t see the intruder, that is, is not looking. Often they are looking intensively. It is that they don’t see the absolute disruption in the new until it is too late. It is a problem of perception. This is why industry horizon scanning is a little about the easy task of looking, and a lot about the much harder job of seeing. And why putting one’s corporate head down and making an existing product or service ‘more perfect’ is part of not seeing.
* Interestingly, the Blockbuster demise was called exactly right in November 2007 by Don Reisinger on CNET.
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