Future Savvy: Quality in Foresight

Charlie Munger, Vice-Chairman of Berkshire Hathaway Corporation, the diversified investment firm chaired by Warren Buffett, has a piece titled: ‘Basically, it’s Over‘ in Slate this week.

Charles Munger

First, let me say, what I like about investors (and managers and entrepreneurs) with long-term track records of success, is it means — it must mean, by definition — they have a high quality view of the future. Not only a high-quality view, but a high quality view that renews itself. There is no doubt that Berkshire Hathaway has consistently over time had a better view of the future than most expert forecasters, policy pundits, and futurists. The record is clear.

Anyway, Munger this week offers a parable about Basicland, a C18 Pacific island colonized by Europeans where: “Property rights were greatly respected and strongly enforced. The banking system was simple… Almost no debt was used to purchase or carry securities or other investments, including real estate and tangible personal property…  Speculation in Basicland’s security and commodity markets was always rigorously discouraged and remained small…

“(But) as their affluence and leisure time grew, Basicland’s citizens more and more whiled away their time in the excitement of casino gambling… Many of the gamblers were highly talented engineers attracted partly by casino poker but mostly by bets available in the bucket shop systems, with the bets now called “financial derivatives.”

And so it goes on, telling the history of America and the route to the Credit Crunch, and potential for new misery going forward, via this parable. He uses the parable as parables have always been used, to say something in ‘make-believe-land’ that cannot be said (or will not be heard) in reality. The folly of Basicland’s citizens and government is much easier to acknowledge than our own. Scenarios of the future are similar in function, similarly allowing mental and institutional ‘permission’ to think the unthinkable and ’say the unsayable.

The worst investor in America

Munger wouldn’t be the first to say: “Change yer ways or ye be doomed.” Isaiah and many before and since have said that. Nor would he be the first old white guy to espouse traditional ways of doing things. We factor that in. But he does look to basics and basics are important in having a high-quality view of the future. They signal the limits of the excess and reversion-to-the-mean imperatives.

I remember in the 1990s, when I was living in Washington DC, and Warren Buffet was “the worst investor in America” for missing out on the dot.com boom and Nasdaq bonanza. He just stuck to his guns saying, time after time, ‘there are no fundamentals behind these valuations (aka, this is just a casino) and fundamentals will prevail, which of course they did.

Now the brains at Berkshire Hathaway are saying that forums where risk, debt, currencies, etc., are up for speculation are ‘casinos,’ and their players therefore gamblers (rather than, as they would have it, ‘investors), and that they produce little fundamental value and fundamentals will prevail.

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Two running business stories with foresight importance this week, both I realize brought to me by smartbrief.com (Smartbrief on Leadership) which I find a very credible news aggregation service. The first is a WSJ piece ‘How Lean Manufacturing Can Backfire.’

Toyota President Akio Toyoda, Feb 11, 2010. Pic: AP

Lean manufacturing creates efficiencies and shaves production costs by creating just-in-time — no inventory — systems, using common parts and designs across product lines, and generally squeezing materials, processes, and (inevitably) quality controls. This may or may not include pressing suppliers to lower prices, and therefore squeeze their own materials, processes, and quality controls. ‘Lean’ has been very much a core process and operations mantra for about two decades. To misquote a favorite saying, manufacturing companies have been adamant: ‘one can never be too rich or too lean.’

But now Toyota has had a slew of embarrassing recalls — the 2010 Highlander; 2008 – 2010 Sequoia SUVs; and 2009 – 2010 RAV4’s due to gas pedal problems. It has just recalled 437,000 Prius and other hybrid vehicles worldwide to fix brake problems. In 2009 it recalled Corolla, Camry, Vios and Yaris sedans due to faulty electric window-control systems.

The point of the WSJ piece is to implicate lean manufacturing in this. (It’s unclear whether it’s too much lean or too little quality control, but they are clearly connected.) Now, lean as an idea is not going to go away. Nobody is suddenly going to advocate ‘bloat manufacturing,’ but looking at the damage in reputation and bottom line that Toyota has soaked up, the company and others like it will obviously looking across their lines and saying to themselves ‘a bit of redundancy (fat, if you like) in the system will be cheaper than this.’ Thus the pendulum swings back from lean extreme to somewhere a bit more durable. A happy medium.

Maharaj Mac

In the other story, the Times reports how McDonalds is seeing benefits from localization of it’s menu, for example, offering the McItaly in Italy, the (non-beef) Maharaja Mac in India, the McLobster in Canada and the Ebi Filit-O (shrimp burger) in Japan. The pendulum effect here is that McDo became the mega-corporation it is based on global standardization and a ‘one-menu’ mantra from Cleveland to Taipei. It wasn’t just one menu, but each item had to be produced from the same stock, and in the same way. McDo fries were identical everywhere, that was the guarantee (and they were always called ‘fries’ no matter what locals called them.)

It is now become common cause among the global food companies (notably Starbucks and KFC) to work local options into their offering. One may think this is merely ‘think global, act local.’ The point is, it is an about-turn indeed from the ‘think American, act global’ that went before. What works best is in fact a happy medium.

What does this have to do with better future-thinking? Expect a recall sooner or later on forecasts that don’t see change resolving itself around a happy medium.

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I have a fond little memory from one of the early multi-candidate debates in the last US election campaign. It was on prime-time TV: there were still about a dozen or so candidates in the running, including Obama and Hillary Clinton, each was standing behind a podium, and as the topic of climate change came up they were asked en masse: “So, who didn’t fly here today in a private plane, raise your hand?” The delegates all sheepishly kept their hands down but one – I forget which – raised his. “I came in yesterday,” he explained. (laughter)

So to the Copenhagen climate change summit, and all the luminaries and dignitaries and celebrities landing at København airport, many of them in private jets.

http://www.cph.dk/CPH/DK/MAIN

This tells us something about the future, and what it says is: ‘needs must.’ What are they going to do, row a boat to Copenhagen? Scale that up and you have the real, actual future. People will fly. In fact the entire new global middle class of billions will fly. And they will heat their homes. And they will eat meat, and so on. And any even remotely democratic system that tries to take away this will be out on its ear.

But we will of course move to cleaner, renewable, sustainable systems. How fast this happens depends essentially on money, which in turn depends on political will, which in turn depends on public concern. Money is required to fund new energy technology research, and — the core issue of Copenhagen this week — it is needed to buy off industrializing countries.

There’s no doubt that climate change (manmade or not) is real, and a real danger. But when scientists and academics are worried about it that means little in terms of changes to human practices. When the public gets concerned — as they now are — we get the possibility of fundamental change. This is true of the future generally, not just climate and the environment.

Between the public sentiment and the money lies political will. Essentially the political will of post-industrial economies on the one side, who find it politically easy, relatively, to pay the price of emissions constraints vs. that of developing economies which will be choked economically and therefore politically by those constraints.

Inequality

Correlating degrees warming with ecological and therefore social upheaval is important. But to think that is what the argument is about is to miss the point. The point is global inequality and its future, and how developing economies are not going to allow emissions constraints to further entrench it.

The future goes always to the most powerful side. That’s what power is for: determining the future. The sides are both strong in this dispute, so this battle will not be won or lost in Copenhagen this week. We are still in its early stages. The effects of climate change are incremental (unlike, say, nuclear holocaust) meaning there is plenty of room for postponement even if the planet can’t and won’t ultimately take it. And those who would occupy the moral high ground have burned public and private jet fuel to be there to do it, and will no doubt indulge in a bit of Smørrebrød and Frikadeller too. Needs must.

So expect the political clock to remain stuck as it has been for a while now, at ‘5 minutes to midnight,’ while the issue smolders slowly without definitive resolution — until technology advances get human energy, finally, off fossil fuels and the problem works its way out of environmental and human systems.

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Economists make a handy, if mildly irreverent, distinction between “freshwater” and “saltwater” economics. Freshwater refers to economic theory that rests on the efficient markets hypothesis — a belief in the efficiency and rationality of free markets. It is associated with Milton Friedman and the University of Chicago school. It was the thinking behind Thatcher and Reaganomics and still more-or-less holds sway today, or it did up until the credit crunch.

Keynesian or saltwater economics by contrast holds that free markets often behave irrationally and inefficiently, and therefore need corrective policy from government. Saltwater economists say people and institutions often behave in ways contrary to the general good, or in ways that can bring markets (on which they depend) to their knees. Sound familiar?

Anyway, a recent Knowledge@Wharton article comments: “Like a natural science, freshwater economics lends itself to complex, often elegant mathematical modeling. The freshwater view is that consumers, offered an array of choices, will select the one that is best for them — a straightforward assertion that can be neatly expressed in mathematical formulae.

“In contrast, many assertions made in behavioral economics are more challenging to express mathematically. ‘Behavioralists’ argue that consumers don’t always act in their own interests, especially when they fail to understand the choices on offer or succumb to irrational impulses involving those choices… but such impulses are inherently vague and difficult to define.”

Cognitive bias

In other words mathematically modeling the economic future is possible if humans and the markets they create are rational, but far less possible if we act irrationally.

Now, as elaborated in Future Savvy, the fact that humans make irrational choices due to many cognitive biases and heuristics  is indisputable, not least since the work of  Tversky and Kahneman. Biases and heuristics such as “anchoring,” “recency effect,” “personal validation fallacy,” “herd mentality,” and so on, in which people make irrational choices, are well documented.

That’s why mathematical projections of economic behavior are unreliable. The economy may be counted in numbers, but it is still a human system, with associated inefficiency and irrationality. Blow this little debate in economic forecasting up large, and you have the essential problem with quantitative forecasting of any type. It assumes, erroneously, a freshwater view of humanity.

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In Monday’s Washington Post, under an Op-Ed headed ‘Could America Go Broke?’ columnist Robert Samuelson raises the prospect of the U.S. or another major economy defaulting on its national debt. Says Samuelson: “It’s still a very, very long shot, but it’s no longer entirely unimaginable. Governments of rich countries are borrowing so much that it’s conceivable that one day the twin assumptions underlying their burgeoning debt (that lenders will continue to lend and that governments will continue to pay) might collapse… The question is so unfamiliar that the past provides few clues to the future.”

Well, this raises the question of whether the past tells us anything about the future, and if so what? There’s a common wisdom attributed to Mark Twain (why is it that aphorisms are always attributed to Twain or Winston Churchill?) that goes: “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes,” and this is the position that most educated future-thinkers would hold.

So what would the ‘rhyme’ be? From cases such as Argentina, Russia, South Africa, and many developing world countries over the past 50 years: lenders loose confidence in a country’s ability to repay on its national bonds and stop lending; the country is faced with a choice of drastic spending cuts (great social and humanitarian cost) or major tax increases (pointless, because it stifles business, therefore lowers tax revenue) or default. Going broke, into national “Chapter 11,” suing for time and ‘debt restructuring’ becomes the best among the bad options event though it pretty much ensures a deep and dark recession.
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Thinking the unthinkable

Could this be the future of America? As I’ve written before here and other places, after the ‘unimaginable’ Credit Crunch was ignored due to its ‘low probability,’ it’s a relief to know that remote but plausible outcomes with serious consequences are getting attention, at least in the Washington Post.

Clearly major economies are in a more precarious situation than they were 5 years ago. Too much debt is always precarious, for the smallest household or the biggest country alike. On the other hand, an economy’s size and enduring wealth counts too. As Samuelson observes, it created the unexpected effect in Japan’s case where debt at 200% of GDP (America’s is currently about 40%) should have raised the cost of its debt (lower confidence of repayment) but this hasn’t happened because domestic Japanese households and businesses rather than foreigners have easily (and confidently) bought the debt — and this may well hold true for the U.S. too. In other words, the rhyme may go this way.

The ‘more likely’ future is incremental raising of taxes and lowering of public service provision as Western economies incrementally claw their way back to stability. But at least this default wild card on the margins of plausibility has the oxygen of some attention and this is no bad thing. As with all good foresight work, it predicts nothing, but it does allow us to think through the roadmap to the outcome, and press for the right decisions now, in plenty of time and in a measured way.

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Continuing the theme of financial types talking to each other about predictions and predictability, this ‘Tea with the Economist’ interview of Stephen Roach, Chairman, Morgan Stanley Asia by Economist New York Bureau Chief Mathew Birk, carries interesting lessons about the limits of prediction.

Birk commends Roach for being one of the few to have predicted the Credit Crunch problems, to which Roach demurs in saying he was “too early”. He then furthers his modesty in saying that the “breakage” in the financial system was “in excess of anything I envisioned.”

Self-deprecation in assessing one’s predictive abilities will endear anyone to me. Even Roach, who later in the interview burns this hard-won credibility by laying the blame for the credit crunch at the door of regulators, forgetting how hard financial institutions lobbied regulators for greater freedoms in the 1990s.

But I digress. The predictive issues the interview raises are as follows. Issue one: it’s not enough (as any stock short-seller will confirm) to get the direction of a future change right. One must get the timing right too. Issue two: it’s not enough to anticipate a change. One must be able to judge it’s impact. Getting either timing or impact wrong is effectively to have missed the future.

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Probability

On the latter topic — the problem of impact — Nassim Taleb is unrelenting, and he is right. Analysts routinely mix up probability and impact. They think that because an event has a low probability (‘it would be a 10-sigma event!’) it can be marginalized in the predictive number crunching. Of course, it can’t. The low-probability of a wildcard or black swan event is irrelevant because when it happens it will change the game, and that’s why, in every predictive situation of reasonable complexity and uncertainty, using statistical extrapolations (regressions and so on) to predict, is to dangerously paper over the cracks. It is precisely the cracks that businesses and policy makers need to worry about.

Determining the direction of change is hard enough. Assessing timing or extent of impact — a ‘total future impact index’ — is wickedly difficult. It’s a task not to be underestimated, and to simply extrapolate current trends (= assuming the trend’s timeline and impact stay the same as in the past) is the royal road to underestimating it.

This is the reason foresight for complex, uncertain, changing situations can only be grasped by NOT predicting (quantitatively or otherwise) but by exploring the limit-conditions of the plausible (What would happen if the timing of the change accelerated, or was significantly delayed? What if  the impact was 10x or one tenth of what we expect? And so on.)

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One of the benefits of scenario-based future thinking is the ‘permission’ to think through alternative future outcomes without necessarily predicting them. ‘Predictors’ focus, by contrast, on isolating the highest probability future in order not to have to think through or plan for less likely outcomes.

Predictions of the dollar’s demise are as old as the greenback itself of course, but over recent weeks the specter of the dollar heading way way below its trading range — a dollar crunch — has entered the zone of the credible, or, in scenario terms, the ‘cone of plausible uncertainty.’ That means decision-makers with lots at stake are taking it seriously.

Like the British pound, the dollar has been under a cloud due to perceptions of economic fallout from the credit crunch and global recession, but particular questions about the US currency have recently surfaced, driven by reports [Robert Fisk's 'The Demise of the Dollar' story in The Independent (Oct 6)]  that “Gulf Arabs are planning – along with China, Russia, Japan and France – to end dollar dealings for oil, moving instead to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan, the euro, gold and a new, unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council” (Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar).

The subtext is far from merely financial. Practically, it would mean that on any day, the real cost of oil to US consumers and businesses would go up or down depending on the strength of the currency. This is something America is not used to. But, more deeeply, dropping dollar-denomination of oil is a direct shot across the bows of Washington’s say over oil affairs, and the hegemony of the dollar as the dominant global reserve currency.

De-dollarizing oil would not in itself push the US currency below its 25-year range. But it is portentous of the clear trend to a genuinely multi-power world, for better or worse, in which the dollar will get no favors. That will push the dollar down, at least while the news and fallout make their way through the financial and real economic systems.

Rumors of de-dollarization have been hotly denied, as further reported here, but as the Independent points out, denials are to be expected, and are always issued in these situations. They mean nothing. Even cub reporters know that.

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Scenario thinking

What’s particularly interesting to me is that a ’scenario’ of dollar demise has become not only plausible in the mainstream view of the future, but scenario thinking is being used as a way to consider the nature of this outcome, and how best to respond without predicting the outcome either way. As recently as directly pre-credit crunch, the media question would have been: ‘what is the best prediction for the dollar (or the housing market, or credit default swaps?) and that, rather then scoping out the implications of the lesser-likelihood, would have dominated the discussion.

So, what struck me forcefully in the Business Week video interview above, where BW Chief Economist Mike Mandel interviews the news magazine’s Economics Editor Peter Coy (see Coy’s underlying story here), is how the less-likely, non-predicted, but very significant outcome is actively addressed:

Says Coy: “It’s so hard to know what the dollar is going to do. We don’t argue that we know… what we do is we say, ‘it could happen’ and let’s take that possibility seriously, in the same way we should have taken the possibility of falling housing prices seriously…”

This is not formal scenario-building of course. But it is, fundamentally an adoption of the framework, saying in the classic ’scenarios’ way: “we can’t predict if it will happen or it won’t, but if it does it will have significant impact. So let’s just ask: ‘what if ‘ it does and explore the outcomes and our responses. What will the word look like? What would be the implications, the knock-ons and spinoffs? If it comes to pass, what would be wish we had done today?”

Perhaps failing to predict the credit crunch has dented predictors’ halos enough to cause a mini-zeitgeist-shift towards the only real way to cope with important uncertainty: exploring all outcomes that pass the plausibility and significance test, whether or not we actually believe they will happen.

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The sustained market rally, with stocks up over 40% on average since the lows in March 2009 (The Dow Jones Industrial Average was about 6,500 in March 09; it is now about 9,500) is taken to be a forecast that real future economic recovery is on the horizon. But is the market a reliable forecaster of anything? That is, from the perspective of real industry and strategic foresight professionals, using hard-won, battle-tested approaches to anticipating future outcomes, should we factor the market’s direction into our expectations of the economic future?

DJIA since Sept '08

The answer is, broadly, yes. Stocks are shares in the future earnings of a company. They are therefore a “bet” on (er, an “investment” in) the future performance of a company, or many companies. The trading price on any day is the price at which there are as many buyers as sellers for these future returns. Rising prices mean there are more buyers than sellers, that means general expectation of future profits is going up. Investors are putting a higher price on the future.

The market is therefore considered a leading indicator of economic conditions. (By contrast, employment figures are lagging indicators — due frictional forces, not to mention morality, it takes companies a while to downsize in recessions or upscale in booms, so employment levels track economic conditions but with a delay.)

But how valid and dependable is the market as a leading indicator? It is also apparent that markets move up slowly and steadily, but fall in a hurry. So the downward move can hardly be held to be predictive. But the upward move appears to hold some weight as harbinger of better times. How much weight?

What’s particularly important is that the aggregate insight into future returns from shareholding investments — across many investors and many stocks — cancels out individual errors. Any one person may have a dumb idea of the ‘future cash flows’ from one or many companies, and the price of any one company may be unreliable for innumerable reasons, including fraud, but the knowledge and intelligence of hundreds of thousands of people, when aggregated and spread over many thousands of stocks, corrects for all these errors. It becomes robust.

Prediction Markets

This reliability of shared, aggregated insight — the wisdom of crowds — is precisely what makes ‘prediction markets’ such a powerful forecasting tool, as I have mentioned in previous posts. (Prediction markets apply market-like wisdom to create foresight in areas that are not normally ‘tradeable.’) Any one person will, as likely as not, get it wrong, but everyone together, rather astoundingly, get it right.

Ironically, crowd wisdom is much more reliable than the technical forecasting models that investment institutions use to try to determine how business, macroeconomic, interest rate, or other conditions will affect future stock prices. These predictions, based on the assumptions of a handful of model programmers and/or model users, are deeply vulnerable because there is no crowd-wisdom balance. It’s no better than reading tea leaves, only apparently (and unaccountably) more respectable.

Having said all this, it is well known that the ‘crowd,’ aka the ‘herd’ can and do all get it wrong together. This is what happens in price bubbles, or panic market exits, with everyone buying or selling because they are making the same wrong assumptions, or just doing what everyone else appears to be doing. (Most players making the same mistake together is the basic problem when prediction markets fail too.)

However, what is clear is this case is there was a very hard sell-off in the months prior to March 09, following revelations of the gravity of the Credit Crunch, but that this has slide has been arrested and mostly reversed. This says that innumerable smart people with, collectively, billions of dollars at stake, are expecting future profits higher than they did in March. That’s a prediction one can rely on.

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Listening to the radio this morning there was a review that quoted a news room adage — one that I am indeed old enough to remember from my days as a newspaper reporter — which is: “if it bleeds, it leads.”

That is: disaster, mayhem, and death goes to the top of the page and towards the front of the newspaper.**

“If it bleeds, it leads” can be interpreted more or less narrowly. Mostly it means, literally, that accidents, explosions, injuries, and deaths will take page priority in the news over “talking stories” about politics and government and society. Disasters sell more newspapers than policy debates. But more generally it means bad news is more arresting and interesting, and will get more attention (and, again, sell more newspapers or gather more listeners and viewers) than good news, therefore it takes priority.

Now, if you were a ‘forecasting pundit’ or a think tank, or investment institution with an interest in getting media attention for yourself, which route would you choose in garnering media exposure? Good news or bad news?

Bad news. Of course. Russian Professor Igor Panarin gets an insane amount of publicity because his book claims that the United States could collapse soon (in two months time, I believe.) Ditto asset manager, Egon von Greyerz, who bangs on, for example saying: “America is hemorrhaging financially and economically. Other countries now realize they hold ‘worthless’ US dollars” in a piece called: The Dark Years Are Here. And just in case you think these are all gloomy foreigners, consider how Bronx boy, Gerald Celente, has dominated media coverage in the credit-crunch era predicting doom-and-gloom in every way, including riots and revolution on U.S. streeets within in the Obama-presidency term. For example http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=46MEqEgdLTg

These are just three that I single out just to make the point, but they are not different from many hundreds that trawl for media attention by predicting, essentially … “bleeding.” In fact, the real future will have good and bad in balance, just like the past. One of the lessons of Future Savvy is: if a prediction bleeds, it probably shouldn’t lead your thinking.

** In fact, the task of deciding what story to lead page one (or any other page) with, and what other stories to run, in what order, and at what length, is one of the more intellectually demanding tasks around, and one that quality journalist take seriously. So, “if it bleeds, it leads” is, in part, cynical journalist-ese for saying that the popular audience doesn’t have the time, patience, or interest in the deeper issues.

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In all the predictions of the future that I have ever read or heard, and all the scenarios I have been exposed to, it’s almost unheard of to see one that says “the squeezed middle class keeps their eye on a good deal, as they always have.”

I’m thinking about this as I see the Guardian today featuring a story about how “Poundland” has doubled it’s profits. Poundland is a copy-cat of the venerable US institution, the “dollar store,” where everything cost the same price, in this case £1.

Pic: Andrew Fox, The Guardian, August 4, 2009

The merchandising of these stores is not unsubtle. There are definite too-good-to-be-true loss leaders, but these more than offset by the many items that cost pennies wholesale. Fair enough. And recently reported doubling of profits is because more people are buying at these stores (downshifting) due to recessionarly squeeze and/or because of the current “sense of thrift” in the zeitgeist which makes pennywatching more “the done thing.”

But neither merchandising, nor consumer psychology is our primary concern here. From a foresight point of view, the point is that forecasts of 2010 that were around around a decade or two ago didn’t quite get around to saying anything about Poundstretcher leading a healthy economic life. It’s as unsexy as anything, compared to “peak oil” or advancing “singularity,” or nano-babble, and so on into the glorious future – or its polar alternative: crash & burn, soup kitchens, urban warlords rampaging, and so on.

But here we are coming to the end of the decade and a basic retailing gimmick for the squeezed middle-class consumer is well trafficked and very much part of the future. Yes, it’s success correlates with tougher times, but economic cycles will be with us repeatedly through the rest of the century and beyond.

This doesn’t mean there won’t be breakthroughs in technology or in consumer behavior. In fact, looking at the picture, one surely would not have got a pound for any amount of plain bottled water in a retail environment 20 years ago. Things do change. They just change slowly, or unevenly, against the gritty reality of savvy agregate choices made by a wary (global and growing) middle class.

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