Bears are in a surprise squeeze. Not so long ago it was rebound-optimist Jon Corzine of MF Global publicly taking the hit that many others were privately taking too.

It’s certainly not news that markets don’t behave as expected, nor that emotion drives decisions, but Joan Foltz, author of  Market Whipped: And Not By Choice (Alsek, 2012) suggests something further: that we are going through a basic shift in how markets work and therefore how to succeed in them.

She says the financial markets have become a MMORPG, that is, a “massive multiplayer online role-playing game.” In gamer world, a MMORPG is a vast virtual world where an effectively unlimited number of players assume characters and interact with each other in a persistent and ever-evolving “reality.”

The same computation and virtualization platform technologies that have produced game worlds also underpin financial markets, and are therefore unsurprisingly producing similar effects.

Buy a stock and you have entered a virtual arena of realms and battles, with characters taking roles in stories that play out over a known (to insiders) time period. There are masters and magicians and druids and emporers, and who knows what else, all gaming for your money. Play the game right, and you win theirs.

Says Foltz: “Keep the market in mind as you go through this list of features:

• a massive base of online players who create a dynamic environment that requires extremely complex strategies and sharp analytical skills.
• an extensive systems architecture with multiple regions and restricted levels of access, all of which are usually controlled by a Game Master.
• an online location that blurs the real and virtual worlds, where human and computerized players interact with real money that transfers into virtual currencies.
• automated programs (bots) that create situations to trig­ger reactions from other players.
• players who are classified by attributes, powers, and capabilities, which limit their territories.
• players who can take on multiple characters, each with a unique mission.
• social interaction that immerses players in role-playing opportunities.”

Who are the characters in the game? High-frequency traders, hedge funds, corporations, pension funds, celebrity investors, the media, the government, to name just the obvious ones.

Into this world walk investors who think the markets are what they used to be, and work how they used to work – that they are understandable through due-diligence in research, and winnable by well-considered valuations or by technical analysis. No surprise that they find themselves surprised. In gamer world, nothing is as it appears and nothing works out as expected.

Game on

Foltz’s argument is that traders of all stripes improve their results by acknowledging market MMORPG and thinking like a gamer. That is, seeking to understand where the battle is at any time; recognizing who battles whom, under what conditions, and for how long; knowing who the strongmen are in their realm and what story is playing out.

Investors should know their own token in the game, its attributes and ammunition, as well as its limitations. This will improve judgment of where to be, when to come and go (market timing), and encourage quick exits from realms that are best left to more powerful, and perhaps, darker forces.

The book itself has a chaotic, breathless, aspect, and is marred by a tendency to conspiracy theory. But it does provide a productive analogy that sheds light on unchartered territory. In other words, it does what “futurists” should do when they do their job right: identify and illuminate a change in the world, and describe why assumptions and practices that worked in the past may fail going forward.

Herman Kahn

Interesting times we live in, when most of the world’s business media has a front-page tab on their Web sites that says something like “Euro Crisis – Live – Follow Here” as if there was a hostage drama or bank heist on the go.

Perhaps it is a bank heist of sorts, in the frantic run up this week and next to the Brussels summit in on 8-9 December, where the 27 Eurozone leaders are expected to make some binding, if not bold, decisions.

There has been short-term market relief following the US and China’s undertakings to make dollars more easily available into the European banking system. But everyone knows that liquidity, while a problem in itself, is a symptom of the larger problem of sovereign debt. And sovereign debt is only a problem when lenders don’t see future growth such that loan capital looks safe at less than, say, 7%.

In the world of foresight we talk about the need to “think the unthinkable,” a phrase coined about Herman Kahn in the 1960s when he was making scenarios about the road to US-Soviet thermonuclear war. So I was curious to see this exact phrase pop up in various media analyses where implications of Euro-demise, such as redenomination risk, cross-border contract liability, and so on are getting a thinking through, at least in the media, for example here in the WSJ.

Adaptive Measures

This is scenario planning “lite”: thinking down the path to, and implications of, a plausible operating environment — even if it is highly unlikely — and determining best responses, necessary hedges, and other adaptive measures. (Non-lite would be to do the background work, not just the journalistic summary.)

As the unthinkable forces itself to be thought, even the Corporate Executive Board was motivated to put the injunction to their executive partners as follows: ”As the threat of a potential euro zone breakup looms, we strongly advise companies to enhance their scenario planning disciplines. Leading companies in our network begin by documenting project assumptions and building scenarios off of those variables to test profitability under a range of outcomes before committing capital.”

But to this they add the intelligent real-world rider, often missed by scenario-ists: ”Don’t make the mistake of assuming that entire projects, P&L’s, or budgets need to be reconfigured under volatile outcomes. Instead, build your contingency plans around critical, controllable line items.”

The new axis in world diplomacy and global leadership flexes its muscles next week on Hainan Island – the southernmost tip of China – with the BRICS summit on April 14 in Sanya, and the Boao Forum the following day.

BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) is already something of a “G5” of non-Western nations. Next week its leaders (China’s Hu Jintao, Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff, Russia’s Dmitry Medvedev, India’s Manmohan Singh, and South Africa’s Jacob Zuma) will set themselves to discuss their joint concerns in international affairs, economics, development, trade, security, etc.

More than anything, the event signals growing intention to coordinate views and act in closer alignment, and press towards future empowerment and responsibility of non-Western world leaders. Political clout has always gone with economic clout, and in this respect the future can be depended on to “rhyme” with the past.

BRICS countries already account for 40% of global population and 20% of global GDP – and they are the nations expected to grow most rapidly in GDP terms in the next decade and beyond, and to provide primary succor to neighbors in their regions.

Hainan 2011 is the third summit of the BRIC countries. The acronym BRIC was coined by Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS) in 2001 in a chicken-and-egg prophesy: causing Russia, China, Brazil and India to see their interests as potentially aligned, and politically worth aligning. South Africa was accepted into the group in February.

Without stopping for breath, the diplomatic caravan moves 125 miles overnight up the coast of Hainan Island to Boao, where President Hu will give the keynote address the next day at the annual Boao Forum for Asia (BFA).

Boao is an undisguised knock-off of the World Economic Forum in Davos (with skiing replaced by snorkeling perhaps): a high-level gathering for policy and business influencers, with a similar nudge-and-influence mandate, here with an Asian focus. In attendence, in addition the the BRICS representatives, will be by Korea’s Kim Hwang-Sik, Spain’s Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, Ukrainian’s Mikola Azarov, and New Zealand’s Bill English.

But, making one of the classic mistakes of technology-driven futures thinking, Clarke lets his technological imagination blur basic insight into human nature and social service/product adoption. Specifically, he goes on to say that because of communications technology advances, “the city of 2000 may not even exist at all. The traditional role of the city as meeting place for a man will cease to make any sense.”
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Note the gender paradigm blinkers. But anyway – the end of cities? Fat chance. One of the defining issues of the early 21st century is urban growth and the emergence of  10+ million-population mega-cities. And across the world, a higher proportion of the human population live in cities than at any point in history (and that proportion has just crossed 50% making humans for the first time a primarily urban species.) Hello? Arthur?

Urban concentrations 2007. Source: The Guardian

Why the miscue? First Clarke makes the classic error of holding key variables still while running technology forward. The key variable here is population growth. The number of people on the planet has doubled, at least, since 1964.

But that population could all be comfortably telecommuting from rural idylls, so there is another problem. Clarke fails to factor in social and economic pressures which sometimes run counter to technology advancement or, as in this case, merely absorb technology shift with no change. No matter how good communications get, nothing in the information-communications revolution has changed the age-old social truth that proximity matters. It matters to community welfare. It matters to social opportunities. It matters to  career advancement, and so on. It mattered in the past. It will matter in the future. That’s why people are in jam-packed into into Los Angeles and São Paulo and Johannesburg and Seoul, etc., but not Tahiti.
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Controversy has resulted from lack of transparency in the tests, leading to speculation that they are designed to have most banks “pass” in order to boost confidence — as clear an example of mixing up judgment and advocacy as one is likely to get.

The key measure for determining which of the 91 banks fail the test — and need to raise capital — is whether their Tier 1 capital ratio would fall below 6% under the “loss assumptions” imposed by the test. This is the same level that was required in the stress tests of U.S. banks in its similar May 2010 test.

Model worlds

Anyhow, what is particularly interesting to this author is that the concept “scenario planning” has not been used through the bank test process, but these tests are fundamentally future scenarios, this is what scenarios are all about: creating model future worlds that express the evolution of important uncertainties towards somewhere at the limits (but not beyond) of plausibility, with the specific intent to use these worlds to stress test current decisions as to what a company is and does — from its business model to its resource base to product line to marketing, and so on.

If the organization’s key decisions would hold up (produce profitability or however success is defined) in different, alternative tests, this tells managers theirs are probably good decisions for the future. If they would flop in any test, this points to what needs to be urgently addressed. In this way an organization explores and becomes robust to its unknowable and unpredictable future.

Notably, it is precisely the stress-test purpose of scenarios that stops this foresight technique becoming (as it does all-too-often in the wrong hands) a “wishing well” for better times. When scenarios cease to be direct stress tests of present decisions, they become floaty indeed.

Full scenarios

Having said all this, the difference between the US and European banking stress tests and full scenario work is the bank tests are considering only economic factors, only adverse (risk) conditions, and only “known unknowns.” Full scenarios would include the full range of important drivers of change — and potential surprises — outside of economics or finance in their construction. In operating as stress tests, they would look at threats to the status quo as the bank tests do, but also provide a testbed for exploring opportunities in change.

I was lucky enough to be asked to do the opening address at the conference, and even luckier in that this Web site: South Africa – The Good News summarized some of what I and others said:

“Adam Gordon, Foresight Project Director and author of “Future Savvy” gave us some pointers:

1. Beware of sector experts, they are deeply entrenched in the present.
2. The consumer and choice is the determinant, not technology.
3. Change is about overestimating followed by underestimating.
4. Trends are patterns in the data, behind the trend are enablers and drivers, but frictional forces exist and in front of the trend are turners and blockers.
5. Trend extrapolation is limited, don’t fall foul of the turkey syndrome.
6. There is well behaved and badly behaved change. Both can be predictable and unpredictable. The potential of sudden shifts always lurks.
7. Scenario planning wraps up the key uncertainties over which we have no control.

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“The ‘BIG’ question he asks is ‘when do we influence the future and when do we adapt?’ There are big predictable forces out there (like population growth / the diminishing availability of oil etc), and there are big unpredictable forces out there (ja, well no fine!). Importantly, we can design our ability to influence and we can design the way we adapt. It is critical that we are able to do both.

“But managing the future is more than just about scenario planning, it is also about the implementation of the plan. It is about developing a methodology that prioritises, engages with stakeholders, and enables proactive actions on the ground.

So how?

Some important considerations (from various speakers):

1. Often we know what causes the problem (poverty, crime, HIV) but we don’t know what to do about it.
2. Often the logic that gives rise to the problem is not the logic that will solve the problem.
3. Mostly the problem does not contain the makings of the solution.
4. Solutions in one area can exacerbate problems in another.
5. The current situation has momentum, change to the system should happen concurrently not suddenly.

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“What is critical is the foresight process, it must be well-informed so that the implementation strategies that follow have buy-in, are doable, are relevant and far-reaching. There is a very real danger of visions being disconnected, unachievable and, at the end of the day, a pipe-dream.”

Dr Elizabeth Dostal talked of a stakeholder democracy in which she promoted the design of a matrix that recognised different stakeholder levels on the vertical axis and different environmental dimensions on the horizontal axis. A multi-level, multi-dimensional model.

“Imagine” she said, “putting four Nobel Peace laureates together and asking them what the causes of global conflict are. One may argue poverty, another ideology, another resources, and another greed. In no time, they would all be in different silo’s defending their view, in one sense they are all right, but in another sense they have not looked at the whole picture. A multi-level, multi-dimensional model would reveal this, the gaps in their logic, and the opportunities for agreement.”

In a fascinating recent development, John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Richard Lugar, Republican of Indiana, introduced the Start-up Visa Act to the US Senate, as reported in Inc. magazine.

The legislation is a forward-looking bid to turbo-charge entrepreneurial venturing in the U.S. by attracting foreign entrepreneurs and connecting them to U.S. capital, therein driving new economic growth and local jobs. What’s really interesting is it goes against past common wisdom that recessions are ‘bad for immigration’ (as citizens demand job protection.)

If passed, the bill gives U.S. visas to foreigners who can raise $100,000 from an angel investor or $250,000 from a qualified VC firm. After two years, if the immigrant entrepreneur can create five or more jobs (excluding family), attract an additional $1 million in investment, or produce $1 million in revenue, he or she gets a green card (permanent residency.)

The only current option, the EB-5 business investment visa, requires immigrants to invest at least $1 million in the U.S. and employ 10 people.

Job creation

The  National Venture Capital Association says 25 percent of America’s venture-backed, publicly-traded businesses, incl. Google, Yahoo!, eBay and Intel have been founded or co-founded by immigrants. According to Richard Herman, author of Immigrant, Inc.: Why Immigrant Entrepreneurs Are Driving the New Economy, nearly all U.S. job creation in the past 20 years has come from companies less than five years old.

The history of US immigration policy has been schizophrenic to say the least, with periods of great social openness followed by about-face door slamming. The slamming has always corresponded to economic downturns or anxiety thereto. But here we have the opposite effect. And we have legislators taking a forward view! Both proof that the future is sure to surprise us.

Charles Munger

First, let me say, what I like about investors (and managers and entrepreneurs) with long-term track records of success, is it means — it must mean, by definition — they have a high quality view of the future. Not only a high-quality view, but a high quality view that renews itself. There is no doubt that Berkshire Hathaway has consistently over time had a better view of the future than most expert forecasters, policy pundits, and futurists. The record is clear.

Anyway, Munger this week offers a parable about Basicland, a C18 Pacific island colonized by Europeans where: “Property rights were greatly respected and strongly enforced. The banking system was simple… Almost no debt was used to purchase or carry securities or other investments, including real estate and tangible personal property…  Speculation in Basicland’s security and commodity markets was always rigorously discouraged and remained small…

“(But) as their affluence and leisure time grew, Basicland’s citizens more and more whiled away their time in the excitement of casino gambling… Many of the gamblers were highly talented engineers attracted partly by casino poker but mostly by bets available in the bucket shop systems, with the bets now called “financial derivatives.”

And so it goes on, telling the history of America and the route to the Credit Crunch, and potential for new misery going forward, via this parable. He uses the parable as parables have always been used, to say something in ‘make-believe-land’ that cannot be said (or will not be heard) in reality. The folly of Basicland’s citizens and government is much easier to acknowledge than our own. Scenarios of the future are similar in function, similarly allowing mental and institutional ‘permission’ to think the unthinkable and ‘say the unsayable.

The worst investor in America

Munger wouldn’t be the first to say: “Change yer ways or ye be doomed.” Isaiah and many before and since have said that. Nor would he be the first old white guy to espouse traditional ways of doing things. We factor that in. But he does look to basics and basics are important in having a high-quality view of the future. They signal the limits of the excess and reversion-to-the-mean imperatives.

I remember in the 1990s, when I was living in Washington DC, and Warren Buffet was “the worst investor in America” for missing out on the dot.com boom and Nasdaq bonanza. He just stuck to his guns saying, time after time, ‘there are no fundamentals behind these valuations (aka, this is just a casino) and fundamentals will prevail, which of course they did.

Now the brains at Berkshire Hathaway are saying that forums where risk, debt, currencies, etc., are up for speculation are ‘casinos,’ and their players therefore gamblers (rather than, as they would have it, ‘investors), and that they produce little fundamental value and fundamentals will prevail.

Toyota President Akio Toyoda, Feb 11, 2010. Pic: AP

Lean manufacturing creates efficiencies and shaves production costs by creating just-in-time — no inventory — systems, using common parts and designs across product lines, and generally squeezing materials, processes, and (inevitably) quality controls. This may or may not include pressing suppliers to lower prices, and therefore squeeze their own materials, processes, and quality controls. ‘Lean’ has been very much a core process and operations mantra for about two decades. To misquote a favorite saying, manufacturing companies have been adamant: ‘one can never be too rich or too lean.’

But now Toyota has had a slew of embarrassing recalls — the 2010 Highlander; 2008 – 2010 Sequoia SUVs; and 2009 – 2010 RAV4′s due to gas pedal problems. It has just recalled 437,000 Prius and other hybrid vehicles worldwide to fix brake problems. In 2009 it recalled Corolla, Camry, Vios and Yaris sedans due to faulty electric window-control systems.

The point of the WSJ piece is to implicate lean manufacturing in this. (It’s unclear whether it’s too much lean or too little quality control, but they are clearly connected.) Now, lean as an idea is not going to go away. Nobody is suddenly going to advocate ‘bloat manufacturing,’ but looking at the damage in reputation and bottom line that Toyota has soaked up, the company and others like it will obviously looking across their lines and saying to themselves ‘a bit of redundancy (fat, if you like) in the system will be cheaper than this.’ Thus the pendulum swings back from lean extreme to somewhere a bit more durable. A happy medium.

Maharaj Mac

In the other story, the Times reports how McDonalds is seeing benefits from localization of it’s menu, for example, offering the McItaly in Italy, the (non-beef) Maharaja Mac in India, the McLobster in Canada and the Ebi Filit-O (shrimp burger) in Japan. The pendulum effect here is that McDo became the mega-corporation it is based on global standardization and a ‘one-menu’ mantra from Cleveland to Taipei. It wasn’t just one menu, but each item had to be produced from the same stock, and in the same way. McDo fries were identical everywhere, that was the guarantee (and they were always called ‘fries’ no matter what locals called them.)

It is now become common cause among the global food companies (notably Starbucks and KFC) to work local options into their offering. One may think this is merely ‘think global, act local.’ The point is, it is an about-turn indeed from the ‘think American, act global’ that went before. What works best is in fact a happy medium.

What does this have to do with better future-thinking? Expect a recall sooner or later on forecasts that don’t see change resolving itself around a happy medium.

So to the Copenhagen climate change summit, and all the luminaries and dignitaries and celebrities landing at København airport, many of them in private jets.

http://www.cph.dk/CPH/DK/MAIN

This tells us something about the future, and what it says is: ‘needs must.’ What are they going to do, row a boat to Copenhagen? Scale that up and you have the real, actual future. People will fly. In fact the entire new global middle class of billions will fly. And they will heat their homes. And they will eat meat, and so on. And any even remotely democratic system that tries to take away this will be out on its ear.

But we will of course move to cleaner, renewable, sustainable systems. How fast this happens depends essentially on money, which in turn depends on political will, which in turn depends on public concern. Money is required to fund new energy technology research, and — the core issue of Copenhagen this week — it is needed to buy off industrializing countries.

There’s no doubt that climate change (manmade or not) is real, and a real danger. But when scientists and academics are worried about it that means little in terms of changes to human practices. When the public gets concerned — as they now are — we get the possibility of fundamental change. This is true of the future generally, not just climate and the environment.

Between the public sentiment and the money lies political will. Essentially the political will of post-industrial economies on the one side, who find it politically easy, relatively, to pay the price of emissions constraints vs. that of developing economies which will be choked economically and therefore politically by those constraints.

Inequality

Correlating degrees warming with ecological and therefore social upheaval is important. But to think that is what the argument is about is to miss the point. The point is global inequality and its future, and how developing economies are not going to allow emissions constraints to further entrench it.

The future goes always to the most powerful side. That’s what power is for: determining the future. The sides are both strong in this dispute, so this battle will not be won or lost in Copenhagen this week. We are still in its early stages. The effects of climate change are incremental (unlike, say, nuclear holocaust) meaning there is plenty of room for postponement even if the planet can’t and won’t ultimately take it. And those who would occupy the moral high ground have burned public and private jet fuel to be there to do it, and will no doubt indulge in a bit of Smørrebrød and Frikadeller too. Needs must.

So expect the political clock to remain stuck as it has been for a while now, at ’5 minutes to midnight,’ while the issue smolders slowly without definitive resolution — until technology advances get human energy, finally, off fossil fuels and the problem works its way out of environmental and human systems.

Keynesian or saltwater economics by contrast holds that free markets often behave irrationally and inefficiently, and therefore need corrective policy from government. Saltwater economists say people and institutions often behave in ways contrary to the general good, or in ways that can bring markets (on which they depend) to their knees. Sound familiar?

Anyway, a recent Knowledge@Wharton article comments: “Like a natural science, freshwater economics lends itself to complex, often elegant mathematical modeling. The freshwater view is that consumers, offered an array of choices, will select the one that is best for them — a straightforward assertion that can be neatly expressed in mathematical formulae.

“In contrast, many assertions made in behavioral economics are more challenging to express mathematically. ‘Behavioralists’ argue that consumers don’t always act in their own interests, especially when they fail to understand the choices on offer or succumb to irrational impulses involving those choices… but such impulses are inherently vague and difficult to define.”

Cognitive bias

In other words mathematically modeling the economic future is possible if humans and the markets they create are rational, but far less possible if we act irrationally.

Now, as elaborated in Future Savvy, the fact that humans make irrational choices due to many cognitive biases and heuristics  is indisputable, not least since the work of  Tversky and Kahneman. Biases and heuristics such as “anchoring,” “recency effect,” “personal validation fallacy,” “herd mentality,” and so on, in which people make irrational choices, are well documented.

That’s why mathematical projections of economic behavior are unreliable. The economy may be counted in numbers, but it is still a human system, with associated inefficiency and irrationality. Blow this little debate in economic forecasting up large, and you have the essential problem with quantitative forecasting of any type. It assumes, erroneously, a freshwater view of humanity.

Well, this raises the question of whether the past tells us anything about the future, and if so what? There’s a common wisdom attributed to Mark Twain (why is it that aphorisms are always attributed to Twain or Winston Churchill?) that goes: “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes,” and this is the position that most educated future-thinkers would hold.

So what would the ‘rhyme’ be? From cases such as Argentina, Russia, South Africa, and many developing world countries over the past 50 years: lenders loose confidence in a country’s ability to repay on its national bonds and stop lending; the country is faced with a choice of drastic spending cuts (great social and humanitarian cost) or major tax increases (pointless, because it stifles business, therefore lowers tax revenue) or default. Going broke, into national “Chapter 11,” suing for time and ‘debt restructuring’ becomes the best among the bad options event though it pretty much ensures a deep and dark recession.
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Thinking the unthinkable

Could this be the future of America? As I’ve written before here and other places, after the ‘unimaginable’ Credit Crunch was ignored due to its ‘low probability,’ it’s a relief to know that remote but plausible outcomes with serious consequences are getting attention, at least in the Washington Post.

Clearly major economies are in a more precarious situation than they were 5 years ago. Too much debt is always precarious, for the smallest household or the biggest country alike. On the other hand, an economy’s size and enduring wealth counts too. As Samuelson observes, it created the unexpected effect in Japan’s case where debt at 200% of GDP (America’s is currently about 40%) should have raised the cost of its debt (lower confidence of repayment) but this hasn’t happened because domestic Japanese households and businesses rather than foreigners have easily (and confidently) bought the debt — and this may well hold true for the U.S. too. In other words, the rhyme may go this way.

The ‘more likely’ future is incremental raising of taxes and lowering of public service provision as Western economies incrementally claw their way back to stability. But at least this default wild card on the margins of plausibility has the oxygen of some attention and this is no bad thing. As with all good foresight work, it predicts nothing, but it does allow us to think through the roadmap to the outcome, and press for the right decisions now, in plenty of time and in a measured way.

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Birk commends Roach for being one of the few to have predicted the Credit Crunch problems, to which Roach demurs in saying he was “too early”. He then furthers his modesty in saying that the “breakage” in the financial system was “in excess of anything I envisioned.”

Self-deprecation in assessing one’s predictive abilities will endear anyone to me. Even Roach, who later in the interview burns this hard-won credibility by laying the blame for the credit crunch at the door of regulators, forgetting how hard financial institutions lobbied regulators for greater freedoms in the 1990s.

But I digress. The predictive issues the interview raises are as follows. Issue one: it’s not enough (as any stock short-seller will confirm) to get the direction of a future change right. One must get the timing right too. Issue two: it’s not enough to anticipate a change. One must be able to judge it’s impact. Getting either timing or impact wrong is effectively to have missed the future.

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Probability

On the latter topic — the problem of impact — Nassim Taleb is unrelenting, and he is right. Analysts routinely mix up probability and impact. They think that because an event has a low probability (‘it would be a 10-sigma event!’) it can be marginalized in the predictive number crunching. Of course, it can’t. The low-probability of a wildcard or black swan event is irrelevant because when it happens it will change the game, and that’s why, in every predictive situation of reasonable complexity and uncertainty, using statistical extrapolations (regressions and so on) to predict, is to dangerously paper over the cracks. It is precisely the cracks that businesses and policy makers need to worry about.

Determining the direction of change is hard enough. Assessing timing or extent of impact — a ‘total future impact index’ — is wickedly difficult. It’s a task not to be underestimated, and to simply extrapolate current trends (= assuming the trend’s timeline and impact stay the same as in the past) is the royal road to underestimating it.

This is the reason foresight for complex, uncertain, changing situations can only be grasped by NOT predicting (quantitatively or otherwise) but by exploring the limit-conditions of the plausible (What would happen if the timing of the change accelerated, or was significantly delayed? What if  the impact was 10x or one tenth of what we expect? And so on.)

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Predictions of the dollar’s demise are as old as the greenback itself of course, but over recent weeks the specter of the dollar heading way way below its trading range — a dollar crunch — has entered the zone of the credible, or, in scenario terms, the ‘cone of plausible uncertainty.’ That means decision-makers with lots at stake are taking it seriously.

Like the British pound, the dollar has been under a cloud due to perceptions of economic fallout from the credit crunch and global recession, but particular questions about the US currency have recently surfaced, driven by reports [Robert Fisk's 'The Demise of the Dollar' story in The Independent (Oct 6)]  that “Gulf Arabs are planning – along with China, Russia, Japan and France – to end dollar dealings for oil, moving instead to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan, the euro, gold and a new, unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council” (Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar).

The subtext is far from merely financial. Practically, it would mean that on any day, the real cost of oil to US consumers and businesses would go up or down depending on the strength of the currency. This is something America is not used to. But, more deeeply, dropping dollar-denomination of oil is a direct shot across the bows of Washington’s say over oil affairs, and the hegemony of the dollar as the dominant global reserve currency.

De-dollarizing oil would not in itself push the US currency below its 25-year range. But it is portentous of the clear trend to a genuinely multi-power world, for better or worse, in which the dollar will get no favors. That will push the dollar down, at least while the news and fallout make their way through the financial and real economic systems.

Rumors of de-dollarization have been hotly denied, as further reported here, but as the Independent points out, denials are to be expected, and are always issued in these situations. They mean nothing. Even cub reporters know that.

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Scenario thinking

What’s particularly interesting to me is that a ‘scenario’ of dollar demise has become not only plausible in the mainstream view of the future, but scenario thinking is being used as a way to consider the nature of this outcome, and how best to respond without predicting the outcome either way. As recently as directly pre-credit crunch, the media question would have been: ‘what is the best prediction for the dollar (or the housing market, or credit default swaps?) and that, rather then scoping out the implications of the lesser-likelihood, would have dominated the discussion.

So, what struck me forcefully in the Business Week video interview above, where BW Chief Economist Mike Mandel interviews the news magazine’s Economics Editor Peter Coy (see Coy’s underlying story here), is how the less-likely, non-predicted, but very significant outcome is actively addressed:

Says Coy: “It’s so hard to know what the dollar is going to do. We don’t argue that we know… what we do is we say, ‘it could happen’ and let’s take that possibility seriously, in the same way we should have taken the possibility of falling housing prices seriously…”

This is not formal scenario-building of course. But it is, fundamentally an adoption of the framework, saying in the classic ‘scenarios’ way: “we can’t predict if it will happen or it won’t, but if it does it will have significant impact. So let’s just ask: ‘what if ‘ it does and explore the outcomes and our responses. What will the word look like? What would be the implications, the knock-ons and spinoffs? If it comes to pass, what would be wish we had done today?”

Perhaps failing to predict the credit crunch has dented predictors’ halos enough to cause a mini-zeitgeist-shift towards the only real way to cope with important uncertainty: exploring all outcomes that pass the plausibility and significance test, whether or not we actually believe they will happen.

DJIA since Sept '08

The answer is, broadly, yes. Stocks are shares in the future earnings of a company. They are therefore a “bet” on (er, an “investment” in) the future performance of a company, or many companies. The trading price on any day is the price at which there are as many buyers as sellers for these future returns. Rising prices mean there are more buyers than sellers, that means general expectation of future profits is going up. Investors are putting a higher price on the future.

The market is therefore considered a leading indicator of economic conditions. (By contrast, employment figures are lagging indicators — due frictional forces, not to mention morality, it takes companies a while to downsize in recessions or upscale in booms, so employment levels track economic conditions but with a delay.)

But how valid and dependable is the market as a leading indicator? It is also apparent that markets move up slowly and steadily, but fall in a hurry. So the downward move can hardly be held to be predictive. But the upward move appears to hold some weight as harbinger of better times. How much weight?

What’s particularly important is that the aggregate insight into future returns from shareholding investments — across many investors and many stocks — cancels out individual errors. Any one person may have a dumb idea of the ‘future cash flows’ from one or many companies, and the price of any one company may be unreliable for innumerable reasons, including fraud, but the knowledge and intelligence of hundreds of thousands of people, when aggregated and spread over many thousands of stocks, corrects for all these errors. It becomes robust.

Prediction Markets

This reliability of shared, aggregated insight — the wisdom of crowds — is precisely what makes ‘prediction markets’ such a powerful forecasting tool, as I have mentioned in previous posts. (Prediction markets apply market-like wisdom to create foresight in areas that are not normally ‘tradeable.’) Any one person will, as likely as not, get it wrong, but everyone together, rather astoundingly, get it right.

Ironically, crowd wisdom is much more reliable than the technical forecasting models that investment institutions use to try to determine how business, macroeconomic, interest rate, or other conditions will affect future stock prices. These predictions, based on the assumptions of a handful of model programmers and/or model users, are deeply vulnerable because there is no crowd-wisdom balance. It’s no better than reading tea leaves, only apparently (and unaccountably) more respectable.

Having said all this, it is well known that the ‘crowd,’ aka the ‘herd’ can and do all get it wrong together. This is what happens in price bubbles, or panic market exits, with everyone buying or selling because they are making the same wrong assumptions, or just doing what everyone else appears to be doing. (Most players making the same mistake together is the basic problem when prediction markets fail too.)

However, what is clear is this case is there was a very hard sell-off in the months prior to March 09, following revelations of the gravity of the Credit Crunch, but that this has slide has been arrested and mostly reversed. This says that innumerable smart people with, collectively, billions of dollars at stake, are expecting future profits higher than they did in March. That’s a prediction one can rely on.

That is: disaster, mayhem, and death goes to the top of the page and towards the front of the newspaper.**

“If it bleeds, it leads” can be interpreted more or less narrowly. Mostly it means, literally, that accidents, explosions, injuries, and deaths will take page priority in the news over “talking stories” about politics and government and society. Disasters sell more newspapers than policy debates. But more generally it means bad news is more arresting and interesting, and will get more attention (and, again, sell more newspapers or gather more listeners and viewers) than good news, therefore it takes priority.

Now, if you were a ‘forecasting pundit’ or a think tank, or investment institution with an interest in getting media attention for yourself, which route would you choose in garnering media exposure? Good news or bad news?

Bad news. Of course. Russian Professor Igor Panarin gets an insane amount of publicity because his book claims that the United States could collapse soon (in two months time, I believe.) Ditto asset manager, Egon von Greyerz, who bangs on, for example saying: “America is hemorrhaging financially and economically. Other countries now realize they hold ‘worthless’ US dollars” in a piece called: The Dark Years Are Here. And just in case you think these are all gloomy foreigners, consider how Bronx boy, Gerald Celente, has dominated media coverage in the credit-crunch era predicting doom-and-gloom in every way, including riots and revolution on U.S. streeets within in the Obama-presidency term. For example http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=46MEqEgdLTg

These are just three that I single out just to make the point, but they are not different from many hundreds that trawl for media attention by predicting, essentially … “bleeding.” In fact, the real future will have good and bad in balance, just like the past. One of the lessons of Future Savvy is: if a prediction bleeds, it probably shouldn’t lead your thinking.

** In fact, the task of deciding what story to lead page one (or any other page) with, and what other stories to run, in what order, and at what length, is one of the more intellectually demanding tasks around, and one that quality journalist take seriously. So, “if it bleeds, it leads” is, in part, cynical journalist-ese for saying that the popular audience doesn’t have the time, patience, or interest in the deeper issues.

I’m thinking about this as I see the Guardian today featuring a story about how “Poundland” has doubled it’s profits. Poundland is a copy-cat of the venerable US institution, the “dollar store,” where everything cost the same price, in this case £1.

Pic: Andrew Fox, The Guardian, August 4, 2009

The merchandising of these stores is not unsubtle. There are definite too-good-to-be-true loss leaders, but these more than offset by the many items that cost pennies wholesale. Fair enough. And recently reported doubling of profits is because more people are buying at these stores (downshifting) due to recessionarly squeeze and/or because of the current “sense of thrift” in the zeitgeist which makes pennywatching more “the done thing.”

But neither merchandising, nor consumer psychology is our primary concern here. From a foresight point of view, the point is that forecasts of 2010 that were around around a decade or two ago didn’t quite get around to saying anything about Poundstretcher leading a healthy economic life. It’s as unsexy as anything, compared to “peak oil” or advancing “singularity,” or nano-babble, and so on into the glorious future – or its polar alternative: crash & burn, soup kitchens, urban warlords rampaging, and so on.

But here we are coming to the end of the decade and a basic retailing gimmick for the squeezed middle-class consumer is well trafficked and very much part of the future. Yes, it’s success correlates with tougher times, but economic cycles will be with us repeatedly through the rest of the century and beyond.

This doesn’t mean there won’t be breakthroughs in technology or in consumer behavior. In fact, looking at the picture, one surely would not have got a pound for any amount of plain bottled water in a retail environment 20 years ago. Things do change. They just change slowly, or unevenly, against the gritty reality of savvy agregate choices made by a wary (global and growing) middle class.

There’s an old joke in journalism from the 1970s that goes: “You can write the same headline on any and every story about Israel’s relationship with its neighbors: ‘Prospects for Middle-East Peace Dim.’”

Sure, it’s partly Eeyeore-ish journalist wit. But what’s interesting from a foresight point of view is that, running the world forward 40 years shows it was a reasonable understanding of the future. Why? Solid foresight is always predicated on a solid understanding of the forces for and against change. “Prospects for peace dim” acknowledged that forces and enablers of change were overpowered by what was preventing anything fundamental from happening (friction and blockers in Future Savvy terms.)

The basic truth is that Israel-Middle East is a complex situation characterized by a more-or-less equal balance of power. Israel has military and nuclear superiority, and US backing. Arab countries have oil, population numbers and population growth, and a billion more-or-less sympathetic moslems around the world, and therefore time on their side. They also have, particularly in Gaza, relatively widespread poverty and low welfare and educational development, which is  a force against moderation and therefore a negotiated settlement.

A genuine balance of power means we have equilibrium, and therefore should expect no change. That’s why we’ve had plenty of skirmishes, but no change in 40 years.

Looking out for the next 40 years, is this still the case? Can we write “Prospects for Middle East Peace Dim” on all news stories for another two generations? Following the foresight logic above, this depends on whether anything breaks the fundamental equilibrium. There are four issues apparently large enough to threaten the status quo:

• Water shortages and water conflicts
• Change in US policy
• The end of oil-based transport energy
• Iran going toxic

Water is a favorite of trend-foresight sessions. It sounds like the key issue in a rising-population world. In theory yes, but it’s unclear whether it will lead to anything more than local conflicts or wars, which in Israels case, we have already. On US policy, the Obama administration is attempting to show even-handedness, but its strategic interest lies with Israel as military ally and ideologically temperate (democratic, at least) bastion in the region. So no change there either. On oil, we are definitely in an era where – for security and climate change reasons – fossil fuel is entering it’s twilight phase, which will erode revenues and therefore power of ME Arab states. But, as mentioned earlier, poverty is as great an obstacle to peace as any other. (Remember the Israeli “let’s-grow-our-way-out-of the-situation-together peace platform of the 1990s, seeing tackling the development issues as the root of creating moderate mindsets across the region.)

That leaves Iran which may change the balance if it really goes toxic (develops and uses nuclear weapons in terror strikes.) This is a low futures likelihood – it’s not just luck that nukes have stayed in their box since 1945 – no state wants to carry the stain of the nuclear pariah for all time. There’s a moral blocker on this outcome that has worked for generations. Nuclear powers rattle, but the don’t bite. But … what if the wildcard scenario of a massive nuclear strike on Israeli soft targets were to happen, what then? The current low-grade hostile standoff would become a supernova, but we’d still have power balance, and while we have that we’ll have status quo and  journalists can expect to write “Prospects for Middle East Peace Dim” on top of every story about the region for another 40 years.

They have a bit of the fashionable “SunTzu Art of War” feel to them, and some of the quotes may be apocryphal. But no matter. What’s really interesting in this very savvy list is how customer-focused the lessons are. As said in Future Savvy, and one can’t say it too many times, what customers (users, the public) want and the cost-benefit tradeoffs they will make is a MUCH more reliable guide to the future than any techno-fantasy.

The wisdoms also reflect a foresight industry insider truism and paradox: you seldom get to the future by asking the customer directly (e.g. in a focus group) what they would like to have. You have to leap for the customer (and use focus groups only to refine new offerings.)

The list:

“1. St Augustine said that it is a blessing from God that we can’t predict the future. If we predict prosperity, we will become complacent. If we predict evil, we will lose the ability to discriminate.

2 Sharp President Haruo Tsuji: ‘You cannot find out what the consumer wants only by doing market research. You need to pull the ideas out of your brain. Manufacturers of the future should not simply respond to market demands, they must create market demands.’

3. Konosuke Matsushita said: ‘Don’t try to fit your business to a forecast. Fit it to the needs of your customers.’

4. Toshiba President Sugiichio Watari: ‘Money doesn’t come falling into the headquarters of Toshiba. If you want money you need to go to the customers.’

5. President Yoshio Tateishi of Omron: ‘Learn from your customers. If you learn from internal resources you will become self-satisfied. If you learn from your competitors you will fall far behind.’

6. Professor Yoshiya Teramoto of Meiji Gakuin University: ‘When companies start a big market research project, it is one sign of the ‘big company’ disease.’

7. Tsuyoshi Kawanishi: ‘The way to predict the weather is to look at the sky. And, every once in a while, you can make your prediction by simply thinking.’

8. President Haruo Tsuji of Sharp says: ‘Don’t be a spider, be a honey bee.’

9. Takeshi Kaneda, a management critic, says: ‘After elaborate research to find out what the consumer wants, Ford produced the Edsel. It was a complete failure. Ford mistook what the customer wanted for what they would really buy. They ignored their insight and relied on consensus. Japanese tend to emphasize harmony and consensus. But insight and decisiveness can be more important.’

10. Someone says: ‘Figures do not lie. But liars often use figures.’”

Christian Blanckaert, Executive Vice President at Hermès International was quoted as saying: “We have absolutely no visibility into 2009!”

On the one hand, fair enough. This economic downturn is steeper than previous down cycles, and the basic viability of the financial sector has been tested. Access to credit is normally easier in a recession, but in this one it is not. All of which makes luxury spending harder to predict.

No doubt the most unlikely prediction of all would have been that Hermès, Burberry, LVMH, Moët Hennessy, Louis Vuitton, and PPR (Gucci , Yves Saint Laurent) have all recently reported better-than-expected results.

Nevertheless luxury industry leaders have declined to provide investors and analysts with any official outlook. What’s curious, from an industry foresight point of view, is how executives such as Blanckaert thought they really had more “visibility” into any previous year, or that they will somehow gain it again when the financial crisis is over. They will not. The world will continue to surprise them and us. What they will gain, certainly, is a greater likelihood that the standard business-as-usual future assumptions they make will not be upset by reality.

Meanwhile, judging by the conference, the luxury goods industry has a very decent grip on current social and moral trends, and clear insight into the bigger picture of change in its industry over the next five to ten years. As they know from before, what happens in a recession is that luxury goes out of fashion. Conspicuous consumption wanes, or retreats further behind secluded walls. This is a basic pendulum swing that tracks the economy (witness how the early 1990s recession stimulated a return to “values” era after the “me, me, me” 1980s.)

Sustainable luxury

So we are again in a swing to modesty. But we also know that each swing of the pendulum also carries with it the specific issues of its time. Current key issues for consumers in this segment are sustainability, global warming, business ethics, and globalization (or fear thereof).

Therefore the luxury brands will be looking for ways of making, transporting, and displaying goods in an energy-efficient and socially conscious way, including a renewed emphasis on local artisans and traditional craftsmanship that speaks sustainability in both natural and human resources. This will be the basis of the “sustainable luxury,” positioning that the famous houses will define and compete in. Fabulous and renewable  – now there’s something you can charge top dollar for.

Guinness' view of the pub of 2259. Image credit: Chris Bainbridge

The Guinness Pub-of-the-Future is a St. Patrick’s day (March 17) promotion. Nothing wrong with a little bit of fantasy foresight. But what they come up is so “20th-century-futurism” it’s hilarious. Among various reports on the project – for example in the Telegraph – the following features are foreseen:

- robotic doorman, greets you by name
- cash obsolete; orders via RFID; payments deducted automatically
- your product tailored to you on the spot
- touch-sensitive tables, send your order straight to the bar
- socializing via virtual / hologram technology
- a running tally of the number of units consumed.

Yawn. Even on it’s own terms (minimal constraints of realism) this is a totally derivative piece of foresight. These “innovations” are the staples of an infotech view of the future, and they have all been thought and spoken of countless times. Also many of the elements and services cited are already here, or not more than a decade away. What we have is the current pub assumptions + digital steriods, while the year 2259 will be, truly, another world.

The limits to growth
But all this leads us to more interesting industry foresight problem. Will there be pubs in even a generation, never mind 250 years? What the Telegraph dryly observes at the bottom of its report is that 39 pubs are closing every week Why? A number of driving forces are coming together:

First is strict drink-driving limits, which makes “the local” literally local or nothing. Second, pubs in the UK have traditionally been a refuge from housing that was poor and/or underheated. Unprecedented waves of affluence (credit-crunch notwithstanding) have led to widespread housing “do-ups.” It’s now a valid option for most people to spend their leisure time at home and entertain at home.

Then there’s the where’s-my-friend trend. You’re likely to go down the pub if your friends are there, but not if they are where most people’s friends are: on Facebook.

The social-legislative clock
Fourth, no matter how you dress it up, pubs are retail outlets. So, like all retail they are under the cosh in a Wal-mart / Tesco world. The price gap between store and pub has become too great for most consumers to cross with good conscience.

Which brings us to the current price-floor legislation bid. Alcohol is a huge social cost in terms of health care and violence. Drink costs the NHS £3bn a year, and the total price of alcohol to the taxpayer is estimated at five times that. Eventually these costs will become unjustifiable so, like smoking before it, the social-legislative clock is ticking for booze. As the 2-martini lunch has become the 2-seltzer lunch, the trend to social stigmatization is clear, and legislators will follow (not with Prohibition, but with a much more subtle community-endorsed squeeze).

Like the good politician he is, Gordon Brown won’t let his party get ahead of the trend. But the trend is clear and it bodes ill for pubs.

My question, as the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), and the FTSE100, the DAX, the Hang Seng and so on have hit a decade lows is, what is this predicting, if anything? What is the long-term value of this prediction, and could it be used to make better decisions in the real world?
We know that the value of a common stock – a share in a company – is based ultimately on the returns (dividends) it will bring. Buyers and sellers therefore derive a daily market price based on their views of the share’s expected, that is, predicted future payback. The greater the expectation, the greater the price. A high price vis a vis earnings (P/E ratio) suggests confidence in future earnings, and vice versa.
Therefore the current steep fall in share prices is an expectation of (crowd prediction of) lower future payouts. Of course the complexity in human-prediction situations is that this basic level is also overlayed with a meta-level: people are not only trying to figure out what will happen, they are trying to figure out what others think will happen. So falling PE ratios are an expectation of what others will do (predicting they will continue to sell.)

Madness or not?
One of the perplexing things about the markets is they very often seem to react opposite to what is expected; to what would be common sense. They often fall on good news, rise on bad news, close unchanged on big news, and so on. Although there is – famously much irrational behavior and herd instinct in the market – you don’t get hundreds of thousands of decision-makers wagering significant money not using common sense.
What is going on, of course, is that the market has often already risen or fallen in prediction of the news. When a new condition – an interest rate move, for example – is imminent, the market will move to “price in” the expectation. If market participants as a whole have called the future correctly the market will not move much on announcement.

Pricing-in the future
Because of this predictive component to group decision-making in market situations, the stock market as a whole is a classic leading indicator of the real economy. When prices move they may be taken as the crowd “pricing-in” a future prediction. So markets will fall ahead of real economic problems (they may continue to fall, as now, during steep economic declines.) But they will also turn up well before any real, measurable upturn.

By the way, there is little doubt it will overshoot in this time, as it always does. This is because, as in prediction markets, the wisdom of crowds can predict the trend but not the turn. Trend extrapolation will never show you the key shifts, and this is why predicting the bottom or top of a market is so hard.

The point, for market speculators, is that long before the real gloom is over the markets will be zooming upwards. The point for the rest of us is that recession times will be with us even after the markets move up. In the long term the market will go up. Like death and taxes, it’s the surest thing there is.

The IFTF’s full map is available for download here.  Quick aside: these maps, putting complex forces into visuals, have defined IFTF’s public (and client, one presumes) communications for over five years, and have raised the bar of excellence in the foresight communications. The company has produced many such outstanding maps, some publicly available.

The new map and Sir Fred-gate are unrelated of course. But here was the connection for me: The IFTF map lists six “Key Driving Forces” (2007-2017) in the area of sustainability, and the first is:
“An Imperative for Looking Long: The 21st century will test our ability to grasp the future impacts of present choices, but even as we struggle to incorporate future knowledge into our day-to-day decisions, we’re tuning up our bodies and minds and even our cultural frameworks for a much longer view.”

My question is, “really?” Is the long view really a driver – something that will drive change and shape the future? Or do we hope it is. Are we trying to talk it into being?

No question that the long-term view is crucial. Solving just about any social, technological, or environmental problem requires sustained long-term action. And everyone who works in foresight keeps evangelizing long-termism. But, in fact, what we have in industry and government is rampant short-termism and there is no indication this will change, despite the crisis and many heartfelt calls.

Linking big to long

The problem with Sir Goodwin’s package (in career and in retirement) is that the reward numbers were based on short-term company returns. “Hey, we made lots of money this year, so you get a big bonus, and you get a big bonus,” etc. But a few years down the line  – in the long term – it turns out that no bonuses were valid (if a bonus is, truly, a reward for success).

Put it another way: in finance, as in other aspects of society, technology, and the environment, we don’t know if we’ve succeeded or failed until the long-term numbers are in. Few would have a problem with handsome rewards for a valuable job well done, but those rewards must surely be delayed, and delayed, until we are in command of the long view of the performance.

Easy in theory, hard in practice. Perhaps impossible in practice when most politicians and legislators are themselves on a short 3-7 year cycle, like CEOs. I have some inkling from the IFTF map that the thinking is that life-extending technologies will improve to the point where people will really see themselves in for the long haul, and so adopt a longer perspective on benefits and rewards.

Time on the clock

Perhaps. But, life-technologies aside, plenty of decision-makers – Goodwin included – still have a lot of time left on the clock and that doesn’t appear to stop them chasing and cashing in short-term incentives at the expense of the future. Or legislators (and the public who votes them in) structuring performance rating on our immediate perception of their performance.

What we have, and what we have increasingly had (the trend) over the past few decades, is systemic short-termism. Winning in the next annual report or the next election is what what leaders’ rewards are based on. Incentives for politicians or business leaders or even scientists or engineers to make a better world for 2025 or 2050 are negligable.

Until there is reason to anticipate that this fundamental underlying short-term incentive structure and mentality changes (that is – convince me – who will change it and how?) the future savvy perspective must say that the “long-term imperative” remains a nice sound-bite, but not a material driver of anything.