Posted by Adam Gordon on Jul 5, 2011 in all, emerging technologies, failed predictions, innovation, technology change
Mansueto Library: robots and underground storage vaults
The University of Chicago’s new Joe and Rika Mansueto Library is, it seems, a caricature of futurism. Under a vast glass dome sits an 8,000 sq-ft reading room, complete with flat screens, a circulation desk, ergonomic furniture, and … no books.
Turns out the books, all 3.5 million of them, are packed efficiently – by size – into 2 x 4 x 1.5 ft metal bins stored in vaults below ground. If you need one, you go tap-tap at your keyboard, which sends enormous rolling robots to fetch the right bin and crank it up to the circulation desk, allegedly in less than 5 minutes.
A number of things are interesting here, the first being that this “library-of-the-future” is about paper books at all. In a Google-digitize-the-planet world where Amazon says that more than half of its books sales are for the Kindle, the University of Chicago’s $81m bet on “dead-tree” storage and retrieval is quite a bet.
It is a good bet. Hype aside, it will be still many generations before “paperless” is any kind of on-the-ground reality, as paperless office evangelists have found out. Imbedded human habits and systems just don’t move that fast.
But systems do. Ingrained human preference for tactile objects doesn’t mean that storing, finding, and retrieving of the objects can’t be improved overnight, which is the essence of what is going on here. The automated search-and-retrieval system creates efficiencies as all automation does – by dumping human beings out of the process. Specifically, it copies advanced manufacturing systems such as those used in automobile assembly plants, which effects just-in-time finding and retrieving of components this way.
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The first industry foresight principle at work here is this: where the same problem applies, a solution that creates value in one industry will turn up to create value in another, even if apparently unrelated. Innovation doesn’t respect sector or management thought silos. Ergo, leaders who are able to comprehend challenges at a systemic level and look across industry boundaries for solutions that already exist elsewhere, find the future before competitors do.
Second, although the book definitely survives in the University of Chicago’s forward view of the library, note that the solution is not simply head-in-the-sand “nothing changes.” What changes, they are arguing, is the system aroundthe book, the storage, finding, and shlepping thereof. Moreover, the new system is a radical departure. It turns the status quo upside down, to make the physical book a relatively minor element of the online system, not the other way around.
Finally, the solution on offer is one more piece of evidence that inexorable advances in single-purpose (non-human-like) robotics and sensors are quietly yet absolutely changing the world around us. If we drop the Frankenstein image, and see robots for what they really are in our time, that is, sensors + wheels + software, many imminent changes in industry and society come quickly into focus.
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Posted by Adam Gordon on Mar 9, 2011 in all, failed predictions, forecast filtering, policy, politics of the future, social change
As the 24-hour news caravan moves on from Cairo to Libya in search of the next news fix, I’m reminded how poorly the media caravanserai thinks about the future: in this case, what real changes (if any) the fall of Mubarak may cause in Egypt, or in the political and business environment in the Middle East, or the world at large, going forward.
That a 30-year despot was toppled by people-power is without doubt a good outcome story for those with broadly democratic and civil-liberties biases. But the breathless pundits have been quick to call the Tahrir Square events “the ‘Berlin Wall’ of the Arab world.”
Is it? The Tahrir Square revolt tells us there is economic hardship and rumbling social discontent in Egypt, and that the populace is emboldened, but it doesn’t tell us much about the future.
Yes Egypt is the bellweather of the region. And yes, it has gone through a cataclysmic moment. But the future is all about momentum. Can we expect momentum? Is there reason to anticipate follow through? Can we expect the “fast-forward” button from now, or is it going to be the pause button that defines outcomes?
The fall of the Berlin Wall fall was symbolic: the symbol of Eastern bloc demise – a crack in the national prison that held back human aspiration. But it was also more than a symbol. In reality, on the ground, the political will that sustained the Wall was gone by 1989. Tricky as it was, and still is, the then West German government had a stake in and a will towards reintegrating the East. The situation went into fast-forward mode.
Egyptian protesters have dislodged a few boulders, and shaken a few certainties. But what is the political will in Egypt and among its Western allies going forward? That’s what will tell us about the future.
Head chopped off
The army is in charge, but the army is more closely allied with the ruling elite than the common protesters. The elite has had its head chopped off, but it can easily grow a new one. The issue it will highlight – as we have already seen – is stability, raising the specter of (a) chaos or (b) Islamists, or both, to stoke the military and cow the population.
Genuine chaos is in fact a high likelihood. Whenever the glue of power melts, and power (over the future) is up for grabs, agencies and interests will contend for it, seeking to win absolutely while the chips are in the aire, or to be in the best pre-pax position when they fall. A merry-go-round of tottering regimes, interspersed by chaos, or even a Lebanon-style multifaceted civil war between army, ruling elite, Islamists, warlords, students, etc., is surely a more-than-possible scenario.
The deeper story, as many have pointed out, is the economic, infrastructural, and civil weakness that defines Egypt, whoever takes over. It has a young and growing population, a stalled economy with chronic high unemployment, inequitable wealth distribution, poor local and regional governance, and corruption.
This is why it should not be believed that any party or interest can deliver a new future. Without considerable change at the grassroots, democratic fanfare, would be just that — fanfare.
So if the political will in Egypt is both fractured and hamstrung, what about outside interested parties and the West?
Friendly dictator
What will be future-defining is whether the US and its allies drop the “friendly dictator” policy — propping up corrupt despots because they are externally benign (and better than the Islamic alternative.) If they keep this up, the outcome for Egypt and the region is a fractured “pause” situation, no matter what blather about democracy, elections, human rights, new constitutions, makes the airwaves, from Hillary Clinton down.
But if, by some albeit unlikely turn of events, the external political towards Egypt was reshaped to transcend self-interest and neglect; and starts to support quiet, consistent, financial and non-financial development of the mechanisms and institutions of civil governance, backed by education and micro-loan economic stimulus – then the future is on the move and business managers should start realigning their thinking towards stable long-term growth for the region.
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Posted by Adam Gordon on Sep 7, 2010 in all, economy & finance, failed predictions, forecast filtering, strategic foresight
Here’s a video of Arthur C. Clark in 1964, remarkably predicting that in 50 years we would be able to communicate equally from anywhere on the planet, and so work from Tahiti or Bali equally well as from London. He predicts brain surgeons in Edinburgh operating on patients in New Zealand as technology collapses distance. Fabulous foresight? To a point, yes. This has all become possible, and in the time frame specified.
But, making one of the classic mistakes of technology-driven futures thinking, Clarke lets his technological imagination blur basic insight into human nature and social service/product adoption. Specifically, he goes on to say that because of communications technology advances, “the city of 2000 may not even exist at all. The traditional role of the city as meeting place for a man will cease to make any sense.”
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Note the gender paradigm blinkers. But anyway – the end of cities? Fat chance. One of the defining issues of the early 21st century is urban growth and the emergence of 10+ million-population mega-cities. And across the world, a higher proportion of the human population live in cities than at any point in history (and that proportion has just crossed 50% making humans for the first time a primarily urban species.) Hello? Arthur?
Urban concentrations 2007. Source: The Guardian
Why the miscue? First Clarke makes the classic error of holding key variables still while running technology forward. The key variable here is population growth. The number of people on the planet has doubled, at least, since 1964.
But that population could all be comfortably telecommuting from rural idylls, so there is another problem. Clarke fails to factor in social and economic pressures which sometimes run counter to technology advancement or, as in this case, merely absorb technology shift with no change. No matter how good communications get, nothing in the information-communications revolution has changed the age-old social truth that proximity matters. It matters to community welfare. It matters to social opportunities. It matters to career advancement, and so on. It mattered in the past. It will matter in the future. That’s why people are in jam-packed into into Los Angeles and São Paulo and Johannesburg and Seoul, etc., but not Tahiti.
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Posted by Adam Gordon on Jul 29, 2010 in all, decision-making, failed predictions, forecast filtering, Future Savvy, managing uncertainty, scenario planning, strategic foresight, trend tracking
I was lucky enough to have Future Savvy included in a lengthy review of critical thinking in forecasting & foresight, done on the SmithySmithy “info-savvy” blog. The post also included Nassim Taleb’s ‘The Black Swan’ (2007) and ‘Fooled By Randomness’ (2005); Kenneth Posner’s ‘Stalking the Black Swan’ (2010), and Chris Luebkeman’s Drivers of Change (2009).
As Stoyko’s is head-and-shoulders the most insightful and thorough assessments of the book itself, and the book in context, I’m reposting it here, with thanks. There are also fabulous graphics added, such as these (see more below):
“My search led to Adam Gordon’s Future Savvy. Like Posner, Gordon challenges Taleb’s blanket dismissal of forecasting. Gordon does not deny the existence of Black Swan events. And his book is a giant compendium of all of the things that usually go wrong with predictions. Moreover, Gordon offers a sceptical discussion of the subject that chastises simple-minded futurists, tech enthusiasts, and various other prophets of doom and boom. The difference between Taleb and Gordon is that Gordon doesn’t dismiss out-of-hand the usefulness of structured thinking about the future. Many important decisions require us to speculate about what the future might hold. Gordon wants us to be savvy in the way we anticipate the future instead of flying by the seats of our pants, so to speak.
“To set the stage, Gordon talks about how the forecasting industry is rife with problems. There are no standards, no accepted methods, no standard terminology. There are no penalties for failure given that people tend to forget forecasts by the time they can be proven wrong. And when dealing with the forecasts offered by pundits, stakeholders, and activists, Gordon reminds us, “we are knee deep in predictive wishful thinking, scare-mongering, or blatant self-promotion.” (p. 5) Buyer beware.
“Then there are the data problems. Forecasters use data from the past to project trends into the future. They rely heavily on data gathered for other purposes, not gathered for the task at hand. Availability is patchy. The data comes from multiple sources and is created using different methods. Important statistical caveats get lost. The context of the original studies gets forgotten. Variables are often defined loosely … and change over time … and are measured differently in different places. Data gathering methods often change over time in ways that exaggerate or obscure a trend. Sensationalist “newsy” data often commands the most attention. Some things are inherently difficult or impossible to measure accurately. All sorts of assumptions get embedded in data projected into the future. Furthermore, Gordon talks about the ways in which numbers can be finessed in an underhanded way. He advocates “number scepticism”, warning: “But no matter how scientific the data appears, choices have been exercised at every point about what to observe, what to count, how to measure it, and how to report it. … But numbers are not bedrock. There is no bedrock.” (p. 59)
“As an aside, statisticians have a snide nickname for analysts who mix’n’match statistics from a hodgepodge of sources to create complicated models or story-lines. That nickname is junk-yard dog. Gordon gives the impression that the forecasting business is, by necessity, heavily populated with these collectors.
“The sources of potential error don’t end with data. Our biases cause us to misinterpret and misreport the data.
“Some bias is intentional manipulation. Rascally analysts ignore or downplay countervailing evidence. They give evidence less scrutiny if it confirms the desired result. Emotionally charged language and associations are used. Terms are defined in leading ways. Extreme cases are used to represent the norm. Forecasts that don’t accord with an agenda get ignored, especially if the forecast is sponsored by a powerful interest. Organisational incentives can cause those being scrutinised to fudge the numbers. When forecasts are presented to the media, the most extreme trends get attention and important caveats remain unreported. Gordon is particularly critical of the so-called futurists who use “stretch thinking” and “big-picture thinking” to imagine a world full of only big changes. Many have a technophile bias, or the assumption that technology is the sole motive-force of large-scale societal change. Gordon’s advice is to keep your guard up and be wary of motives.
“Setting aside the thinness of this advice, Gordon has a strange attitude when talking about manipulation. He makes a distinction between forecasts that attempt to be accurate and forecasts that attempt to influence. Employee-prodding managers, partisan policy wonks, and alarmist activists use loaded forecasts to move minds. Humility, qualification, and tentativeness don’t have a place in these circles. There may be a legitimate reason for using leading forecasts, such as communicating the art-of-the-possible or giving someone an ambitious target to strive for. However, leading forecasts without full disclosure are instruments of underhanded manipulation. Gordon is eerily agnostic. His advice and tone of voice suggests that he is oblivious to the ethical problems posed by the manipulative use of forecasts. It’s a strange contrast with Gordon’s advice about being careful and pragmatically sceptical. [Editor's note: Agnostic? Moi? Hardly, but perhaps the chill of my irony was not chilly enough.]
“Back to the sources of error.
“Gordon itemises a number of cognitive biases that are inherent to the way we think. We often miss Black Swan events and abrupt changes in prevailing wisdom (“paradigm shifts”), he argues, because we are always filtering information based on perceived relevance. This “inattentional blindness” causes us to not notice important influences on the future. We also overemphasize recent happenings over older events (the recency effect). We’re susceptible to herd thinking and faddish ideas. A few chance events are often mistakenly interpreted as a trend or other pattern. Gordon places particular emphasis on how our current context frames the way we see and think (situational bias), especially how the prevailing mindset and preoccupations of an era skew the way we think about the future (Zeitgeist bias). For example, nuclear-powered airplanes may have seemed inevitable to someone living in the 1950s, a time preoccupied with thoughts of nuclear technology, suggests Gordon. That notion seems absurd today. To counter this problem, he argues for the need to extract the assumptions underpinning our expectations. Those assumptions need to be questioned and tested. And one good test is to reverse the assumption; that is, consider how the future would be different if the opposite (or very different) assumption were used.
I would add that people habitually rely on lazy assumptions about the future in general. As Howard Segal points out in his book Technological Utopianism in American Culture (2005), late-19th and early-20th-Century intellectuals assumed a technological plateau when describing the future. Even today, we assume our arrival at some destination—a future steady state—instead of a world of on-going change that is unevenly distributed and erratically paced, as exists now.
Gordon invites us to consider the utility people derive from a particular technology before jumping to conclusions about how it will revolutionise everyone’s lives. Tech-happy futurists are too quick to assume broad public acceptance of a new technology while ignoring the trade-offs of adoption. There are costs to be considered. In many cases, the price is too high and existing technologies do a good enough job. Or old technologies have an inertia, such as when users are “locked in” to a particular technology. Or social values change. Or switching creates undue inconvenience and aggravation. Or the technology has uneven appeal across diverse groups in society. Or, or … Gordon reminds us that simple technological domino effects almost never happen. The pace of change is usually slower than anticipated. A variety of factors determine how successful an innovation will be.
That leads us to the dynamics of change. I’m not going to describe each dynamic in detail. Gordon devotes a lot of space to them. Instead, I’ve listed them iconographically in the following diagram. Note that the darker lines signify consequences (and consequences of consequences; a.k.a. second-order and third-order events).
“A trend observed today may not continue onward along a straight-forward path. Trends peter out … change course … hit limits … get caught in reinforcing loops … have side-effects … provoke reactions … et cetera. The same goes for underlying causes. Trends can be particularly difficult to track within the complex systems that govern our lives. Thus, Gordon offers a chapter on system analysis.
“As someone who studies organisations, I’m often seeing policies and strategies change with sadly predictable pendulum swings. Gung-ho leaders push in one direction with gusto only to get a lesson in humility. Their efforts hit limits and opposition. Their assumptions hit reality. Subsequent leaders see wreckage everywhere and push in the opposite direction, looking for balance. Balance alludes them and they go to far. Another pendulum swing begins. Some swings happen from season to season. Others happen over decades. These swings may be predictable, but their exact timing certainly isn’t.
“Gordon rounds out Future Savvy with a utilitarian survival-guide of sorts. His big advice is that “it’s better to be vaguely right than exactly wrong.” Success is being alert to important changes and being prepared to cope, not with having accurate predictions. Narrowing down the things that need to be prepared for is an important practical benefit. In that spirit, Gordon talks about the strengths and weaknesses of using multiple scenarios instead of pat forecasts. He steps the reader through the analysis of some forecasts while looking for weaknesses. A chapter-long battery of questions is offered to guide the analysis. These questions do a good job of summarising the book.
“All told, Future Savvy is an excellent textbook for those who want to discipline the way they think about the future. I disagree with Gordon’s tangents about the inherently subjective nature of truth. I also have a few qualms about his take on scepticism. But these tangents rarely get in the way of his stock-taking exercise. That exercise has led me to be even more suspicious of forecasting, especially forecasts in volatile industries where data is patchy and assumptions are legion. I’d love to know the success rate of high-tech cheer-leaders … er, research firms that peddle forecasting numbers. Gordon dismisses the tracking of forecast failures as “smirk lists”. I’m with Taleb and his tsk tsking. If these numbers are just part of the hype machine and have a dismal track-record, then what good are they? Validation for reckless investment strategies? Fodder for misleading PowerPoint slides? Numbers that give a false sense of being in-touch with the market? Tsk tsk.
“That said, Future Savvy has increased my interest in foresight more generally. Gordon’s guide left me wondering how I can better prepare groups of decision-makers to think about the future. How do we get them to see the many changes afoot with greater foresight?”
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on May 27, 2010 in 2015, all, emerging technologies, failed predictions, Future Savvy, Perils of Prediction, strategic foresight, systems dynamics, technology change
Successful people are considered to be better future prognosticators than average. Why? Because it is assumed they must have known something about the future at some previous point in order to become as successful as they are. (Unfortunately Taleb’s various injunctions as to the workings of randomness fall on deaf ears, as do Gladwell’s many observations as to the tricky relationship between cause and effect.)
In 1995, at the height of Microsoft’s power over the economy and the zeitgeist (before Google came into its own, before Apple renewed, etc.) Bill Gates wrote “The Road Ahead,” which was, as one would expect, a broadly techno-optimistic look at the future. Did it see 9/11? No. Iraq War 2? No. The Credit Crunch? No. For a start it only really thinks about digital technology, and that’s going to be a very partial guide to the road ahead, at best.
But, in a recent The Atlantic article, “Bill Gates: More Profit than Prophet,” Tom McNichol evaluates Gates’s foresight on its own terms. As reproduced below, he finds it more “miss” than “hit.”
In general, Gates makes the mistakes outlined in Future Savvy, particularly in predicting the future based on its technological possibility rather than economic or social practicality. He’s short on systemic/feedback thinking and therefore misses side effects and unintended consequences. He also falls into the wishful-thinking bias: mixing up what he and (and Microsoft business) would like the future to be with what it really will be.
This last factor is less a mistake than a classic tool of future advocacy, and Gates would no doubt admit to a bit of this. It is illuminating (and sobering for future predictors) to see how much of the digital future Microsoft had within in its area of control in 1995, which it ceded to others. That lowered Microsoft’s ability to influence the road ahead and therefore weakened Gates’ predictions.
The McNichol analysis (shortened in places):
E-Mail
Prediction: Gates wrote, “Electronic mail and shared screens will eliminate the need for many meetings. … when face-to-face meetings do take place, they will be more efficient because participants will have already exchanged background information by e-mail. … information overload is not unique to the (information) highway, and it needn’t be a problem.”
Verdict: Miss. Gates’s view of e-mail now seems naively Utopian, failing to account for unintended consequences. If anything, e-mail has made workplace meetings more frequent and less efficient. “Didn’t you get that e-mail?” is probably the single most common question posed at meetings, a query that often leads to … another meeting.
The Wallet PC
Prediction: “You’ll be able to carry the wallet PC in your pocket or purse. It will display messages and schedules and also let you read or send electronic mail and faxes, monitor weather and stock reports, play both simple and sophisticated games, browse information if you’re bored, or choose from among thousands of easy-to-call up photos of your kids.”
Verdict: Hit. Gates’s wallet PC is more or less today’s mobile smartphone with voice capability added.
Wireless Networks
Prediction: “The wireless networks of the future will be faster, but unless there is a major breakthrough, wired networks will have a far greater bandwidth. Mobile devices will be able to send and receive messages, but it will be expensive and unusual to use them to receive an individual video stream.”
Verdict: Miss. Today, receiving a wireless video stream is neither expensive nor unusual; in fact, it’s so commonplace that most people don’t give it a second thought. Gates failed to anticipate that wireless would become cheaper and faster, but his chief mistake was a common but flawed assumption among techno-futurists: that new technology is adopted chiefly on the basis of technological superiority rather than social factors.
Social Networking
Prediction: “The (information) highway will not only make it easier to keep up with distant friends, it will also enable us to find new companions. Friendships formed across the network will lead naturally to getting together in person.”
Verdict: Hit and Miss. One of the killer apps of the information highway has turned out to be social networking… But friendships formed online don’t regularly lead to face-to-face meetings. Far more common is the user with 250 Facebook friends, most of whom he rarely, if ever, sees in person.
Online Shopping
Prediction: “Because the information highway will carry video, you’ll often be able to see exactly what you’ve ordered. … you won’t have to wonder whether the flowers you ordered for your mother by telephone were really as stunning as you’d hoped. You’ll be able to watch the florist arrange the bouquet, change your mind if you want, and replace wilting roses with fresh anemones.”
Verdict: Miss. Gates was right that the information highway would carry video, but he completely misread the social and economic factors that would shape its use in online commerce. How on earth would a harried florist find the time to hold a videoconference with every customer who orders flowers for Mother’s Day? What company would absorb the colossal expense of having orders changed at the last second according to customers’ shifting whims? Gates’s vision of online shopping has turned out to be a lot like past predictions about personal jet packs and moving sidewalks: a future that’s technologically possible but socially and economically impractical.
Videoconferencing
Prediction: “Small video devices using cameras attached to personal computers or television sets will allow us to meet readily across the information highway with much higher quality pictures and sound for lower prices.”
Verdict: Hit. What came to be called webcams are standard issue on PCs, or can be purchased from Bill Gates’s favorite company for under $30.
The Internet and the Web
Prediction: Gates’s 286-page book mentions the World Wide Web on only four of its pages, and portrays the Internet as a subset of a much a larger “Information Superhighway.” … Verdict: Miss. Gates’s notion that the Internet would play a supporting role in the information highway of the future, rather than being the highway itself, was out-of-date the day The Road Ahead was published… and he made major revisions to a second edition of The Road Ahead, adding material that highlighted the significance of the Internet. In many ways, Gates’s cloudy crystal ball regarding the Internet amounted to wishful thinking. Gates built Microsoft into a global powerhouse by selling proprietary software that users loaded onto their PCs. He wasn’t likely to warm to the idea that the same functions could be delivered cheaper and faster through a decentralized network that he couldn’t control.
Privacy
Predication: “A decade from now, you may shake your head that there was ever a time when any stranger or wrong number could interrupt you at home with a phone call. … by explicitly indicating allowable interruptions, you will be able to establish your home — or anywhere you choose — as your sanctuary.”
Verdict: Little Hit, Big Miss. It’s true that technology lets you explicitly indicate allowable interruptions — you can use caller ID to dodge unwanted calls or sign up at the National Do Not Call Registry to nix telemarketers. But the notion that technology would pave the way to greater privacy has turned out to be anything but true.
Posted by Adam Gordon on Apr 20, 2010 in all, decision-making, failed predictions, Future Savvy, managing uncertainty, Perils of Prediction
I had a chat the other day to Stephan Magus for his Abenteuer Zukunft (Future Adventures) podcast channel, taking about the rationale behind making a stand for quality in foresight. That is, what’s under the hood of Future Savvy, and why.
The podcast is up at the Abenteuer Leben site, playable via the buttons on the right hand side.
Alternatively it can be accessed directly at
http://media1.roadkast.com/abenteuerzukunft/DAZ71_120410_6tt6.mp3
(If you don’t speak German, you need to fast forward through the first 3 minutes.)
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