Kate Middleton's new coat of arms

Tomorrow’s wedding of Prince William and Catherine Middleton dominates the airwaves around the world, and even Harvard Business School professor Rosabeth Moss Kantor has an HBR blog post offering business insights thereto, including that it is an example of the coming of the “experience economy,” where people pay for the chance to participate at particular times, and expenditures on goods and services come in bundles tied to particular events. She councils how the “soft stuff” and “joy factor” can offer big audiences and revenues; romance and ritual matter…“sentiment sells.”

Fair enough. To this, permit me to add a thought or two about how the fact of the royal wedding can improve out judgment of future business environments and opportunities.

First, in the race to the future, leaders should never underestimate the power of traditionalism and continuity –particularly in changing times. Business leaders may be tempted to view the latest gizmo or the new lifestyle choice as the future. But this would be thinking poorly about tomorrow. Yes, new things get adopted all the time, and real and rapid change happens, but at the same time the broad market also has a vast, seemingly unquenchable, appetite for tradition.

The point is, the two are closely correlated. The faster society and technology moves the more people cling to apparent past certainties and traditions.

If you’d looked at the future of the British monarchy anytime through the turbulent, democratizing 20th century you might have be tempted to say it must soon be phased out, given the estimated $65m-a-year cost to the taxpayer (not including the spiraling cost of security.) You would think that the public would tire of upper-class toffs prancing around from polo matches to garden parties, wearing Chloe and drinking Krug at their expense.

Popular

But, in fact, no. The British monarchy is as popular as ever. There is some truth in the view that royalty is good for UK tourism. But mostly the monarchy survives because the public wants vestiges of the past as it peers at the changing future and the steady erosion of tradition and other fixed points from middle class lives.

A handsome military prince, a girl in white, a horse-drawn carriage, a bishop, a cathedral … is a psychological balm for most of us, even if we are, or more exactly because we are, viewing it all streamed on an iPad.

In industry foresight, we call this a “counter-trend.”

Another counter trend at work here is marriage itself. The figures are clear that people are marrying later, if at all, and staying married for a shorter time. William and Kate represent a minority: the number of weddings that are a first-time marriage for both parties is down to 150,000 a year, 35% what it was in 1940. That’s the trend. So the royal couple and their public ritual affirms publicly what most ordinary people are denying or denied privately.

The point not to be missed is the middle-class compromises most people are making drives counter-trend nostalgia for what once was, and marketing campaigns or business units, if not entire companies, can be built thereon – not only on traditionalist revivalism specifically, but on any strong counter-trend.

American Dream

Finally, the wedding of Prince William to “commoner” Catherine Middleton shows us how, despite all its apparent protestations, the UK is yet still Americanizing faster than one might think, and not just in splurging on cheap Chinese imports or putting university education on a pay-to-play basis.

Kate is very much an “American” princess, in the sense of being from a self-made family. Her mother was a flight attendant, her father too, before becoming a flight dispatcher for BA. (Rumor, hotly denied, is that Prince William’s friends used to snigger “doors-to-manual” among themselves on Kate’s arrival, in reference to her parents’ profession.)

But then “the American dream” could and did happen: The Middletons hit it rich with an online party supplies company (Party Pieces), were able to send Catherine to the right schools, and the rest is history.

Fukushima plant, Japan. Picture: digitalglobe.com

At the time of writing, Japan is battling a nuclear meltdown and radiation emergency, and Fukushima could become a word suddenly the whole world knows, like Chernobyl.

Bloomberg News has called the whole tsunami crisis Naoto Kan’s “Katrina moment,” and one can only hope and pray for all concerned that the Japanese prime minister is a more competent leader than Bush was at this moment of human catastrophe.

As to the nuclear meltdown: If ever we have been warned about anything in the future, we have been warned about nuclear plant catastrophes. Not only have there been, as it were, verbal warnings going all the way back to the 1950s, but real-world events such as Three-Mile-Island and Chernobyl have fully fleshed out the scenario of nuclear reactor failure or near failure in populated areas.

If nuclear-generated electricity makes sense anywhere, it makes sense in Japan, which famously has no coal or gas reserves. But these are nuclear plants … built right on the Pacific Ring of Fire? Japan is a small island with 125 million people densely packed into urban areas. As we face the possibility of this many people put at risk, however the next few days play out it’s clear the risk and reward of nuclear energy here is out of alignment.

This is hardly news. The question is, why are the plants are there? And the answer is not a simple one of collusion or corruption of government, or shenanigans of power companies, although there may be some of that. It comes down to a misapprehension of probability and risk among leaders and decision-makers such that it appears that risk and reward are in balance, when in fact they are not.

Year 869AD

To think about this, consider yesterday’s BBC Story: Japan tsunami ‘could be 1,000-year event,” saying last week’s tidal wave was equivalent to a giant wave that hit the Sendai coast in 869AD. The report says: ”It is not unusual for undersea earthquakes to generate tsunamis in this part of Japan. Offshore quakes in the 19th and 20th centuries also caused large walls of water to hit this area of coastline. But previous research by a Japanese team shows that (only) in the 869 ‘Jogan’ disaster, tsunami waters moved some 4km inland, causing widespread flooding.”

The point is, tsunamis are common, but “the big one” is a one-in-thousand year event — an extremely low probability outcome.

Here I’m strongly reminded of the days following the depth of the Credit Crunch, Bear Stearns’ collapse, and general world financial system meltdown of 2008. If bankers said one thing sensible through the whole period it was: “this was a one-in-ten-(hundred, etc.)-thousand probability outcome, and extreme ‘outlier’ event!”

A low-probability event means we can relax, right? Wrong. The problem is probability says zilch about impact. “Wild Cards,” or now more famously in Nassim Taleb’s terms, “Black Swan” events are low probability but of game-changing impact.

Taleb’s point, made repeatedly across his various books and articles, is that standard probability theory and Gaussian statistics lull analysts into thinking that because an event is low probability – an outlier in a normal bell-curve distribution – it is of low or lower consequence.

Ignoring the tail of the Bell Curve is okay if events are genuinely assessed as low impact. If they are high-impact aka “fat-tailed” events, they are the most important events we face in the future, in building or maintaining any system or organization.

A probabilistic framework misleads decision-makers because it degrades their attention to crucial events (by tagging them low-probability,) which means next thing they are betting banks on mortgage-backed securities, or building nuclear plants on earthquake fault lines.

As the 24-hour news caravan moves on from Cairo to Libya in search of the next news fix, I’m reminded how poorly the media caravanserai thinks about the future: in this case, what real changes (if any) the fall of Mubarak may cause in Egypt, or in the political and business environment in the Middle East, or the world at large, going forward.

That a 30-year despot was toppled by people-power is without doubt a good outcome story for those with broadly democratic and civil-liberties biases. But the breathless pundits have been quick to call the Tahrir Square events “the ‘Berlin Wall’ of the Arab world.”

Is it? The Tahrir Square revolt tells us there is economic hardship and rumbling social discontent in Egypt, and that the populace is emboldened, but it doesn’t tell us much about the future.

Yes Egypt is the bellweather of the region. And yes, it has gone through a cataclysmic moment. But the future is all about momentum. Can we expect momentum? Is there reason to anticipate follow through? Can we expect the “fast-forward” button from now, or is it going to be the pause button that defines outcomes?

The fall of the Berlin Wall fall was symbolic: the symbol of Eastern bloc demise – a crack in the national prison that held back human aspiration. But it was also more than a symbol. In reality, on the ground, the political will that sustained the Wall was gone by 1989. Tricky as it was, and still is, the then West German government had a stake in and a will towards reintegrating the East. The situation went into fast-forward mode.

Egyptian protesters have dislodged a few boulders, and shaken a few certainties. But what is the political will in Egypt and among its Western allies going forward? That’s what will tell us about the future.

Head chopped off

The army is in charge, but the army is more closely allied with the ruling elite than the common protesters. The elite has had its head chopped off, but it can easily grow a new one. The issue it will highlight – as we have already seen – is stability, raising the specter of (a) chaos or (b) Islamists, or both, to stoke the military and cow the population.

Genuine chaos is in fact a high likelihood. Whenever the glue of power melts, and power (over the future) is up for grabs, agencies and interests will contend for it, seeking to win absolutely while the chips are in the aire, or to be in the best pre-pax position when they fall. A merry-go-round of tottering regimes, interspersed by chaos, or even a Lebanon-style multifaceted civil war between army, ruling elite, Islamists, warlords, students, etc., is surely a more-than-possible scenario.

The deeper story, as many have pointed out, is the economic, infrastructural, and civil weakness that defines Egypt, whoever takes over. It has a young and growing population, a stalled economy with chronic high unemployment, inequitable wealth distribution, poor local and regional governance, and corruption.

This is why it should not be believed that any party or interest can deliver a new future. Without considerable change at the grassroots, democratic fanfare, would be just that — fanfare.

So if the political will in Egypt is both fractured and hamstrung, what about outside interested parties and the West?

Friendly dictator

What will be future-defining is whether the US and its allies drop the “friendly dictator” policy — propping up corrupt despots because they are externally benign (and better than the Islamic alternative.) If they keep this up, the outcome for Egypt and the region is a fractured “pause” situation, no matter what blather about democracy, elections, human rights, new constitutions, makes the airwaves, from Hillary Clinton down.

But if, by some albeit unlikely turn of events, the external political towards Egypt was reshaped to transcend self-interest and neglect; and starts to support quiet, consistent, financial and non-financial development of the mechanisms and institutions of civil governance, backed by education and micro-loan economic stimulus – then the future is on the move and business managers should start realigning their thinking towards stable long-term growth for the region.

Truth be told, the foresight field is littered with predictions about the future of the automobile, from the futurists’ flying car that never happened to the-pumps-run-dry doomsday, and everything inbetween.

The Xiao EN-V concept car. Photograph © General Motors / Wieck Media Services Inc

But, judging by the interview, Burns has a higher-quality foresight view of this industry than most, and this because he prioritizes what consumers really value as a guide to what will emerge over any policy principle or ideological interest.

What do consumers really value? “There’s nothing like the freedom they (cars) provide to let us go where we want, when we want, with the people we want to travel with,” says Burns.

“Ever since people could walk, the ability to move when they want and where they want is something people have found very compelling.”

Nothing new, but what he is warding off, in preparing the ground to looking to the industry future, is views of the automotive future that are ideologically colored, particularly those imbued with the virtues of public transport.

Says Burns, “Three major impediments get in the way of public transportation:

• The first is routes. A public transportation system can’t go everywhere, so people have to have a way to get to and from the stations.
• The second is schedules. You can’t leave exactly when you want to, so you have to arrive before the public transit system arrives to pick you up, which has major impacts on how people schedule their lives. And unfortunately, those schedules aren’t always predictable, so you have to buffer.
• The third is that since people have to shift modes from how they get to the station — whether it’s in cars, on scooters, or on bicycles — to the public transport mode, you create a need for parking.”

This balance could change — this is what public transport executives seek to effect. But until there is clear reason to see public-transport pain-points diminishing, there’s no reason to see anything but private-dominated transport in the future (other than very dense urban environments such as Manhattan.)

Pain avoidance

Burns places automotive foresight at the intellectual crossroads between what the majority of consumers really want (or what pain they want to avoid) and what pundits and ideologues think would be a better solution. Guess which always wins?

With that issue solved, the question then turns to what these private vehicles are exactly? Here Burns and co-authors have a vision, but it is more “anybody’s guess.” Their fundamental assumptions is that onboard inter-vehicle accident-avoidance technology is watertight, which means cars don’t need all their defensive armour and can so be far lighter, and therefore use less energy, so battery power and life is no longer the limiting issue it is today. See the concept-car above.

This blog first posted at Forbes Leadership: http://blogs.forbes.com/adamgordon

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But, making one of the classic mistakes of technology-driven futures thinking, Clarke lets his technological imagination blur basic insight into human nature and social service/product adoption. Specifically, he goes on to say that because of communications technology advances, “the city of 2000 may not even exist at all. The traditional role of the city as meeting place for a man will cease to make any sense.”
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Note the gender paradigm blinkers. But anyway – the end of cities? Fat chance. One of the defining issues of the early 21st century is urban growth and the emergence of  10+ million-population mega-cities. And across the world, a higher proportion of the human population live in cities than at any point in history (and that proportion has just crossed 50% making humans for the first time a primarily urban species.) Hello? Arthur?

Urban concentrations 2007. Source: The Guardian

Why the miscue? First Clarke makes the classic error of holding key variables still while running technology forward. The key variable here is population growth. The number of people on the planet has doubled, at least, since 1964.

But that population could all be comfortably telecommuting from rural idylls, so there is another problem. Clarke fails to factor in social and economic pressures which sometimes run counter to technology advancement or, as in this case, merely absorb technology shift with no change. No matter how good communications get, nothing in the information-communications revolution has changed the age-old social truth that proximity matters. It matters to community welfare. It matters to social opportunities. It matters to  career advancement, and so on. It mattered in the past. It will matter in the future. That’s why people are in jam-packed into into Los Angeles and São Paulo and Johannesburg and Seoul, etc., but not Tahiti.
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As Stoyko’s is head-and-shoulders the most insightful and thorough assessments of the book itself, and the book in context, I’m reposting it here, with thanks. There are also fabulous graphics added, such as these (see more below):

“My search led to Adam Gordon’s Future Savvy. Like Posner, Gordon challenges Taleb’s blanket dismissal of forecasting. Gordon does not deny the existence of Black Swan events. And his book is a giant compendium of all of the things that usually go wrong with predictions. Moreover, Gordon offers a sceptical discussion of the subject that chastises simple-minded futurists, tech enthusiasts, and various other prophets of doom and boom. The difference between Taleb and Gordon is that Gordon doesn’t dismiss out-of-hand the usefulness of structured thinking about the future. Many important decisions require us to speculate about what the future might hold. Gordon wants us to be savvy in the way we anticipate the future instead of flying by the seats of our pants, so to speak.

“To set the stage, Gordon talks about how the forecasting industry is rife with problems. There are no standards, no accepted methods, no standard terminology. There are no penalties for failure given that people tend to forget forecasts by the time they can be proven wrong. And when dealing with the forecasts offered by pundits, stakeholders, and activists, Gordon reminds us, “we are knee deep in predictive wishful thinking, scare-mongering, or blatant self-promotion.” (p. 5) Buyer beware.

“Then there are the data problems. Forecasters use data from the past to project trends into the future. They rely heavily on data gathered for other purposes, not gathered for the task at hand. Availability is patchy. The data comes from multiple sources and is created using different methods. Important statistical caveats get lost. The context of the original studies gets forgotten. Variables are often defined loosely … and change over time … and are measured differently in different places. Data gathering methods often change over time in ways that exaggerate or obscure a trend. Sensationalist “newsy” data often commands the most attention. Some things are inherently difficult or impossible to measure accurately. All sorts of assumptions get embedded in data projected into the future. Furthermore, Gordon talks about the ways in which numbers can be finessed in an underhanded way. He advocates “number scepticism”, warning: “But no matter how scientific the data appears, choices have been exercised at every point about what to observe, what to count, how to measure it, and how to report it. … But numbers are not bedrock. There is no bedrock.” (p. 59)

“As an aside, statisticians have a snide nickname for analysts who mix’n’match statistics from a hodgepodge of sources to create complicated models or story-lines. That nickname is junk-yard dog. Gordon gives the impression that the forecasting business is, by necessity, heavily populated with these collectors.

“The sources of potential error don’t end with data. Our biases cause us to misinterpret and misreport the data.

“Some bias is intentional manipulation. Rascally analysts ignore or downplay countervailing evidence. They give evidence less scrutiny if it confirms the desired result. Emotionally charged language and associations are used. Terms are defined in leading ways. Extreme cases are used to represent the norm. Forecasts that don’t accord with an agenda get ignored, especially if the forecast is sponsored by a powerful interest. Organisational incentives can cause those being scrutinised to fudge the numbers. When forecasts are presented to the media, the most extreme trends get attention and important caveats remain unreported. Gordon is particularly critical of the so-called futurists who use “stretch thinking” and “big-picture thinking” to imagine a world full of only big changes. Many have a technophile bias, or the assumption that technology is the sole motive-force of large-scale societal change. Gordon’s advice is to keep your guard up and be wary of motives.

“Setting aside the thinness of this advice, Gordon has a strange attitude when talking about manipulation. He makes a distinction between forecasts that attempt to be accurate and forecasts that attempt to influence. Employee-prodding managers, partisan policy wonks, and alarmist activists use loaded forecasts to move minds. Humility, qualification, and tentativeness don’t have a place in these circles. There may be a legitimate reason for using leading forecasts, such as communicating the art-of-the-possible or giving someone an ambitious target to strive for. However, leading forecasts without full disclosure are instruments of underhanded manipulation. Gordon is eerily agnostic. His advice and tone of voice suggests that he is oblivious to the ethical problems posed by the manipulative use of forecasts. It’s a strange contrast with Gordon’s advice about being careful and pragmatically sceptical. [Editor's note: Agnostic? Moi? Hardly, but perhaps the chill of my irony was not chilly enough.]

“Back to the sources of error.

“Gordon itemises a number of cognitive biases that are inherent to the way we think. We often miss Black Swan events and abrupt changes in prevailing wisdom (“paradigm shifts”), he argues, because we are always filtering information based on perceived relevance. This “inattentional blindness” causes us to not notice important influences on the future. We also overemphasize recent happenings over older events (the recency effect). We’re susceptible to herd thinking and faddish ideas. A few chance events are often mistakenly interpreted as a trend or other pattern. Gordon places particular emphasis on how our current context frames the way we see and think (situational bias), especially how the prevailing mindset and preoccupations of an era skew the way we think about the future (Zeitgeist bias). For example, nuclear-powered airplanes may have seemed inevitable to someone living in the 1950s, a time preoccupied with thoughts of nuclear technology, suggests Gordon. That notion seems absurd today. To counter this problem, he argues for the need to extract the assumptions underpinning our expectations. Those assumptions need to be questioned and tested. And one good test is to reverse the assumption; that is, consider how the future would be different if the opposite (or very different) assumption were used.

I would add that people habitually rely on lazy assumptions about the future in general. As Howard Segal points out in his book Technological Utopianism in American Culture (2005), late-19th and early-20th-Century intellectuals assumed a technological plateau when describing the future. Even today, we assume our arrival at some destination—a future steady state—instead of a world of on-going change that is unevenly distributed and erratically paced, as exists now.

Gordon invites us to consider the utility people derive from a particular technology before jumping to conclusions about how it will revolutionise everyone’s lives. Tech-happy futurists are too quick to assume broad public acceptance of a new technology while ignoring the trade-offs of adoption. There are costs to be considered. In many cases, the price is too high and existing technologies do a good enough job. Or old technologies have an inertia, such as when users are “locked in” to a particular technology. Or social values change. Or switching creates undue inconvenience and aggravation. Or the technology has uneven appeal across diverse groups in society. Or, or … Gordon reminds us that simple technological domino effects almost never happen. The pace of change is usually slower than anticipated. A variety of factors determine how successful an innovation will be.

That leads us to the dynamics of change. I’m not going to describe each dynamic in detail. Gordon devotes a lot of space to them. Instead, I’ve listed them iconographically in the following diagram. Note that the darker lines signify consequences (and consequences of consequences; a.k.a. second-order and third-order events).

“A trend observed today may not continue onward along a straight-forward path. Trends peter out … change course … hit limits … get caught in reinforcing loops … have side-effects … provoke reactions … et cetera. The same goes for underlying causes. Trends can be particularly difficult to track within the complex systems that govern our lives. Thus, Gordon offers a chapter on system analysis.

“As someone who studies organisations, I’m often seeing policies and strategies change with sadly predictable pendulum swings. Gung-ho leaders push in one direction with gusto only to get a lesson in humility. Their efforts hit limits and opposition. Their assumptions hit reality. Subsequent leaders see wreckage everywhere and push in the opposite direction, looking for balance. Balance alludes them and they go to far. Another pendulum swing begins. Some swings happen from season to season. Others happen over decades. These swings may be predictable, but their exact timing certainly isn’t.

“Gordon rounds out Future Savvy with a utilitarian survival-guide of sorts. His big advice is that “it’s better to be vaguely right than exactly wrong.” Success is being alert to important changes and being prepared to cope, not with having accurate predictions. Narrowing down the things that need to be prepared for is an important practical benefit. In that spirit, Gordon talks about the strengths and weaknesses of using multiple scenarios instead of pat forecasts. He steps the reader through the analysis of some forecasts while looking for weaknesses. A chapter-long battery of questions is offered to guide the analysis. These questions do a good job of summarising the book.

“All told, Future Savvy is an excellent textbook for those who want to discipline the way they think about the future. I disagree with Gordon’s tangents about the inherently subjective nature of truth. I also have a few qualms about his take on scepticism. But these tangents rarely get in the way of his stock-taking exercise. That exercise has led me to be even more suspicious of forecasting, especially forecasts in volatile industries where data is patchy and assumptions are legion. I’d love to know the success rate of high-tech cheer-leaders … er, research firms that peddle forecasting numbers. Gordon dismisses the tracking of forecast failures as “smirk lists”. I’m with Taleb and his tsk tsking. If these numbers are just part of the hype machine and have a dismal track-record, then what good are they? Validation for reckless investment strategies? Fodder for misleading Power­Point slides? Numbers that give a false sense of being in-touch with the market? Tsk tsk.

“That said, Future Savvy has increased my interest in foresight more generally. Gordon’s guide left me wondering how I can better prepare groups of decision-makers to think about the future. How do we get them to see the many changes afoot with greater foresight?”

So may I say, this is what I was trying to say: When trying to predict the future, watch for dog poop!

Or perhaps: apparently helpful guides to the future are often dog poop disguised as chocolate, and here’s how to know the difference.

Something like that.

Note that this Greenbang story, below, is damaged by letting the most extreme predictions (the howlers) stand in for the general item. Prediction howler-spotting is sobering, but misses how many people got the future right, or right enough to make excellent decisions, and therefore overly damages the foresight field.

Also, howlers are actually the low-hanging fruit. Being future savvy is ultimately about the more subtle job of correcting weighing apparently very credible and well-founded predictions, some of which are excellent, but others of which are far flimsier than they appear.

There are various other minor problems such as not knowing the difference between the Gartner Hype Cycle and Zeitgeist bias, etc. And I would never call myself, not even in my most self-deprecating moments, a “futurologist.” But anyway, as I said, just a bit of fun:

Greenbang (13th April 2010) by Trish Lorenz & Martin Wright: Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.” Niels Bohr’s words are a wise warning to reckless forecasters.

“Combining a nuclear reactor with a home boiler is no longer a problem. It would heat and cool the house, provide unlimited hot water and melt the snow from sidewalks and driveways. All that could be done for six years on a single charge of fissionable material costing about $300.” — Robert Ferry, US Institute of Boiler and Radiator Manufacturers, 1955

“Nuclear-powered vacuum cleaners will probably be a reality in ten years.” — Alex Lewyt, President of vacuum cleaner company Lewyt Corp, also 1955

Lewyt and Ferry both stumbled into a risky habit of all amateur futurists: extrapolating from present trends. In this case, they were caught up in the surge of excitement over the rise of nuclear power. They were not alone. In the tech-fuelled optimism of the ’50s, magazines, radio and the infant TV were buzzing with predictions of flying cars and lunar settlements.

They had fallen victim to what later became known as the Gartner Hype Cycle. This maps the enthusiasm and subsequent disillusionment typical in the introduction of new technology — a useful reality check for those caught up in “irrational optimism.”

By contrast, there are those whose feet are too firmly rooted in present realities, and fail to see how innovation can combine with social changes to speed the widespread adoption of new technology.

“The Americans need the telephone, but we do not. We have plenty of messenger boys.” — Sir William Preece, Chief Engineer, Royal Mail, 1878

“The horse is here to stay, but the automobile is only a novelty, a fad.” — President of the Michigan Savings Bank, advising Henry Ford’s lawyer not to invest in Ford Motors, 1903

It is difficult to consider any factor that doesn’t apparently exist at the time of making a prediction, but that’s essentially what looking ahead requires. It wasn’t all that long ago when people were predicting a bright future for teletext and fax machines. Few would have anticipated that both would be made almost obsolete by the internet and email. And yet the weak signals were there for those who chose to hear them. A fax machine, after all, is simply a modem with a rather complex print interface attached. It only evolved as it did because people were unused to reading information solely on screen, and computers were too big to carry around with them. Once laptops took off in the early ’90s, the fax was doomed.

“There is no reason why anyone would want a computer in their home.” — Ken Olson, Chairman, Digital Equipment Corp, 1977

Australian Senator Dr Russell Trood sums it up neatly when he says: ” ‘Nowism’ is a serious occupational hazard for those in the prediction game.”

Today’s futurologists no longer try to predict a single outcome for the future; instead they map a variety of scenarios. For Adam Gordon of Future Savvy, scenario-based thinking gives people “permission to think through alternative outcomes without necessarily predicting them.” Instead of trying to forecast precisely what might happen, he says, “we can ask ‘What if it does?,’ and then explore the outcomes and our responses.” Such thinking characterises much of the strategy adopted by forward-looking governments on tackling climate change.

James Goodman, head of Futures at Forum for the Future, agrees: “People think it’s the output that’s important, but actually it’s the process.” And, he adds, “All future planning has uncertainty at its heart.”

Or as Martin Raymond, Strategy and Insight Director at The Future Laboratory, says, “We always try to spot the dog
poop in our forecast.”

Greenbang Editor’s note: This was a guest article by Trish Lorenz and Martin Wright at Forum for the Future. This piece originally appeared in Green Futures, which is published by Forum for the Future and is the leading magazine on environmental solutions and sustainable futures. Its aim is to demonstrate that a sustainable future is both practical and desirable — and can be profitable, too.

In a fascinating recent development, John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Richard Lugar, Republican of Indiana, introduced the Start-up Visa Act to the US Senate, as reported in Inc. magazine.

The legislation is a forward-looking bid to turbo-charge entrepreneurial venturing in the U.S. by attracting foreign entrepreneurs and connecting them to U.S. capital, therein driving new economic growth and local jobs. What’s really interesting is it goes against past common wisdom that recessions are ‘bad for immigration’ (as citizens demand job protection.)

If passed, the bill gives U.S. visas to foreigners who can raise $100,000 from an angel investor or $250,000 from a qualified VC firm. After two years, if the immigrant entrepreneur can create five or more jobs (excluding family), attract an additional $1 million in investment, or produce $1 million in revenue, he or she gets a green card (permanent residency.)

The only current option, the EB-5 business investment visa, requires immigrants to invest at least $1 million in the U.S. and employ 10 people.

Job creation

The  National Venture Capital Association says 25 percent of America’s venture-backed, publicly-traded businesses, incl. Google, Yahoo!, eBay and Intel have been founded or co-founded by immigrants. According to Richard Herman, author of Immigrant, Inc.: Why Immigrant Entrepreneurs Are Driving the New Economy, nearly all U.S. job creation in the past 20 years has come from companies less than five years old.

The history of US immigration policy has been schizophrenic to say the least, with periods of great social openness followed by about-face door slamming. The slamming has always corresponded to economic downturns or anxiety thereto. But here we have the opposite effect. And we have legislators taking a forward view! Both proof that the future is sure to surprise us.

Birk commends Roach for being one of the few to have predicted the Credit Crunch problems, to which Roach demurs in saying he was “too early”. He then furthers his modesty in saying that the “breakage” in the financial system was “in excess of anything I envisioned.”

Self-deprecation in assessing one’s predictive abilities will endear anyone to me. Even Roach, who later in the interview burns this hard-won credibility by laying the blame for the credit crunch at the door of regulators, forgetting how hard financial institutions lobbied regulators for greater freedoms in the 1990s.

But I digress. The predictive issues the interview raises are as follows. Issue one: it’s not enough (as any stock short-seller will confirm) to get the direction of a future change right. One must get the timing right too. Issue two: it’s not enough to anticipate a change. One must be able to judge it’s impact. Getting either timing or impact wrong is effectively to have missed the future.

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Probability

On the latter topic — the problem of impact — Nassim Taleb is unrelenting, and he is right. Analysts routinely mix up probability and impact. They think that because an event has a low probability (‘it would be a 10-sigma event!’) it can be marginalized in the predictive number crunching. Of course, it can’t. The low-probability of a wildcard or black swan event is irrelevant because when it happens it will change the game, and that’s why, in every predictive situation of reasonable complexity and uncertainty, using statistical extrapolations (regressions and so on) to predict, is to dangerously paper over the cracks. It is precisely the cracks that businesses and policy makers need to worry about.

Determining the direction of change is hard enough. Assessing timing or extent of impact — a ‘total future impact index’ — is wickedly difficult. It’s a task not to be underestimated, and to simply extrapolate current trends (= assuming the trend’s timeline and impact stay the same as in the past) is the royal road to underestimating it.

This is the reason foresight for complex, uncertain, changing situations can only be grasped by NOT predicting (quantitatively or otherwise) but by exploring the limit-conditions of the plausible (What would happen if the timing of the change accelerated, or was significantly delayed? What if  the impact was 10x or one tenth of what we expect? And so on.)

.

That is: disaster, mayhem, and death goes to the top of the page and towards the front of the newspaper.**

“If it bleeds, it leads” can be interpreted more or less narrowly. Mostly it means, literally, that accidents, explosions, injuries, and deaths will take page priority in the news over “talking stories” about politics and government and society. Disasters sell more newspapers than policy debates. But more generally it means bad news is more arresting and interesting, and will get more attention (and, again, sell more newspapers or gather more listeners and viewers) than good news, therefore it takes priority.

Now, if you were a ‘forecasting pundit’ or a think tank, or investment institution with an interest in getting media attention for yourself, which route would you choose in garnering media exposure? Good news or bad news?

Bad news. Of course. Russian Professor Igor Panarin gets an insane amount of publicity because his book claims that the United States could collapse soon (in two months time, I believe.) Ditto asset manager, Egon von Greyerz, who bangs on, for example saying: “America is hemorrhaging financially and economically. Other countries now realize they hold ‘worthless’ US dollars” in a piece called: The Dark Years Are Here. And just in case you think these are all gloomy foreigners, consider how Bronx boy, Gerald Celente, has dominated media coverage in the credit-crunch era predicting doom-and-gloom in every way, including riots and revolution on U.S. streeets within in the Obama-presidency term. For example http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=46MEqEgdLTg

These are just three that I single out just to make the point, but they are not different from many hundreds that trawl for media attention by predicting, essentially … “bleeding.” In fact, the real future will have good and bad in balance, just like the past. One of the lessons of Future Savvy is: if a prediction bleeds, it probably shouldn’t lead your thinking.

** In fact, the task of deciding what story to lead page one (or any other page) with, and what other stories to run, in what order, and at what length, is one of the more intellectually demanding tasks around, and one that quality journalist take seriously. So, “if it bleeds, it leads” is, in part, cynical journalist-ese for saying that the popular audience doesn’t have the time, patience, or interest in the deeper issues.

Arsène Wenger

But this was different. Wenger (on the eve of the Arsenal vs Celtic Rangers Champions League match) predicted a “European League” in 10 years featuring the continent’s top clubs – that is, he offered foresight into potential structural, industry-wide change in multi-billion-dollar UK and European soccer industry.

Currently clubs play in their national domestic leagues. And all Europe-wide competitions are cup (pool stage + knockout) competitions.

Although not fleshed out, the form is not hard to see: the top four-or-so clubs from each major country (fewer from smaller countries) in one annual league competition. This means that Manchester United, Liverpool, AC Milan, Porto, Juventus, Real Madrid, Barcelona, Roma and so on would all be playing each other on a weekly basis throughout the year (and, presumably, playing in no other league competitions).

Drivers of Change

The point of Future Savvy is that one can judge the validity of predictions like this before time. In this case, part of the way to assess Mr Wenger’s future view would be to gauge the strength of driving vs blocking forces behind his outcome.

There is evidence of strong drivers in favor of a European Super League. These are:

1. The rise of “super-teams.” In the UK and across Europe the same few teams dominate their domestic league year after year. The reason is a simple reinforcing feedback loop where winning teams get more money (from TV rights, from gates, from merchandising, etc.) which means they can buy better players, which means they win more. Over the last decade the English Football Premier League has become, effectively, a competition between Manchester United, Chelsea, Liverpool, and Arsenal. (In the US the “draft–pick” system mitigates against any franchise getting too strong in this way, but no such system-balancer exists in European football.)

2. The growing ease and ubiquity of continental travel. Whether fans will follow their teams across Europe is a key issue, but indicators from cup competitions is that fans can and will travel.

3. The growing role of, and technological sophistication of television, particularly Sky Sports. Despite the many who travel, most people these days follow games at home or in sports bars. Television’s coverage and choices (the remote control options “red button”) have exploded, and screens themselves have got bigger and better. And genuine personalization of camera feed and other forms of interactively is emerging. In this, football, and professional sports as a whole, is becoming more about the screen as the stadium, accelerating a long-term trend. The reality is it makes little difference to most fans if the game is being played 50 miles away or 500.

4. The move to high-level, star-packed, events. There’s a clear trend across sports in general for events featuring the best players playing each other in all-star environments, not as a special “all-star” game but as an everyday occurrence. In cricket, for example, the Indian IPL has ridden this trend, offering franchised matches of, effectively, one mixed team of global superstars versus another. The fans love it.

There is also the financial do-or-die logic that soccer clubs face. The money feedback loop means they must continually drive up their revenues. It’s not possible to stand still. A European Football Super League would compel participation from the top teams for this reason alone.

vs Blockers

Adequately assessing the likelihood of the Wenger view of the future further requires investigation of blockers – factors which will prevent the outcome. In this case these may be overwhelming logistics of moving teams around to this extent week in and week out; limits on fans’ travel energy and budget; extent of fans’ loyalty to the relatively minor (non-super) domestic teams; and domestic league administrators’ determination and ability to keep domestic leagues from loosing their cash cows and following their own downward spiral into television obscurity.

These blockers on the European football league forecast are real. The question is whether they stop the future or how long they delay it. I’d judge the blockers as considerably weaker than the drivers and so I’d go with Wenger in predicting a European Super League (even richer and more “glamorous” than anything soccer has seen before) in about 10 years from now.

The failed “our-future-in-space prediction” cluster is useful because it is the poster child for bad predicting, nothing less than foresight idiocy in its purest form, worth mentioning only because it helps us to see smaller and more subtle future-thinking mistakes we make routinely.

This is what I said in Future Savvy (Chapter 5):

“The forecasts that surrounded the future of space travel and exploration are perhaps the most high-profile and comprehensively poor set of forecasts ever made, and therefore provide a good vantage point to consider what can go wrong in forecasting. From the 1950s, space was a huge topic of interest. All significant earthbound exploration challenges had been overcome, technology was moving rapidly, and what lay ahead, unconquered, was space. The need to explore it was deeply in the zeitgeist.
“At the same time, the Cold War created the specific situation where beating the Soviets in prestige projects was an important priority, important enough to divert massive resources to it. J.F. Kennedy’s rousing (future-influencing) 1961 prediction of putting a man on the moon by the end of the decade motivated and galvanized the United States, and the resulting Gemini and Apollo programs made this not only a human achievement but a successful prediction. As a result, analysts of all stripes were quick to project the trend and predict a moon base, lunar communities by 2000, followed soon by trips to Mars and beyond, and on to the limits of space. . . .
“The last man to set foot on the moon was in 1973. The Space Shuttle tried to maintain forward momentum under the guise of scientific research, not without disaster, and an almost inconsequential international space station has been built. To this day there are many who cry into their soup over the lack of space exploration and conquest. So what happened? The groundswell of prediction was wrong because it failed to see that putting a few U.S. men into orbit did not add enough value to enough peoples’ lives to justify the expense—particularly in the economically uncertain 1970s. In the end, the majority of consumers voted with their wallets to postpone, if not entirely eviscerate, human space exploration.”

One could go into great detail, but simply put, the intertwined elements resulting in this poor view of the future were:

1. Failure to recognize user utility and the choice consumers make in determining the future. That is, for most people the cost of any space venturing is not worth the benefit (i.e. what benefit?) The fact that we “can do it” is hardly relevant. The real futures question is always: do most people want it? In the 1960s space was “worth it” (particularly in that the goal was clear and bounded) because spending billions on a prestige project made sense at a time of (a) absolute US economic prosperity and (b) ideological dispute with the USSR.

2. Projecting trends without considering the strength of underlying drivers. Space exploration was, apparently, on-the-up in the 1950s and 60s. But trends are only as good as the drivers that support them. When the drivers go away (lack of public support due to cost/benefit issues) the trend stops. In fact, there is no real, dependable, trend to space exploration. There was a blip in the 1960s when conditions temporarily favored a national prestige extravaganza. There wasn’t a trend before, and there hasn’t been any since.

3. Forecasting mired in the conditions or spirit of the present, the zeitgeist. Space was important in the golden-era 50s and 60s; and particularly in that it was arena of competition with the Soviets. But it’s always a mistake to assume the framing conditions of the present will exist in the future, and in this case 40 years later, they most certainly don’t.

Don’t hold your breath

What of 40 years time? It is quite likely that “space flip” flights into orbit will be safe and cheap enough to commercialized in the next decade. Unmanned probes (again safe and relatively cheap) will continue, and popular access to their images and experiences will be greatly enhanced. But that’s all that will happen until such time as costs and other conditions of possibility change fundamentally, which implies a completely new form of space travel, of energy, of materials, and of human resilience and longevity. Not in this century.

Wired Science ran a July 20 article “40 Years After Apollo 11, NASA Maps Out the Future,” which puts the best possible spin on  this unmanned-probe future. It is careful to end without crushing the feelings of space junkies, saying: “Any American landing on Mars through the Constellation program would come some time after 2030.” It won’t happen, and here’s another secret: if anyone is going to land anywhere it will be a Chinese person. China still has prestige projects ahead of it, and human space exploration could be one of them.

Samuel, L., Future: A Recent History, University of Texas Press, 2009

I recently received a copy of Future: A Recent History to review. True confession: what hit me first on picking up the book was (a) “wow, the title Future is not already taken!? And (b) what a fabulous job the University of Texas Press has done producing this book. It is beautifully designed, with an understated Art Deco motif, and carefully laid out with enough text on the page, on delightfully solid paper stock.
It may seem odd to go on about text on the page, but it’s much easier to read like an adult, in paragraphs. So many books, particularly business books, these days appear produced at 14-point, double spacing, like pre-school readers. Makes you wonder…

Anyway, author Larry Samuel’s project is to investigate the history of views of the future from 1920 to the present. (The book has an acknowledged US-centric focus, partially defended by the notion that future-mindedness is “a principle strand in America’s DNA.”) He organizes the book chronologically into six periods between then and now, and shows, with interesting examples, how each period had its own views of the future, and how the views shifted from period to period.

In tracing the history of “tommorowism,” in this way, Future is on a similar track to the classic book in this field: I.F. Clarke’s The Pattern of Expectation 1644-2001 (Jonathan Cape, 1979). It ultimately makes similar points, although Samuel’s argument is obviously drawn from more recent examples. As Samuel puts it: “A look back on how people looked forward reveals that while it possesses certain common themes … the future is not a fixed idea but a highly variable on that reflects the values of those who are imagining it.”

Happily I can say this chimes exactly with the argument of Future Savvy, particularly Chapter 4 “Zeitgeist & Perception,” where I argued how heavily the nature of the present and its topical issues frames how the future is seen (what is forecast, what is aspired to or feared, what counts as a valid method for thinking ahead, and so on). Which means the framing conditions of the present  should be carefully analyzed in assessing the validity of any future view.

Historiography

Historiography – investigating the meta-conditions surrounding what is recorded and how it is interpreted by historians – what counts as “history” and for whom –  is a well-understood part of doing good history. Unfortunately, there is no equivalent standard “futuriography” in the foresight field, despite it being absolutely fundamental to understanding the value of our own predictions as, similarly, highly determined by the epistemic configurations of their production. It is here that Samuel very competently fills a much needed gap.

The practical implication of this, which Future does not get into – it’s not that kind of book – is that to make better predictions (or make valid assessments of others’ predictions) we need to ask stiff questions as to how much of what we foresee is determined by the perspectives of today, and expect the answer to be “very much.” Understanding the limitations and biases of our own perspective is the sine-qua-non of a robust view of what tomorrow will actually bring.

They have a bit of the fashionable “SunTzu Art of War” feel to them, and some of the quotes may be apocryphal. But no matter. What’s really interesting in this very savvy list is how customer-focused the lessons are. As said in Future Savvy, and one can’t say it too many times, what customers (users, the public) want and the cost-benefit tradeoffs they will make is a MUCH more reliable guide to the future than any techno-fantasy.

The wisdoms also reflect a foresight industry insider truism and paradox: you seldom get to the future by asking the customer directly (e.g. in a focus group) what they would like to have. You have to leap for the customer (and use focus groups only to refine new offerings.)

The list:

“1. St Augustine said that it is a blessing from God that we can’t predict the future. If we predict prosperity, we will become complacent. If we predict evil, we will lose the ability to discriminate.

2 Sharp President Haruo Tsuji: ‘You cannot find out what the consumer wants only by doing market research. You need to pull the ideas out of your brain. Manufacturers of the future should not simply respond to market demands, they must create market demands.’

3. Konosuke Matsushita said: ‘Don’t try to fit your business to a forecast. Fit it to the needs of your customers.’

4. Toshiba President Sugiichio Watari: ‘Money doesn’t come falling into the headquarters of Toshiba. If you want money you need to go to the customers.’

5. President Yoshio Tateishi of Omron: ‘Learn from your customers. If you learn from internal resources you will become self-satisfied. If you learn from your competitors you will fall far behind.’

6. Professor Yoshiya Teramoto of Meiji Gakuin University: ‘When companies start a big market research project, it is one sign of the ‘big company’ disease.’

7. Tsuyoshi Kawanishi: ‘The way to predict the weather is to look at the sky. And, every once in a while, you can make your prediction by simply thinking.’

8. President Haruo Tsuji of Sharp says: ‘Don’t be a spider, be a honey bee.’

9. Takeshi Kaneda, a management critic, says: ‘After elaborate research to find out what the consumer wants, Ford produced the Edsel. It was a complete failure. Ford mistook what the customer wanted for what they would really buy. They ignored their insight and relied on consensus. Japanese tend to emphasize harmony and consensus. But insight and decisiveness can be more important.’

10. Someone says: ‘Figures do not lie. But liars often use figures.’”

Book reviews by SAMI fellows and associates
“Future Savvy” by Adam Gordon (American Management Association, 2009)

“Forecasts and predictions are ubiquitous. We are bombarded with views of the future on a plethora of subjects from myriad sources, with a diverse set of motivations and self-interests. Adam Gordon seeks to provide a practical users guide to the assessment and interpretation of all things about the future, with special emphasis on the cautions and ‘health warnings’ that need to be applied, so as not to be misled by forecasts. However, the author is careful not to veer towards over-cynical dismissal of all future projections; rather, he seeks to provide guidance to the reader on how to apply the necessary caveats, and in the author’s words “profit from change”.

The book covers a very broad field, from the basic issues of the misuse of data and statistics, covering the quality and validity of data as well as their misinterpretation, through technology forecasting, trend and horizon scanning to quantitative modelling and scenarios. The one theme common to all these activities is the need to be alert to bias, whether it be a deliberate motive to influence behaviour through a dire prediction; or a bias inherent in futurologists needing to see rapid and pervasive change in all areas of society – if it exists or not – and evangelising it.

The track record of much futurology is mixed. Well-known examples are quoted: television did not lead to the end of the cinema industry. Nor has space exploration led to people taking foreign holidays on other planets – yet! Bias may also lie in the beholder. The ‘Zeitgeist’ tendency, whereby we are all influenced by contemporary perceptions, affects not only how “experts” and professionals see the world, but also how the audience receives the views of the future – often with unprepared minds. The internal “official future” of an organisation can pose a real blind spot to its progress.

The weaknesses of much quantitative modelling are highlighted, with such forecasts only being as good as the assumptions on which they are based, but which are often not overtly stated. In contrast to the conceptual and practical errors inherent in much futures output, the role and advantages of scenario planning are emphasised as a tool for challenging assumptions and developing alternative futures: “It’s better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong”.

The penultimate chapter takes examples of relatively recent forecasts from a range of organisations, whose subjects range from US agricultural production to UK dementia sufferers. These are subjected to a form of ‘retro wind-tunnelling’ to illustrate the deficiencies in their construction and how they would have benefited from the application of methodologies described earlier in the book. The final chapter provides a summary checklist, or framework, to apply in evaluating forecasts and future predictions.

Adam Gordon has written a shrewd and perceptive book that deserves a wide readership, especially among managers in both the private and public sectors, as well as the familiar ‘general reader’. Those wishing a more detailed technical guide to the various forecasting and futurist methodologies will need to consult other standard works. Professionals in the fields of management and strategy consulting and scenario practitioners might well be familiar with many of the points made in the book. However, those with some savvy might do well to recommend the book to their clients.

Michael Owen, 20 April 2009

Pic: thisislondon.co.uk

Google introduced “Google Flu Trends” (US) in November as a way to visualize correlation between flu infections and flu-related searches. It maintains search levels provide early warning of flu spread because search data can be gathered and analyzed almost instantly, unlike traditional epidemiological reporting methods. (More on the goal of the project is in a post on swine flu on the official Google blog.)

The predictive power of Google spikes is hardly clear. Yes, a spike could suggest increased levels of infection. But it could be cause by media coverage and rising levels of pandemic concern.

Google predicts “no pandemic”

More broadly, however, the Google search phenomenon, and information saturation that goes with it is, I believe, highly predictive in epidemic situations. It predicts they are very unlikely. Generally, knowledge is power. Specifically deep and easily searchable public knowledge of where the epidemic is, and what to do to avoid it, and avoid spreading it, is a new condition in human history, one which in fact reliably predicts that no pandemic will happen. Yes, strains become more virulent and dangerous and even drug resistant, and yes, airlines transport it around the world in hours. But the power of knowledge in the labs and in the public at large is immense and ubiquitous in a way it never was before.

One of the debates in futures studies is how much and in what way to look at the past as a guide to the future. Paul Saffo says: look back at least as twice as far as you are trying forecast, and I agree with that. In thinking about a major modern global health epidemic our minds are in fact deeply conditioned by a 90-year-old event: the 1918 Influenza Pandemic that killed an estimated 50 million worldwide. In that epidemic there were particular conditions, not least four year of devastating war where more were lost to disease than fighting; associated drain on resistance and infrastructure; and forced mobiization of troops under poor conditions, that greatly facilitated the spread of the disease. Most importantly, ordinary people were operating in a knowledge vaccum that is unimaginable today.

This is not to say that we should not be vigilant and prepared. But the future that we most likely face is many-and-regular outbreaks like the swine flu, the avian flu, and so on, which we will move fairly quickly to contain. The dystopia of world pandemic is appealing to the health crisis community and its service providers, but the future will not be history (1918-1920) repeating itself.

It was in this spirit that I picked up the UK launch issue (aka May 2009) of Wired. Actually it’s not the first launch. Wired was in the UK ten years ago, but Condé Nast withdrew it in the dot.com crash. In the US at the time, I remember when Wired, the poster child of the Silicon Valley / Nasdaq bonanza, was almost as thick as a phone book each month. But those days were soon over.

Anyway, who could resist an offering that was about to tell me about my “Life in the future. “Fake Meat, Robots and Electro-Sex: the World is About to Change.” On the cover are, I kid you not, flying cars!

Now, I wouldn’t take this stuff seriously for a moment, if everyone else promised not to. But they don’t. So here we go. In the “What’s Next?” cover story 46 experts make 99 predictions about the next 40 years, and none of them will happen, or not in the time frame expressed.

Oh, moon settlement?

I shrink from sharing the list. Meal replacement patches, check. Moon settlement, check. The male pill, check. Every techno-fantasy of the jockish sci-fi world, check. Well, let’s stop on the male pill for a moment. Can we not do it? Sure we can do it – today. What’s stopping it is not technology. It is attitudes (machismo, essentially). So Wired experts are telling us that this will go away in a decade. Puh-leez.

I hardly need mention there’s no method given behind any of these expert forecasts.

Don’t you think Wired should be asking themselves why, in 2009, they are producing 186 pages of dead tree and carting it around the country in carbon-emitting trucks? Technology-vision may lead you to a view of the future. But it’s unreliable. The future is determined by what consumers are ready for. Well, that’s one of the 20-or-so key forecast filtering principles of Future Savvy.

Perhaps we should look at the cover story for what it is really about – which is selling magazines. Because, there’s no doubt that tech is changing, and many new capabilities are coming on stream, and this is very, very fascinating to imagine uses for. And this fascination is what Wired packages and sells. Don’t bet any money on the predictions though, certainly not their timeline.

But sturdy in some areas

Aside from the predicting lark, it’s a good magazine of its kind. The features are well-conceived, well-written, for example, one about how the BBC iPlayer business was built; a feature on sea salvage; a profile of PayPal founder Elon Musk; the David X Li formula and how it mis-calculated risk, and so on. Great stuff. Actually quite a sturdy business-oriented-view of techno-change, if you can get past the boys-with-toys riff of the magazine as a whole.

So, actually, much to like. Just, please, don’t think a lad’s mag is going to tell you anything coherent about the future.

Amazon the new Wal-Mart? pic:Huffington Post

According to yesterday’s LA Times Amazon says the whole thing was a cataloging error. But when author Mark Probst had previously contacted Amazon for an explanation, he got this: “In consideration of our entire customer base, we exclude “adult” material from appearing in some searches and best seller lists.”

Aside: Everyone is trying to figure out what Twitter is good for, or how it will be used, and it has become clear that one application is to quickly aggregate mass protest, evidenced in the anti-Amazon outrage, see Twitter “Amazonfail.”

Author Maya Reynolds has been connecting the dots in the future of publishing, watching Amazon move via acquisitions such as Abe Books, Audible, BookFinder, BookSurge, Brilliance Audio, FillZ, GoJaba, Library Thing, Mobipocket and Shelfari.

She is among various industry watchers who claim, with fair evidence, that Amazon is following a “Wal-Mart” strategy – the well-documented essence of which is to gain enough retailer power to be able to pressure suppliers (telling them what to make or what to charge, or exacting special discounts) to achieve better retail prices and get more retailer power, in a reinforcing spiral which, inter alia, squeezes all the healthy mom-’n-pop-shop diversity and other balances of power out of the industry.

In a post of July 08 she paints the full dystopia scenario:
“1. First, the smaller presses, POD presses and e-publishers will disappear as Amazon’s margins squeeze them out of business. Amazon will help the process along by offering better terms to authors if they will use BookSurge’s POD press and Kindle’s e-book to publish. Even if authors don’t embrace Amazon initially, as their publishers go out of business, they will be forced to do so.
“2. Brick-and-mortar stores have two constraints which Amazon does not: (1) limited shelf space and (2) a limited geographic range. Bookstores carry books “on spec,” filling their shelves with stock they hope readers will seek. Amazon, on the other hand, has unlimited virtual shelf space and unlimited geographic reach. Amazon does not have to warehouse stock. They can wait until a book is actually ordered and the money is in hand before using a digital file and BookSurge to print the book. Because they cannot match the deep discounts Amazon offers, bricks-and-mortar bookstores–already under siege–will be squeezed out of existence.
“3. Like Wal-Mart, Amazon will continue to apply pressure on publishers to give more favorable terms. Wal-Mart’s suppliers used cheaper materials and out-sourced to cheaper overseas labor. As the publishing houses’ profit margins are squeezed, their cost-cutting efforts will take three directions: (1) Focus even more attention on signing best-selling authors whose work is guaranteed to sell; (2) Begin to pressure their mid-list authors to accept lower advances and lower royalty percentages; and (3) Sign fewer and fewer new authors because of the uncertainty and the expense of growing a new writer.

Where will they go?

“4. Mid-list authors and new authors, unable to either find a publisher or unwilling to accept the low royalties, will seek to self-publish. Where will they go? Since, by that time, most of the self-publishing houses will have gone out of business, they will go to Amazon’s BookSurge or to Amazon’s e-book division, Kindle. Amazon will welcome them.
“5. The next death on the food chain will be the publishers and agents themselves. First the mid-level publishers will die. Well-known agents and the larger houses will be protected for a period of time by their best-selling authors who are loyal to them. However, as those cash cows die off, so will the agents and larger houses. A new paradigm will emerge: Amazon as both publisher and retailer.
“6. Eventually Amazon will have so much power, they will be able to decide WHAT is worthy of being published. Welcome to the future of publishing.”

Is this the future of publishing? The logic of unregulated industry power suggests it is. But Future Savvy says response – regulation – is also likely. As with Microsoft and many before them, when Amazon gets too powerful, anti-trust regulators should be in business. But only if their hand is pushed. Articulate and persuasive dystopias such as Reynolds’ are the single most powerful mechanism by which the word is spread (spread it! forward it, tweet it!) so that enough consumers get to see and believe threatening future outcomes early enough, and pressure regulators to act.

Guinness' view of the pub of 2259. Image credit: Chris Bainbridge

The Guinness Pub-of-the-Future is a St. Patrick’s day (March 17) promotion. Nothing wrong with a little bit of fantasy foresight. But what they come up is so “20th-century-futurism” it’s hilarious. Among various reports on the project – for example in the Telegraph – the following features are foreseen:

- robotic doorman, greets you by name
- cash obsolete; orders via RFID; payments deducted automatically
- your product tailored to you on the spot
- touch-sensitive tables, send your order straight to the bar
- socializing via virtual / hologram technology
- a running tally of the number of units consumed.

Yawn. Even on it’s own terms (minimal constraints of realism) this is a totally derivative piece of foresight. These “innovations” are the staples of an infotech view of the future, and they have all been thought and spoken of countless times. Also many of the elements and services cited are already here, or not more than a decade away. What we have is the current pub assumptions + digital steriods, while the year 2259 will be, truly, another world.

The limits to growth
But all this leads us to more interesting industry foresight problem. Will there be pubs in even a generation, never mind 250 years? What the Telegraph dryly observes at the bottom of its report is that 39 pubs are closing every week Why? A number of driving forces are coming together:

First is strict drink-driving limits, which makes “the local” literally local or nothing. Second, pubs in the UK have traditionally been a refuge from housing that was poor and/or underheated. Unprecedented waves of affluence (credit-crunch notwithstanding) have led to widespread housing “do-ups.” It’s now a valid option for most people to spend their leisure time at home and entertain at home.

Then there’s the where’s-my-friend trend. You’re likely to go down the pub if your friends are there, but not if they are where most people’s friends are: on Facebook.

The social-legislative clock
Fourth, no matter how you dress it up, pubs are retail outlets. So, like all retail they are under the cosh in a Wal-mart / Tesco world. The price gap between store and pub has become too great for most consumers to cross with good conscience.

Which brings us to the current price-floor legislation bid. Alcohol is a huge social cost in terms of health care and violence. Drink costs the NHS £3bn a year, and the total price of alcohol to the taxpayer is estimated at five times that. Eventually these costs will become unjustifiable so, like smoking before it, the social-legislative clock is ticking for booze. As the 2-martini lunch has become the 2-seltzer lunch, the trend to social stigmatization is clear, and legislators will follow (not with Prohibition, but with a much more subtle community-endorsed squeeze).

Like the good politician he is, Gordon Brown won’t let his party get ahead of the trend. But the trend is clear and it bodes ill for pubs.

The IFTF’s full map is available for download here.  Quick aside: these maps, putting complex forces into visuals, have defined IFTF’s public (and client, one presumes) communications for over five years, and have raised the bar of excellence in the foresight communications. The company has produced many such outstanding maps, some publicly available.

The new map and Sir Fred-gate are unrelated of course. But here was the connection for me: The IFTF map lists six “Key Driving Forces” (2007-2017) in the area of sustainability, and the first is:
“An Imperative for Looking Long: The 21st century will test our ability to grasp the future impacts of present choices, but even as we struggle to incorporate future knowledge into our day-to-day decisions, we’re tuning up our bodies and minds and even our cultural frameworks for a much longer view.”

My question is, “really?” Is the long view really a driver – something that will drive change and shape the future? Or do we hope it is. Are we trying to talk it into being?

No question that the long-term view is crucial. Solving just about any social, technological, or environmental problem requires sustained long-term action. And everyone who works in foresight keeps evangelizing long-termism. But, in fact, what we have in industry and government is rampant short-termism and there is no indication this will change, despite the crisis and many heartfelt calls.

Linking big to long

The problem with Sir Goodwin’s package (in career and in retirement) is that the reward numbers were based on short-term company returns. “Hey, we made lots of money this year, so you get a big bonus, and you get a big bonus,” etc. But a few years down the line  – in the long term – it turns out that no bonuses were valid (if a bonus is, truly, a reward for success).

Put it another way: in finance, as in other aspects of society, technology, and the environment, we don’t know if we’ve succeeded or failed until the long-term numbers are in. Few would have a problem with handsome rewards for a valuable job well done, but those rewards must surely be delayed, and delayed, until we are in command of the long view of the performance.

Easy in theory, hard in practice. Perhaps impossible in practice when most politicians and legislators are themselves on a short 3-7 year cycle, like CEOs. I have some inkling from the IFTF map that the thinking is that life-extending technologies will improve to the point where people will really see themselves in for the long haul, and so adopt a longer perspective on benefits and rewards.

Time on the clock

Perhaps. But, life-technologies aside, plenty of decision-makers – Goodwin included – still have a lot of time left on the clock and that doesn’t appear to stop them chasing and cashing in short-term incentives at the expense of the future. Or legislators (and the public who votes them in) structuring performance rating on our immediate perception of their performance.

What we have, and what we have increasingly had (the trend) over the past few decades, is systemic short-termism. Winning in the next annual report or the next election is what what leaders’ rewards are based on. Incentives for politicians or business leaders or even scientists or engineers to make a better world for 2025 or 2050 are negligable.

Until there is reason to anticipate that this fundamental underlying short-term incentive structure and mentality changes (that is – convince me – who will change it and how?) the future savvy perspective must say that the “long-term imperative” remains a nice sound-bite, but not a material driver of anything.

The story covers the pilot project of two San Francisco newspapers seeking to create an online edition. The presenter starts: “Imagine if you will sitting down with your morning coffee and turning to your computer to read the day’s newspaper. Well it’s not as far fetched as it seems…”

28 years later it’s exactly what we do. But it seemed far-fetched then, and this was not a misjudgment: it has taken us until now, the full 28 years in most developed countries, to get to the point where mass online newspapers rival mass print editions in the market. What might that tell us about what seems far-fetched now, whether it will happen or not, and how long it will take? How does it improve our foresight?

$10 plays 20c, but not for long
The news clip features early 1980s computers – the text-only green screens – and achingly slow phone-set modems. A newspaper takes two hours to download (with no picture, ads, or comics). So there are technology limitations.

Then there are economic barriers: the local-call hourly charge is $5 (=$10 for the paper) while the print copy costs 20c.

And there are system-wide market-adoption issues: there are only “two to three thousand” home computers in the Bay Area at the time. Home computer penetration is obviously related to utility (usefulness/cost) of the machine.

But in 1981 home computers were about to get a whole lot better for a whole lot less – and with this programmers would be drawn into turning the technology into something we actually need, and ultimately can’t do without – all driving towards the utility jump that signals mainstream adoption. But at the time home computers were an unimaginably small niche of the total media market.

Fast forward to 2037 and what might we be able to say about it? First, that the pilot projects of important new mainstream markets already exist today (along with great business opportunities). The technologies involved are, now, incredibly clunky and expensive, meaning consumer utility is laughably low. But this will steadily unravel to the point where the technology is fantastic and affordable, and voila! We will have fundamental transition and entirely new mainstream markets.

But the most important lesson of all is this: it will take a generation. The future never cuts corners. All fundamental changes in social and market patterns take at least a generation, if not more. There’s a well-known truism in foresight work, which is this: we tend to overestimate the pace of change, but underestimate how all-encompassing it will be, once it comes.

The mood is justly sombre at the World Economic Forum’s Davos meeting this year, as grim-faced world leaders mull over the dismal state of the global economy and how to fix it. This is in marked contrast to recent years, when the top executives were warmly congratulating themselves on the general state of things.

In one sense this is perfectly understandable. The crisis is upon us and leaders should be directly and practically involved in tackling it. On another level it’s profoundly disturbing, because world leaders and senior managers should be doing more than merely responding to situations. When crises occur, crisis management becomes part of a leader’s job, but their real job is thinking ahead effectively to avoid crises and, on the positive side, develop opportunities.

Put another way: the heads of a companies or countries – Davos-level people – are tasked far beyond effective daily management. They are tasked, fundamentally, with negotiating the VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous) world on behalf of the rest of us. If not them, then who?

This requires foresight and vision. In this sense, many who are at Davos this week are responsible for the current crisis. They failed to foresee it, in fact they generally endorsed the growth of complex financial instruments, the shadow banking system, and private equity growth –- much of which bypassed SEC or equivalent regulation, and which is now seen to be the root cause of the meltdown.

In fact much of the “new finance” system was thought to spread and therefore actually lower risk. Turns out that was a poor view of the future. In fact the present situation as a whole is the result of key decision-makers operating on a poor view of future. As a group, their mental model was not open to bad outcomes, or even just alternative outcomes to what was commonly expected.

Could we have thunk it?

Their response might be: “nobody can predict the future!” “Easy to say after the event!” This is true. But it’s common knowledge that there were those who foresaw the mess — The Times identified at least 10. As Davos attendees might now be forced to agree, some forecasts are clearly better than others.

This is where executive leaders can learn from the foresight field and particularly the history of failed predictions. Everyone relies on predictions for their guide to the future – nobody can be an expert in every field. And there’s never a shortage of them – they are frequently published in the media, offered by consultancies and think tanks, and are a key part of Davos.

While getting a prediction is easy, the key leadership skill is to be able to tell a good one from a bad one: that’s what turns a forecast into a strategic resource. That is what leads to better decisions, better plans, and better actions.

Can one do that? Can one critically assess a particular or consensus-held view of the future, to identify its strengths and weaknesses? Absolutely yes. Among the tests one can run on a prediction are:

•    assessing motivation – who is speaking and what their agenda might be, particularly if they have an interest in maintaining a current system or shaping the emergence of a new one
•    determining whether the tools used are appropriate to the level and type of uncertainty faced. High-uncertainty situations and long-term views require different approaches to standard modeling
•    questioning consensus mental-models and forcing consideration of alternative outcomes. All foresight is swayed by “zeitgeist” – spirit of the times – and good forecasts swim against this tide.

These are just a few among the many forecast tests one can run, as detailed in Future Savvy.  But even if Davos attendees had been applying just these three in previous years, their foresight would have been greatly improved. It won’t help with this crisis, but it might forestall the next.

* This article, authored by Adam Gordon, was first edited and published by Bnet.co.uk

Microsoft - Computer Electronics Show 2009

Product prototype communication is a close cousin of scenario building. Typically the company creates their product or service in action, in the future, being used by happy customers, their “preferred future” scenario. Prototype communication doesn’t typically build in alternative scenarios, the litmus test of strategy-based scenario work. It’s more a kite-flying exercise, designed to put out a future-oriented message to stakeholders and the public, garner broad feedback, and (if you’re powerful like Microsoft) put up “this-is-the-future-of-the-industry” markers.

Nevertheless, with the caveat that they are one among many plausible outcomes, product showcase scenarios can be an eye-opening guide to what’s actually possible and what the future will be like.

A newly released Microsoft “Future of Computing” video, showcased at CES 2009 in Las Vegas in the past few days, is an example. The 10-minute piece, presented by Janet Galore, Program Manger: Strategic Prototyping, takes us through a scenario of interactive education in the future (when, exactly, is not said but the implication is it’s not too far off) showing how participants would find, use, and share information across devices and across platforms.

What we see is a tablet PC that can communicate seamlessly with other electronics and interact with Web info on the fly. Okay nothing new there. What’s interesting is how it’s all held together by surface computing, a smart desk with a screen, which allows information to be viewed in the process of collaboration, sharing, and filing.  In some futurist fantasies it is thought that communication is ideally invisible (my phone e-handshakes your phone without me doing anything, etc.) But actually humans mostly seem to prefer to see what’s happening, and to have the choice to interact with what is happening while it’s happening – not least so they know what machines have done and don’t have to pull their hair out before they find their precious work buried four subdirectories into the Temp folder… sheesh. But I digress.

The scenario focuses on organizing and sharing multiple inputs, therein making a pretty clear statement about the future: what will be really valuable is not access to information anywhere, anytime (an assumed, table-stakes factor), but a way to share and collaborate with the information in an productive way. It refreshingly assumes that whiz-bang graphics – they are there too – are the easy stuff, but that collaboration and teamwork are the hard things to get right, and the truly valuable service given the chaos of billions of voices and trillions of data objects that pertain in any human-work future.

The other real strength of the prototype and related scenario is its close attention to natural (or, at least, strongly socialized, conventional, classic) human ways of doing things, which are slow to change, and therefore will change slowly. The smart desk is something one can really see oneself sitting around, because this is what we already do. Also this future of computing envisages no stylus, no mouse, no magic wand to master. Rather, we move digital stuff around the desk with our hands. We point to it and we shift it. That is, digital capability accommodates and interlaces with Stone Age human and organizational patterns. That’s why this view of the future is persuasive.

This punditry is widely read, and sometimes published in respectable places. Some of it is just year-end fun, and nothing wrong with that. But there is also a failed-forecast “nyah-nyah” that is corrosive to the foresight field in general, which demands answers. So at the risk of giving the 20/20 hindsight artists undue oxygen of attention, here are a few thoughts:

Consider Foreign Policy’s “10 Worst Predictions for 2008.” (Dec, 2008). Highlights include:

“If [Hillary Clinton] gets a race against John Edwards and Barack Obama, she’s going to be the nominee. Gore is the only threat to her, then. … Barack Obama is not going to beat Hillary Clinton in a single Democratic primary. I’ll predict that right now.” —William Kristol, Fox News Sunday, Dec. 17, 2006

“Should I be worried about Bear Stearns in terms of liquidity and get my money out of there?’ No! No! No! Bear Stearns is fine! Do not take your money out … —Jim Cramer, responding to a viewer’s e-mail on CNBC’s Mad Money, March 11, 2008 [Bear Stearns was sold to J.P. Morgan Chase at about a 90% discount to it market capitalization at the time of the forecast]

“The possibility of $150-$200 per barrel seems increasingly likely over the next six-24 months.” —Arjun Murti, Goldman Sachs oil analyst, in a May 5, 2008, report [Oil was then around $130 a barrel. By late December it was below $40.]

Or this one from Business Week’s list of 10 (December 24, 2008)

“Existing-Home Sales to Trend Up in 2008″ —Headline of a National Association of Realtors press release, Dec. 9, 2007 [On Dec. 23, 2008, the group said November sales were running at an annual rate of 4.5 million—down 11% from a year earlier—in the worst housing slump since the Depression.]

The Future Savvy question is: how should we think about predictions like this? And how should we think about failed-forecast spotting?

1. Failed-forecast spotting is not remotely “scientific”
This should be obvious, but somehow never is. Purposefully extracting the failed forecasts from the total set of forecasts says nothing about the quality of the set in general. Many did predict Obama; did predict the downturn, etc.

2. Failed-forecast spotting raises a healthy skepticism, but runs to nihilism
Despite not passing any credible test of knowledge, at least failed-forecast spotting stokes apprehension about forecasts and the wisdom of experts. At base this is healthy. Prediction is hard, and it is mostly done poorly. And experts often transgress the boundaries of their expertise. (Typically, in this instance, they know a lot about their field, but often don’t know more than the next Joe about the future of their field, often because their expertise is wedded to existing practices and assumptions.)
Prediction skepticism is fine. What happens, however, is that tempts a “nobody can predict anything” nihilism. This is its own failing because many predictions are in fact excellent, producing good foresight, which is a key strategic and competitive advantage.

3. Often the short term future is harder to see.
This is the trickiest insight of the lot. As everyone knows, it’s impossible to accurately predict the future (which is not the same as usefully predict the future, see arguments in other posts). The world is just too complex, too chaotic. But there’s a wrinkle. It should be that the further we look into the future the harder it is to see. The world will change more – there is more time for unpredictable things to happen. The short-term future (one year, say) is closer to us, it should be more like today and we should be able to anticipate it better.

In fact, short-term foresight is the most impossible task: a casino game. In the longer term (10-20 years, say) strong trends can be relied on to have had their impact. For example, the move away from fossil fuels, or effective nanotechnology engineering, or simple domestic robotics, can be reliably forecast. But while the sweep of these and other similar evolutions are reliable over time, the short-term picture will suffer lags or reversals that follow no pattern at all. (It’s no accident that is this is just like the stock market. In the long term the market will go up, in the short term it can go anywhere.) Also short-term predictive failure is compounded by the fact that the standard to which it is held is higher – we expect specifics: dates, places, numbers, players, winners – that are not demanded of a long-term view. In other words, near-term predictions are all about “point forecasts,” and there’s nothing more impossible than a point forecast unless you believe in tea leaves and crystal balls.

The take away: short-term point forecasts really are a mugs game and the skeptics are right. Medium-long forecasts, when well done, are worthy of our strategic and competitive attention.

In many ways, focusing on whether “this” or “that” is predicted, or not predicted, is to put the cart before the horse. The horse is the adequacy of our approach to anticipating outcomes and the quality of our foresight as a whole. When this is good, the cart – not missing important changes – will follow.

Credit: http://www.lewrockwell.com/blog

In this, it’s important to realize that many did predict the financial crisis (as many predicted 9/11 in various ways). Sticking with the financial crunch for now: it has generally been portrayed it as a “why-didn’t-anyone-see-it-coming” event. It wasn’t. Hats off to The Times for their October 12 piece: “10 People Who Predicted the Financial Meltdown.”(Summary here). Allowing for a fairly loose definition of “predicted,” the article shows that among those who foresaw the crunch were: Vince Cable, deputy leader of the Liberal Democrats (2003); US congressman Ron Paul (2003); Stephen Roach, senior executive at Morgan Stanley (2004); Christopher Wood – chief strategist of a broking firm in the Asia-Pacific Market (2005); and Nouriel Roubini, economics professor at NYU (2006)… and there were many others.

A different problem

So this reframes the problem entirely. It’s not that the predictions were not there. It was that not enough people believed them and, particularly, important decision-makers didn’t believe them or didn’t have the institutional capacity to respond. So there are two halves to the problem: the ability to see the full spectrum of what may happen, including unexpected outcomes; and the ability to act on what we see. Quality in foresight work – the raison d’etre of Future Savvy – makes it possible to see more outcomes more clearly, and to act with more confidence in choosing what to prepare for. (In the real world we can’t prepare for every outcome.)

There was a good letter published in the FT from eminent futurist Peter Schwartz on December 2, which describes this very well. It shows predictions for what they are (one-horse scenarios), and how decision-makers are typically bound into inaction or wrong action not only by working on the basis of a wrong prediction, but by the predictive mindset itself. This mindset – the habit or culture of picking “one right answer” in the face of a complex situation with many competing outcomes, prematurely closes alternatives and leaves us open to surprise. As Schwartz says, as scenario planners have always said (and he was one of the people who defined the field in the first place), a compelling set of alternative future scenarios encourages decision-makers to recognize unlikely and unpopular outcomes, along with expected outcomes, and therefore to be able to respond earlier and more effectively whatever happens.

Scenarios also contribute to the “act” side of the problem. In a well-done set for the banking industry, a financial-meltdown scenario would at least have been in play, institutionalizing the consideration of less unlikely, less popular outcomes in company and government forums, forcing serious consideration of necessary strategies and contingencies, and therein creating the ability to act early and effectively without having predicted the crisis.

The letter is well worth quoting in full:

Sir, The real question regarding the financial crisis is not, as the Queen asked: “Why did nobody see this coming?” In fact, any number of thoughtful people in academia, politics and business had been compiling the data and sounding warnings for several years.
The question we should be asking is: “Why didn’t decision-makers believe that a global financial meltdown was increasingly likely and then act on that belief?” Or, to put it another way: “What would it take to make decision-makers both believe and act?”

The problem is that decision-makers believe that they are forced to pick one right answer: the most likely scenario. Their approach to decision-making does not afford them the opportunity to consider apparently low probability but highly consequential scenarios. The answer, therefore, to the “believe” half of the question is a decision-making process that considers several scenarios: compelling stories about alternative futures that incorporate the analysis of “outliers” and describe three or four plausible paths forward.
Good scenarios force decision-makers to challenge their own assumptions and reconsider what is possible. As a result, they can take seriously those scenarios that seemed less likely at first, but whose plausibility increases over time.

The second part of the question – “What would it take to act?” – is much harder to address. Suppose that Ben Bernanke or Hank Paulson had come to believe a year or two ago that the house of cards was about to collapse and trigger cascading, global failures. What would they have done, given the realities of the complex interconnected systems at the heart of the problem? Perhaps if they had good scenarios with appropriate indicators to start with, they could have rehearsed different strategies and contingencies. Importantly, these decision-makers could have used these scenarios to persuade others on all sides of the issue also to recognise the complexity of the impending crisis in a more timely way. It’s never easy to convince everyone around you that the game they have been playing to their great benefit is about to change. But with a shared recognition of the magnitude of the risks and the ways they might unfold, they could have acted far earlier to prevent some of the dire consequences that have occurred, let alone what is to come.