Future Savvy: Quality in Foresight

I was lucky enough to have Future Savvy included in a lengthy review of critical thinking in forecasting & foresight, done on the SmithySmithy “info-savvy” blog. The post also included Nassim Taleb’s ‘The Black Swan’ (2007) and ‘Fooled By Randomness’ (2005); Kenneth Posner’s ‘Stalking the Black Swan’ (2010), and Chris Luebkeman’s Drivers of Change (2009).

As Stoyko’s is head-and-shoulders the most insightful and thorough assessments of the book itself, and the book in context, I’m reposting it here, with thanks. There are also fabulous graphics added, such as these (see more below):

“My search led to Adam Gordon’s Future Savvy. Like Posner, Gordon challenges Taleb’s blanket dismissal of forecasting. Gordon does not deny the existence of Black Swan events. And his book is a giant compendium of all of the things that usually go wrong with predictions. Moreover, Gordon offers a sceptical discussion of the subject that chastises simple-minded futurists, tech enthusiasts, and various other prophets of doom and boom. The difference between Taleb and Gordon is that Gordon doesn’t dismiss out-of-hand the usefulness of structured thinking about the future. Many important decisions require us to speculate about what the future might hold. Gordon wants us to be savvy in the way we anticipate the future instead of flying by the seats of our pants, so to speak.

“To set the stage, Gordon talks about how the forecasting industry is rife with problems. There are no standards, no accepted methods, no standard terminology. There are no penalties for failure given that people tend to forget forecasts by the time they can be proven wrong. And when dealing with the forecasts offered by pundits, stakeholders, and activists, Gordon reminds us, “we are knee deep in predictive wishful thinking, scare-mongering, or blatant self-promotion.” (p. 5) Buyer beware.

“Then there are the data problems. Forecasters use data from the past to project trends into the future. They rely heavily on data gathered for other purposes, not gathered for the task at hand. Availability is patchy. The data comes from multiple sources and is created using different methods. Important statistical caveats get lost. The context of the original studies gets forgotten. Variables are often defined loosely … and change over time … and are measured differently in different places. Data gathering methods often change over time in ways that exaggerate or obscure a trend. Sensationalist “newsy” data often commands the most attention. Some things are inherently difficult or impossible to measure accurately. All sorts of assumptions get embedded in data projected into the future. Furthermore, Gordon talks about the ways in which numbers can be finessed in an underhanded way. He advocates “number scepticism”, warning: “But no matter how scientific the data appears, choices have been exercised at every point about what to observe, what to count, how to measure it, and how to report it. … But numbers are not bedrock. There is no bedrock.” (p. 59)

“As an aside, statisticians have a snide nickname for analysts who mix’n’match statistics from a hodgepodge of sources to create complicated models or story-lines. That nickname is junk-yard dog. Gordon gives the impression that the forecasting business is, by necessity, heavily populated with these collectors.

“The sources of potential error don’t end with data. Our biases cause us to misinterpret and misreport the data.

“Some bias is intentional manipulation. Rascally analysts ignore or downplay countervailing evidence. They give evidence less scrutiny if it confirms the desired result. Emotionally charged language and associations are used. Terms are defined in leading ways. Extreme cases are used to represent the norm. Forecasts that don’t accord with an agenda get ignored, especially if the forecast is sponsored by a powerful interest. Organisational incentives can cause those being scrutinised to fudge the numbers. When forecasts are presented to the media, the most extreme trends get attention and important caveats remain unreported. Gordon is particularly critical of the so-called futurists who use “stretch thinking” and “big-picture thinking” to imagine a world full of only big changes. Many have a technophile bias, or the assumption that technology is the sole motive-force of large-scale societal change. Gordon’s advice is to keep your guard up and be wary of motives.

“Setting aside the thinness of this advice, Gordon has a strange attitude when talking about manipulation. He makes a distinction between forecasts that attempt to be accurate and forecasts that attempt to influence. Employee-prodding managers, partisan policy wonks, and alarmist activists use loaded forecasts to move minds. Humility, qualification, and tentativeness don’t have a place in these circles. There may be a legitimate reason for using leading forecasts, such as communicating the art-of-the-possible or giving someone an ambitious target to strive for. However, leading forecasts without full disclosure are instruments of underhanded manipulation. Gordon is eerily agnostic. His advice and tone of voice suggests that he is oblivious to the ethical problems posed by the manipulative use of forecasts. It’s a strange contrast with Gordon’s advice about being careful and pragmatically sceptical. [Editor's note: Agnostic? Moi? Hardly, but perhaps the chill of my irony was not chilly enough.]

“Back to the sources of error.

“Gordon itemises a number of cognitive biases that are inherent to the way we think. We often miss Black Swan events and abrupt changes in prevailing wisdom (“paradigm shifts”), he argues, because we are always filtering information based on perceived relevance. This “inattentional blindness” causes us to not notice important influences on the future. We also overemphasize recent happenings over older events (the recency effect). We’re susceptible to herd thinking and faddish ideas. A few chance events are often mistakenly interpreted as a trend or other pattern. Gordon places particular emphasis on how our current context frames the way we see and think (situational bias), especially how the prevailing mindset and preoccupations of an era skew the way we think about the future (Zeitgeist bias). For example, nuclear-powered airplanes may have seemed inevitable to someone living in the 1950s, a time preoccupied with thoughts of nuclear technology, suggests Gordon. That notion seems absurd today. To counter this problem, he argues for the need to extract the assumptions underpinning our expectations. Those assumptions need to be questioned and tested. And one good test is to reverse the assumption; that is, consider how the future would be different if the opposite (or very different) assumption were used.

I would add that people habitually rely on lazy assumptions about the future in general. As Howard Segal points out in his book Technological Utopianism in American Culture (2005), late-19th and early-20th-Century intellectuals assumed a technological plateau when describing the future. Even today, we assume our arrival at some destination—a future steady state—instead of a world of on-going change that is unevenly distributed and erratically paced, as exists now.

Gordon invites us to consider the utility people derive from a particular technology before jumping to conclusions about how it will revolutionise everyone’s lives. Tech-happy futurists are too quick to assume broad public acceptance of a new technology while ignoring the trade-offs of adoption. There are costs to be considered. In many cases, the price is too high and existing technologies do a good enough job. Or old technologies have an inertia, such as when users are “locked in” to a particular technology. Or social values change. Or switching creates undue inconvenience and aggravation. Or the technology has uneven appeal across diverse groups in society. Or, or … Gordon reminds us that simple technological domino effects almost never happen. The pace of change is usually slower than anticipated. A variety of factors determine how successful an innovation will be.

That leads us to the dynamics of change. I’m not going to describe each dynamic in detail. Gordon devotes a lot of space to them. Instead, I’ve listed them iconographically in the following diagram. Note that the darker lines signify consequences (and consequences of consequences; a.k.a. second-order and third-order events).

“A trend observed today may not continue onward along a straight-forward path. Trends peter out … change course … hit limits … get caught in reinforcing loops … have side-effects … provoke reactions … et cetera. The same goes for underlying causes. Trends can be particularly difficult to track within the complex systems that govern our lives. Thus, Gordon offers a chapter on system analysis.

“As someone who studies organisations, I’m often seeing policies and strategies change with sadly predictable pendulum swings. Gung-ho leaders push in one direction with gusto only to get a lesson in humility. Their efforts hit limits and opposition. Their assumptions hit reality. Subsequent leaders see wreckage everywhere and push in the opposite direction, looking for balance. Balance alludes them and they go to far. Another pendulum swing begins. Some swings happen from season to season. Others happen over decades. These swings may be predictable, but their exact timing certainly isn’t.

“Gordon rounds out Future Savvy with a utilitarian survival-guide of sorts. His big advice is that “it’s better to be vaguely right than exactly wrong.” Success is being alert to important changes and being prepared to cope, not with having accurate predictions. Narrowing down the things that need to be prepared for is an important practical benefit. In that spirit, Gordon talks about the strengths and weaknesses of using multiple scenarios instead of pat forecasts. He steps the reader through the analysis of some forecasts while looking for weaknesses. A chapter-long battery of questions is offered to guide the analysis. These questions do a good job of summarising the book.

“All told, Future Savvy is an excellent textbook for those who want to discipline the way they think about the future. I disagree with Gordon’s tangents about the inherently subjective nature of truth. I also have a few qualms about his take on scepticism. But these tangents rarely get in the way of his stock-taking exercise. That exercise has led me to be even more suspicious of forecasting, especially forecasts in volatile industries where data is patchy and assumptions are legion. I’d love to know the success rate of high-tech cheer-leaders … er, research firms that peddle forecasting numbers. Gordon dismisses the tracking of forecast failures as “smirk lists”. I’m with Taleb and his tsk tsking. If these numbers are just part of the hype machine and have a dismal track-record, then what good are they? Validation for reckless investment strategies? Fodder for misleading Power­Point slides? Numbers that give a false sense of being in-touch with the market? Tsk tsk.

“That said, Future Savvy has increased my interest in foresight more generally. Gordon’s guide left me wondering how I can better prepare groups of decision-makers to think about the future. How do we get them to see the many changes afoot with greater foresight?”

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I’m always looking for ways to explain the role of quality foresight in everyday management, so I liked this little animated gif from managewell.com.

Imagine driving down a country road when a street dog starts chasing your car. The dog attacks the car, but by the time it gets close, the car has moved ahead, so the dog changes direction and attacks the new coordinates. This goes on as the dog adapts, but it never quite catches up, and once it is following behind it is obviously too slow to catch up. Had it thought ahead and run straight it would have had its day with the tires.

The resulting curve looks something like this:

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In mathematics, this is known as the ‘curve of pursuit. The dog is attacking the problem as it sees it right now, but by the time it reaches it, the problem has moved on a few steps. A ‘problem-solving’ approach like this is going to prolong the time it takes to get to key decisions, and give the initiative to competitors. The better approach in managing moving situations — and all situations are moving — is to anticipate and tackle tomorrow’s position today.

Obviously the devil is in the quality of the anticipation, but for that there is Future Savvy and other key resources that exist for determining quality in foresight work. Industry foresight can never be done perfectly, but it can be done well enough to avoid the “dog chase” future-management style that characterizes much of industry leadership.

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Successful people are considered to be better future prognosticators than average. Why? Because it is assumed they must have known something about the future at some previous point in order to become as successful as they are. (Unfortunately Taleb’s various injunctions as to the workings of randomness fall on deaf ears, as do Gladwell’s many observations as to the tricky relationship between cause and effect.)

In 1995, at the height of Microsoft’s power over the economy and the zeitgeist (before Google came into its own, before Apple renewed, etc.) Bill Gates wrote “The Road Ahead,” which was, as one would expect, a broadly techno-optimistic look at the future. Did it see 9/11? No. Iraq War 2? No. The Credit Crunch? No. For a start it only really thinks about digital technology, and that’s going to be a very partial guide to the road ahead, at best.

But, in a recent The Atlantic article, “Bill Gates: More Profit than Prophet,” Tom McNichol evaluates Gates’s foresight on its own terms. As reproduced below, he finds it more “miss” than “hit.”

In general, Gates makes the mistakes outlined in Future Savvy, particularly in predicting the future based on its technological possibility rather than economic or social practicality. He’s short on systemic/feedback thinking and therefore misses side effects and unintended consequences. He also falls into the wishful-thinking bias: mixing up what he and (and Microsoft business) would like the future to be with what it really will be.

This last factor is less a mistake than a classic tool of future advocacy, and Gates would no doubt admit to a bit of this. It is illuminating (and sobering for future predictors) to see how much of the digital future Microsoft had within in its area of control in 1995, which it ceded to others. That lowered Microsoft’s ability to influence the road ahead and therefore weakened Gates’ predictions.

The McNichol analysis (shortened in places):

E-Mail
Prediction: Gates wrote, “Electronic mail and shared screens will eliminate the need for many meetings. … when face-to-face meetings do take place, they will be more efficient because participants will have already exchanged background information by e-mail. … information overload is not unique to the (information) highway, and it needn’t be a problem.”
Verdict: Miss. Gates’s view of e-mail now seems naively Utopian, failing to account for unintended consequences. If anything, e-mail has made workplace meetings more frequent and less efficient. “Didn’t you get that e-mail?” is probably the single most common question posed at meetings, a query that often leads to … another meeting.

The Wallet PC
Prediction: “You’ll be able to carry the wallet PC in your pocket or purse. It will display messages and schedules and also let you read or send electronic mail and faxes, monitor weather and stock reports, play both simple and sophisticated games, browse information if you’re bored, or choose from among thousands of easy-to-call up photos of your kids.”
Verdict: Hit. Gates’s wallet PC is more or less today’s mobile smartphone with voice capability added.

Wireless Networks
Prediction: “The wireless networks of the future will be faster, but unless there is a major breakthrough, wired networks will have a far greater bandwidth. Mobile devices will be able to send and receive messages, but it will be expensive and unusual to use them to receive an individual video stream.”
Verdict: Miss. Today, receiving a wireless video stream is neither expensive nor unusual; in fact, it’s so commonplace that most people don’t give it a second thought. Gates failed to anticipate that wireless would become cheaper and faster, but his chief mistake was a common but flawed assumption among techno-futurists: that new technology is adopted chiefly on the basis of technological superiority rather than social factors.

Social Networking
Prediction: “The (information) highway will not only make it easier to keep up with distant friends, it will also enable us to find new companions. Friendships formed across the network will lead naturally to getting together in person.”
Verdict: Hit and Miss. One of the killer apps of the information highway has turned out to be social networking… But friendships formed online don’t regularly lead to face-to-face meetings. Far more common is the user with 250 Facebook friends, most of whom he rarely, if ever, sees in person.

Online Shopping
Prediction: “Because the information highway will carry video, you’ll often be able to see exactly what you’ve ordered. … you won’t have to wonder whether the flowers you ordered for your mother by telephone were really as stunning as you’d hoped. You’ll be able to watch the florist arrange the bouquet, change your mind if you want, and replace wilting roses with fresh anemones.”
Verdict: Miss. Gates was right that the information highway would carry video, but he completely misread the social and economic factors that would shape its use in online commerce. How on earth would a harried florist find the time to hold a videoconference with every customer who orders flowers for Mother’s Day? What company would absorb the colossal expense of having orders changed at the last second according to customers’ shifting whims? Gates’s vision of online shopping has turned out to be a lot like past predictions about personal jet packs and moving sidewalks: a future that’s technologically possible but socially and economically impractical.

Videoconferencing
Prediction: “Small video devices using cameras attached to personal computers or television sets will allow us to meet readily across the information highway with much higher quality pictures and sound for lower prices.”
Verdict: Hit. What came to be called webcams are standard issue on PCs, or can be purchased from Bill Gates’s favorite company for under $30.

The Internet and the Web
Prediction: Gates’s 286-page book mentions the World Wide Web on only four of its pages, and portrays the Internet as a subset of a much a larger “Information Superhighway.” … Verdict: Miss. Gates’s notion that the Internet would play a supporting role in the information highway of the future, rather than being the highway itself, was out-of-date the day The Road Ahead was published… and he made major revisions to a second edition of The Road Ahead, adding material that highlighted the significance of the Internet. In many ways, Gates’s cloudy crystal ball regarding the Internet amounted to wishful thinking. Gates built Microsoft into a global powerhouse by selling proprietary software that users loaded onto their PCs. He wasn’t likely to warm to the idea that the same functions could be delivered cheaper and faster through a decentralized network that he couldn’t control.

Privacy
Predication: “A decade from now, you may shake your head that there was ever a time when any stranger or wrong number could interrupt you at home with a phone call. … by explicitly indicating allowable interruptions, you will be able to establish your home — or anywhere you choose — as your sanctuary.”
Verdict: Little Hit, Big Miss. It’s true that technology lets you explicitly indicate allowable interruptions — you can use caller ID to dodge unwanted calls or sign up at the National Do Not Call Registry to nix telemarketers. But the notion that technology would pave the way to greater privacy has turned out to be anything but true.

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I had a chat the other day to Stephan Magus for his Abenteuer Zukunft (Future Adventures) podcast channel, taking about the rationale behind making a stand for quality in foresight. That is, what’s under the hood of Future Savvy, and why.

The podcast is up at the Abenteuer Leben site, playable via the buttons on the right hand side.

Alternatively it can be accessed directly at

http://media1.roadkast.com/abenteuerzukunft/DAZ71_120410_6tt6.mp3

(If you don’t speak German, you need to fast forward through the first 3 minutes.)

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I couldn’t resist reposting this yesterday’s bit o’ fluff from the cleantech news portal Greenbang, itself reproduced from Forum for the Future, first, well because it cites yours truly; but even more agonizingly because the headline is exactly what I should have called Future Savvy if I knew the first thing about marketing, which I obviously don’t.

So may I say, this is what I was trying to say: When trying to predict the future, watch for dog poop!

Or perhaps: apparently helpful guides to the future are often dog poop disguised as chocolate, and here’s how to know the difference.

Something like that.

Note that this Greenbang story, below, is damaged by letting the most extreme predictions (the howlers) stand in for the general item. Prediction howler-spotting is sobering, but misses how many people got the future right, or right enough to make excellent decisions, and therefore overly damages the foresight field.

Also, howlers are actually the low-hanging fruit. Being future savvy is ultimately about the more subtle job of correcting weighing apparently very credible and well-founded predictions, some of which are excellent, but others of which are far flimsier than they appear.

There are various other minor problems such as not knowing the difference between the Gartner Hype Cycle and Zeitgeist bias, etc. And I would never call myself, not even in my most self-deprecating moments, a “futurologist.” But anyway, as I said, just a bit of fun:

Greenbang (13th April 2010) by Trish Lorenz & Martin Wright: Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.” Niels Bohr’s words are a wise warning to reckless forecasters.

“Combining a nuclear reactor with a home boiler is no longer a problem. It would heat and cool the house, provide unlimited hot water and melt the snow from sidewalks and driveways. All that could be done for six years on a single charge of fissionable material costing about $300.” — Robert Ferry, US Institute of Boiler and Radiator Manufacturers, 1955

“Nuclear-powered vacuum cleaners will probably be a reality in ten years.” — Alex Lewyt, President of vacuum cleaner company Lewyt Corp, also 1955

Lewyt and Ferry both stumbled into a risky habit of all amateur futurists: extrapolating from present trends. In this case, they were caught up in the surge of excitement over the rise of nuclear power. They were not alone. In the tech-fuelled optimism of the ’50s, magazines, radio and the infant TV were buzzing with predictions of flying cars and lunar settlements.

They had fallen victim to what later became known as the Gartner Hype Cycle. This maps the enthusiasm and subsequent disillusionment typical in the introduction of new technology — a useful reality check for those caught up in “irrational optimism.”

By contrast, there are those whose feet are too firmly rooted in present realities, and fail to see how innovation can combine with social changes to speed the widespread adoption of new technology.

“The Americans need the telephone, but we do not. We have plenty of messenger boys.” — Sir William Preece, Chief Engineer, Royal Mail, 1878

“The horse is here to stay, but the automobile is only a novelty, a fad.” — President of the Michigan Savings Bank, advising Henry Ford’s lawyer not to invest in Ford Motors, 1903

It is difficult to consider any factor that doesn’t apparently exist at the time of making a prediction, but that’s essentially what looking ahead requires. It wasn’t all that long ago when people were predicting a bright future for teletext and fax machines. Few would have anticipated that both would be made almost obsolete by the internet and email. And yet the weak signals were there for those who chose to hear them. A fax machine, after all, is simply a modem with a rather complex print interface attached. It only evolved as it did because people were unused to reading information solely on screen, and computers were too big to carry around with them. Once laptops took off in the early ’90s, the fax was doomed.

“There is no reason why anyone would want a computer in their home.” — Ken Olson, Chairman, Digital Equipment Corp, 1977

Australian Senator Dr Russell Trood sums it up neatly when he says: ” ‘Nowism’ is a serious occupational hazard for those in the prediction game.”

Today’s futurologists no longer try to predict a single outcome for the future; instead they map a variety of scenarios. For Adam Gordon of Future Savvy, scenario-based thinking gives people “permission to think through alternative outcomes without necessarily predicting them.” Instead of trying to forecast precisely what might happen, he says, “we can ask ‘What if it does?,’ and then explore the outcomes and our responses.” Such thinking characterises much of the strategy adopted by forward-looking governments on tackling climate change.

James Goodman, head of Futures at Forum for the Future, agrees: “People think it’s the output that’s important, but actually it’s the process.” And, he adds, “All future planning has uncertainty at its heart.”

Or as Martin Raymond, Strategy and Insight Director at The Future Laboratory, says, “We always try to spot the dog
poop in our forecast.”

Greenbang Editor’s note: This was a guest article by Trish Lorenz and Martin Wright at Forum for the Future. This piece originally appeared in Green Futures, which is published by Forum for the Future and is the leading magazine on environmental solutions and sustainable futures. Its aim is to demonstrate that a sustainable future is both practical and desirable — and can be profitable, too.

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Paul Saffo is always good value, and doesn’t shy from polemic. In this talk at the Foresight Institute 2010 conference, Saffo, emeritus and alumnus of the the foresight industry for over 20 years has a full swipe at ‘futurists’ who participate in ‘future-entertainment’ or profess to ‘see into the future;’ but calls for the broad infusion of foresight into public debate, including the restitution of the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) scrapped by Newt Gingrich in 1995.
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“Profiles of the Future” at the Foresight Institute 2010 conference

Says Saffo: “Futurists today are talking to the wrong people, don’t have good methods (for the most part,) and are still doing the kinds of silly things we did (or they did) when futurism got started…We should have an instant prohibition on anyone who writes an article titled: ‘Top 10 Trends to Watch’… We’ve got to get rid of this ‘future entertainment’ stuff and ‘top-10 trends’ stuff, and get serious.”

Part of the raison d’etre of Future Savvy, of course, is to demythologize exactly this kind of self-promoting infotainment foresight, and give real-world managers a way to see through it. Thinking long-term is too important to allow it to be tainted by snake-oil salesmen. Saffo admits he’s ranting on this topic (as I do too.) In a less ranting mode, he would probably admit there are also many high-quality thinkers doing exemplary foresight work. Certainly he’s all in favor of thinking long-term, and doing it better.

Saffo’s solution? “Move foresight to the masses; make policy conversations cool; engage powerful myopics (short-term thinkers on Wall Street and other financial institutions); engage politicians (incl. via the OTA). But he doesn’t say how, and of course therein lies the rub.

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Economists make a handy, if mildly irreverent, distinction between “freshwater” and “saltwater” economics. Freshwater refers to economic theory that rests on the efficient markets hypothesis — a belief in the efficiency and rationality of free markets. It is associated with Milton Friedman and the University of Chicago school. It was the thinking behind Thatcher and Reaganomics and still more-or-less holds sway today, or it did up until the credit crunch.

Keynesian or saltwater economics by contrast holds that free markets often behave irrationally and inefficiently, and therefore need corrective policy from government. Saltwater economists say people and institutions often behave in ways contrary to the general good, or in ways that can bring markets (on which they depend) to their knees. Sound familiar?

Anyway, a recent Knowledge@Wharton article comments: “Like a natural science, freshwater economics lends itself to complex, often elegant mathematical modeling. The freshwater view is that consumers, offered an array of choices, will select the one that is best for them — a straightforward assertion that can be neatly expressed in mathematical formulae.

“In contrast, many assertions made in behavioral economics are more challenging to express mathematically. ‘Behavioralists’ argue that consumers don’t always act in their own interests, especially when they fail to understand the choices on offer or succumb to irrational impulses involving those choices… but such impulses are inherently vague and difficult to define.”

Cognitive bias

In other words mathematically modeling the economic future is possible if humans and the markets they create are rational, but far less possible if we act irrationally.

Now, as elaborated in Future Savvy, the fact that humans make irrational choices due to many cognitive biases and heuristics  is indisputable, not least since the work of  Tversky and Kahneman. Biases and heuristics such as “anchoring,” “recency effect,” “personal validation fallacy,” “herd mentality,” and so on, in which people make irrational choices, are well documented.

That’s why mathematical projections of economic behavior are unreliable. The economy may be counted in numbers, but it is still a human system, with associated inefficiency and irrationality. Blow this little debate in economic forecasting up large, and you have the essential problem with quantitative forecasting of any type. It assumes, erroneously, a freshwater view of humanity.

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In a recent Times article ‘The future was never going to be the C5‘ actor-comedian Ben Millar offers a familiar criticism of foresight work. Inter alia he says: “For all our achievements in art, science, and technology, the human race has always been spectacularly bad at predicting the future. Literature is littered with shockingly wide-of-the-mark utopias, dystopias, shiny suits, flying saucers and whole meals contained in a single pill. As a child of the Seventies, I was taught that as an adult in a world run by machines my main challenge would be how to spend my endless hours of leisure time…”

Yes, Ben. I’m sure you know this has all been said before ad nauseam. But more importantly, 40 years on many lessons have been learned, and it wouldn’t run foul of quality journalism standards to reflect this.

First, let’s be clear: nobody can predict the future. Anyone who says they can is a charlatan. Also, yes, unconscionably dreadful and irresponsible predictions have been made and are continually being made. But there are three problems with the ‘no-flying-car-so-there-we-can’t-predict-the-future’ argument:

(1) The kinds of predictions Millar cites are a product of a particular moment in Western thought and therefore foresight. The 1960s and early 70s were a time of Post-War American emergence, unleashing for a while a techno-futurist predictive rapture, most of which has indeed proved to be rubbish. There are still people, very famous talking-head futurists, promoting techno-rapture for the 21st century (caveat emptor) but as a whole the foresight field has moved on to become much more circumspect about what can be predicted.

Balancing techno-fantasy

Foresight practitioners are these days more likely to balance technology wowee with economic, social, and environmental friction; see systemic (often indirect or counter-intuitive) effects where once only simple cause-and-effect was seen; and create scenarios of key alternative outcomes rather than predict one.

(2) The second thing that is missed in gleefully deriding foresight work, is how many people and institutions get it right, or right enough.  It’s axiomatic that in order to be successful a person or organization must have correctly assessed both key changes and rate of change in their operating environment. To take a famous case, as quoted in Future Savvy, while Nixon’s Vice President Spiro Agnew in 1972 erroneously forecast super-sonic passenger air travel, Herb Kelleher, founder of SouthWest Airlines, foresaw the low-cost air travel industry. Bingo. Billionaire. Similarly, behind every success one can find future thinking that, while sometimes latent, was present and correct.

(3) The purpose of foresight work is misunderstood. We cannot predict the future and it’s pointless to try. We can only assess signals of change, trends, and potential for surprises and reversals, including challenging our all-too-easily calcified mental models, and take this into a process of understanding alternative outcomes and pre-considering best strategic actions. In other words, actively stimulating the investigation and analysis of future conditions in order to create the basis of better decision-making today.

In fact sometimes the ‘strategic conversation’ that results from poor predictions is instructive to managers. As I say to clients: the goal of foresight work is better decisions not better predictions.

Back-street abortionists

The reality is that there is good and bad foresight work. Yes, some futurists are the technical and moral equivalent of back street abortionists. But the good work remains, and quality foresight is a critical advantage to decision-makers. The key thing is to be able to tell good foresight work from bad.

Simplistic trashing of foresight work en bloc ignores the weight of case evidence that people and organizations can improve their management of future uncertainty and/or create a situation where they manage the future better than competitors. Further, it encourages managers to fly blind into changing environments, often resulting in spectacularly poor decisions that deeply and widely punish their dependent stakeholders.

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Listening to the radio this morning there was a review that quoted a news room adage — one that I am indeed old enough to remember from my days as a newspaper reporter — which is: “if it bleeds, it leads.”

That is: disaster, mayhem, and death goes to the top of the page and towards the front of the newspaper.**

“If it bleeds, it leads” can be interpreted more or less narrowly. Mostly it means, literally, that accidents, explosions, injuries, and deaths will take page priority in the news over “talking stories” about politics and government and society. Disasters sell more newspapers than policy debates. But more generally it means bad news is more arresting and interesting, and will get more attention (and, again, sell more newspapers or gather more listeners and viewers) than good news, therefore it takes priority.

Now, if you were a ‘forecasting pundit’ or a think tank, or investment institution with an interest in getting media attention for yourself, which route would you choose in garnering media exposure? Good news or bad news?

Bad news. Of course. Russian Professor Igor Panarin gets an insane amount of publicity because his book claims that the United States could collapse soon (in two months time, I believe.) Ditto asset manager, Egon von Greyerz, who bangs on, for example saying: “America is hemorrhaging financially and economically. Other countries now realize they hold ‘worthless’ US dollars” in a piece called: The Dark Years Are Here. And just in case you think these are all gloomy foreigners, consider how Bronx boy, Gerald Celente, has dominated media coverage in the credit-crunch era predicting doom-and-gloom in every way, including riots and revolution on U.S. streeets within in the Obama-presidency term. For example http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=46MEqEgdLTg

These are just three that I single out just to make the point, but they are not different from many hundreds that trawl for media attention by predicting, essentially … “bleeding.” In fact, the real future will have good and bad in balance, just like the past. One of the lessons of Future Savvy is: if a prediction bleeds, it probably shouldn’t lead your thinking.

** In fact, the task of deciding what story to lead page one (or any other page) with, and what other stories to run, in what order, and at what length, is one of the more intellectually demanding tasks around, and one that quality journalist take seriously. So, “if it bleeds, it leads” is, in part, cynical journalist-ese for saying that the popular audience doesn’t have the time, patience, or interest in the deeper issues.

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Arsenal FC manager Arsène Wenger this week made a big prediction about the future of football in Europe. Now it’s hardly news when a sports coach predicts the future, but that’s because their forecasts are of the day-to-day variety and restricted to their own micro-climate: “Ronaldo has been going well in practice, I predict he’ll get on the scoresheet come Saturday.’ Or, ‘We’ll beat Chelsea in next months return leg,“ and so on.

Arsène Wenger

But this was different. Wenger (on the eve of the Arsenal vs Celtic Rangers Champions League match) predicted a “European League” in 10 years featuring the continent’s top clubs – that is, he offered foresight into potential structural, industry-wide change in multi-billion-dollar UK and European soccer industry.

Currently clubs play in their national domestic leagues. And all Europe-wide competitions are cup (pool stage + knockout) competitions.

Although not fleshed out, the form is not hard to see: the top four-or-so clubs from each major country (fewer from smaller countries) in one annual league competition. This means that Manchester United, Liverpool, AC Milan, Porto, Juventus, Real Madrid, Barcelona, Roma and so on would all be playing each other on a weekly basis throughout the year (and, presumably, playing in no other league competitions).

Drivers of Change

The point of Future Savvy is that one can judge the validity of predictions like this before time. In this case, part of the way to assess Mr Wenger’s future view would be to gauge the strength of driving vs blocking forces behind his outcome.

There is evidence of strong drivers in favor of a European Super League. These are:

1. The rise of “super-teams.” In the UK and across Europe the same few teams dominate their domestic league year after year. The reason is a simple reinforcing feedback loop where winning teams get more money (from TV rights, from gates, from merchandising, etc.) which means they can buy better players, which means they win more. Over the last decade the English Football Premier League has become, effectively, a competition between Manchester United, Chelsea, Liverpool, and Arsenal. (In the US the “draft–pick” system mitigates against any franchise getting too strong in this way, but no such system-balancer exists in European football.)

2. The growing ease and ubiquity of continental travel. Whether fans will follow their teams across Europe is a key issue, but indicators from cup competitions is that fans can and will travel.

3. The growing role of, and technological sophistication of television, particularly Sky Sports. Despite the many who travel, most people these days follow games at home or in sports bars. Television’s coverage and choices (the remote control options “red button”) have exploded, and screens themselves have got bigger and better. And genuine personalization of camera feed and other forms of interactively is emerging. In this, football, and professional sports as a whole, is becoming more about the screen as the stadium, accelerating a long-term trend. The reality is it makes little difference to most fans if the game is being played 50 miles away or 500.

4. The move to high-level, star-packed, events. There’s a clear trend across sports in general for events featuring the best players playing each other in all-star environments, not as a special “all-star” game but as an everyday occurrence. In cricket, for example, the Indian IPL has ridden this trend, offering franchised matches of, effectively, one mixed team of global superstars versus another. The fans love it.

There is also the financial do-or-die logic that soccer clubs face. The money feedback loop means they must continually drive up their revenues. It’s not possible to stand still. A European Football Super League would compel participation from the top teams for this reason alone.

vs Blockers

Adequately assessing the likelihood of the Wenger view of the future further requires investigation of blockers – factors which will prevent the outcome. In this case these may be overwhelming logistics of moving teams around to this extent week in and week out; limits on fans’ travel energy and budget; extent of fans’ loyalty to the relatively minor (non-super) domestic teams; and domestic league administrators’ determination and ability to keep domestic leagues from loosing their cash cows and following their own downward spiral into television obscurity.

These blockers on the European football league forecast are real. The question is whether they stop the future or how long they delay it. I’d judge the blockers as considerably weaker than the drivers and so I’d go with Wenger in predicting a European Super League (even richer and more “glamorous” than anything soccer has seen before) in about 10 years from now.

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