Kate Middleton's new coat of arms

Tomorrow’s wedding of Prince William and Catherine Middleton dominates the airwaves around the world, and even Harvard Business School professor Rosabeth Moss Kantor has an HBR blog post offering business insights thereto, including that it is an example of the coming of the “experience economy,” where people pay for the chance to participate at particular times, and expenditures on goods and services come in bundles tied to particular events. She councils how the “soft stuff” and “joy factor” can offer big audiences and revenues; romance and ritual matter…“sentiment sells.”

Fair enough. To this, permit me to add a thought or two about how the fact of the royal wedding can improve out judgment of future business environments and opportunities.

First, in the race to the future, leaders should never underestimate the power of traditionalism and continuity –particularly in changing times. Business leaders may be tempted to view the latest gizmo or the new lifestyle choice as the future. But this would be thinking poorly about tomorrow. Yes, new things get adopted all the time, and real and rapid change happens, but at the same time the broad market also has a vast, seemingly unquenchable, appetite for tradition.

The point is, the two are closely correlated. The faster society and technology moves the more people cling to apparent past certainties and traditions.

If you’d looked at the future of the British monarchy anytime through the turbulent, democratizing 20th century you might have be tempted to say it must soon be phased out, given the estimated $65m-a-year cost to the taxpayer (not including the spiraling cost of security.) You would think that the public would tire of upper-class toffs prancing around from polo matches to garden parties, wearing Chloe and drinking Krug at their expense.

Popular

But, in fact, no. The British monarchy is as popular as ever. There is some truth in the view that royalty is good for UK tourism. But mostly the monarchy survives because the public wants vestiges of the past as it peers at the changing future and the steady erosion of tradition and other fixed points from middle class lives.

A handsome military prince, a girl in white, a horse-drawn carriage, a bishop, a cathedral … is a psychological balm for most of us, even if we are, or more exactly because we are, viewing it all streamed on an iPad.

In industry foresight, we call this a “counter-trend.”

Another counter trend at work here is marriage itself. The figures are clear that people are marrying later, if at all, and staying married for a shorter time. William and Kate represent a minority: the number of weddings that are a first-time marriage for both parties is down to 150,000 a year, 35% what it was in 1940. That’s the trend. So the royal couple and their public ritual affirms publicly what most ordinary people are denying or denied privately.

The point not to be missed is the middle-class compromises most people are making drives counter-trend nostalgia for what once was, and marketing campaigns or business units, if not entire companies, can be built thereon – not only on traditionalist revivalism specifically, but on any strong counter-trend.

American Dream

Finally, the wedding of Prince William to “commoner” Catherine Middleton shows us how, despite all its apparent protestations, the UK is yet still Americanizing faster than one might think, and not just in splurging on cheap Chinese imports or putting university education on a pay-to-play basis.

Kate is very much an “American” princess, in the sense of being from a self-made family. Her mother was a flight attendant, her father too, before becoming a flight dispatcher for BA. (Rumor, hotly denied, is that Prince William’s friends used to snigger “doors-to-manual” among themselves on Kate’s arrival, in reference to her parents’ profession.)

But then “the American dream” could and did happen: The Middletons hit it rich with an online party supplies company (Party Pieces), were able to send Catherine to the right schools, and the rest is history.

I’m going back to the S+B interview with Lawrence Burns, former GM head of R&D, cited in my previous post, because there is more to be had in understanding how systems dynamics has shaped and will shape the future of the automobile industry.

This not only helps us think about automobiles, energy, public transport, and so on, but also about foresight in all industries.

Asked about the likelihood of “transformational” change in the auto industry—given the historical pattern of slow, incremental change we have seen for decades—Burns says:

“The main reason upheavals haven’t happened is that the automobile transportation system benefited from a tremendous self-reinforcing dynamic: the codependence between the roadway infrastructure, the energy infrastructure, and the machines that we created.”

In other words, systems dynamics were at work, in this case dominated by a deeply powerful reinforcing loop:

“As cars became available in the early 1900s, you needed to build roads suitable for them, and the costs of the roads were paid with gasoline taxes… As more cars were manufactured, more gasoline was consumed; the more gasoline was consumed, the more roads were built. The more roads were built, the more valuable a car became. And as cars became more valuable, it led to more cars being bought… Next thing, you wake up and in the United States you have 250 million cars, and they travel on 4 million miles of road, 3 trillion miles a year…

“So we thought about a new DNA for the automobile, but you couldn’t create that just for the car itself. It has to operate within a new codependent system.”

Too smart to crash

What drives this new system, is of course the core of the debate. In Burns’ view the key issue is vehicles will become “too smart to crash,” allowing them to be built without current safety defences, that is, 75 percent lighter, which drastically reduces energy requirements.

“The problem with batteries today isn’t really the batteries themselves; the problem is the vehicle that we’re putting them in. To power a typical car today, you need a battery the size of one or two Sumo wrestlers, and it takes eight hours to recharge, so you need charging stations in garages or on the street. For the 750-pound class of vehicles that we envision, the battery could someday become small enough so that you could easily bring it into your house or apartment to recharge, and it would recharge in just three hours.”

Everything rests on the assumption of whether “too smart to crash” is possible, and the secondary assumption whether consumers will ever really trust this. The former is surely sound, the latter questionable.

But, no matter. At least this view of the automobile industry evolution, or indeed revolution, is in clear acknowledgement that one will not see the future of the auto industry by looking through the lens of a single issue such as global warming, or any single propulsion or other technology.

The car is inextricably tied to the deeper systems it is part of. Any transformational future proposed or envisaged—whether that of Burns, or environmental lobbyists, or public transport evangelists, or any other—has to show how the whole current reinforcing system behind the car is overcome, that is bettered for most consumers and stakeholders, by a new system.

First posted at Forbes Leadership: http://blogs.forbes.com/adamgordon

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In a fascinating recent development, John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Richard Lugar, Republican of Indiana, introduced the Start-up Visa Act to the US Senate, as reported in Inc. magazine.

The legislation is a forward-looking bid to turbo-charge entrepreneurial venturing in the U.S. by attracting foreign entrepreneurs and connecting them to U.S. capital, therein driving new economic growth and local jobs. What’s really interesting is it goes against past common wisdom that recessions are ‘bad for immigration’ (as citizens demand job protection.)

If passed, the bill gives U.S. visas to foreigners who can raise $100,000 from an angel investor or $250,000 from a qualified VC firm. After two years, if the immigrant entrepreneur can create five or more jobs (excluding family), attract an additional $1 million in investment, or produce $1 million in revenue, he or she gets a green card (permanent residency.)

The only current option, the EB-5 business investment visa, requires immigrants to invest at least $1 million in the U.S. and employ 10 people.

Job creation

The  National Venture Capital Association says 25 percent of America’s venture-backed, publicly-traded businesses, incl. Google, Yahoo!, eBay and Intel have been founded or co-founded by immigrants. According to Richard Herman, author of Immigrant, Inc.: Why Immigrant Entrepreneurs Are Driving the New Economy, nearly all U.S. job creation in the past 20 years has come from companies less than five years old.

The history of US immigration policy has been schizophrenic to say the least, with periods of great social openness followed by about-face door slamming. The slamming has always corresponded to economic downturns or anxiety thereto. But here we have the opposite effect. And we have legislators taking a forward view! Both proof that the future is sure to surprise us.

Anyway, this is in the intro (p5), and I found it a perfect encapsulation of a core problem in foresight thinking — quantitative vs qualitative methods — well worth retyping out to have on hand for reflection. Here goes:

“The story that I have to tell is marked all the way through by a persistent tension between those who assert that the best decisions are based on quantification and numbers, determined by the patterns of the past, and those who base their decisions on more subjective degrees of belief about the uncertain future This is a controversy that has never been resolved.
The issue boils down to one’s view about the extent to which the past determines the future. We cannot quantify the future, because it is an unknown, but we have learned how to use numbers to scrutinize what happened in the past. But to what degree should we rely on the patterns of the past to tell us what the future will be like? Which matters more when facing a risk, the facts as we see them or our subjective belief in what lies hidden in the void of time? Is risk management a science or an art? Can we even tell for certain precisely where the dividing line between the two approaches lies?
It is one thing to set up a mathematical model that appears to explain everything. But when we face the struggle of daily life, of constant trial and error, the ambiguity of the facts as well as the power of the human heartbeat can obliterate the model in short order.”

Witness the uptake of ‘feudal’ protection in a competitive, recessionary marketplace, where Wal-Mart is offering rental space insde a new Chicago store to neighborhood businesses. Apparently tenants already include a dog groomer and a fried chicken outlet, and Wal-Mart is going to be inviting in barbers, manicurists, and other local small businesses.

Regional general manager Rolando Rodriguez told the NY Times: “We want the same resurgence of the community…”.

It’s not all about community of course. Wal-Mart is seeking counter-PR to endemic criticism (and evidence) that their megastores kill mom-and-pop shops on which many local jobs and services depend, and is hoping the gambit will revive its six-year stalled bid for the city’s approval of proposed Chicago stores.

Anyway, as one observer, Marissa Johnson, said of the new arrangement: “It’s like sharecropping.”

Yes, this is the return of a feudal model. The lord owns the land and the small guy works his patch, offering a regular tribute. And small guys will jump at it because — in the absence of fundamental challenge to an iniquitous system — having the protection of a lord is better than not having it.

Another need that’s not going away, merely being reinterpreted (ironically back to pre-feudal organization) is our need to mark the darkest night of the year with ritual. Yule is the pagan winter solstice rite centered on a December 21 dusk-to-dawn vigil. It was absorbed into Christmas and not widely practiced for centuries. But now, as reported in the big UK media Christmas pregame show, there’s been a great surge in Yule festivities and attendance. By how much depends on who is quoted but nobody is denying the trend — which more or less mirrors the decline in formal Christian Christmas (secular, gift-giving, tree decorating Christmas is alive and well.)

The need is a constant. The rituals will change, often mining the past.

Well, this raises the question of whether the past tells us anything about the future, and if so what? There’s a common wisdom attributed to Mark Twain (why is it that aphorisms are always attributed to Twain or Winston Churchill?) that goes: “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes,” and this is the position that most educated future-thinkers would hold.

So what would the ‘rhyme’ be? From cases such as Argentina, Russia, South Africa, and many developing world countries over the past 50 years: lenders loose confidence in a country’s ability to repay on its national bonds and stop lending; the country is faced with a choice of drastic spending cuts (great social and humanitarian cost) or major tax increases (pointless, because it stifles business, therefore lowers tax revenue) or default. Going broke, into national “Chapter 11,” suing for time and ‘debt restructuring’ becomes the best among the bad options event though it pretty much ensures a deep and dark recession.
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Thinking the unthinkable

Could this be the future of America? As I’ve written before here and other places, after the ‘unimaginable’ Credit Crunch was ignored due to its ‘low probability,’ it’s a relief to know that remote but plausible outcomes with serious consequences are getting attention, at least in the Washington Post.

Clearly major economies are in a more precarious situation than they were 5 years ago. Too much debt is always precarious, for the smallest household or the biggest country alike. On the other hand, an economy’s size and enduring wealth counts too. As Samuelson observes, it created the unexpected effect in Japan’s case where debt at 200% of GDP (America’s is currently about 40%) should have raised the cost of its debt (lower confidence of repayment) but this hasn’t happened because domestic Japanese households and businesses rather than foreigners have easily (and confidently) bought the debt — and this may well hold true for the U.S. too. In other words, the rhyme may go this way.

The ‘more likely’ future is incremental raising of taxes and lowering of public service provision as Western economies incrementally claw their way back to stability. But at least this default wild card on the margins of plausibility has the oxygen of some attention and this is no bad thing. As with all good foresight work, it predicts nothing, but it does allow us to think through the roadmap to the outcome, and press for the right decisions now, in plenty of time and in a measured way.

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The failed “our-future-in-space prediction” cluster is useful because it is the poster child for bad predicting, nothing less than foresight idiocy in its purest form, worth mentioning only because it helps us to see smaller and more subtle future-thinking mistakes we make routinely.

This is what I said in Future Savvy (Chapter 5):

“The forecasts that surrounded the future of space travel and exploration are perhaps the most high-profile and comprehensively poor set of forecasts ever made, and therefore provide a good vantage point to consider what can go wrong in forecasting. From the 1950s, space was a huge topic of interest. All significant earthbound exploration challenges had been overcome, technology was moving rapidly, and what lay ahead, unconquered, was space. The need to explore it was deeply in the zeitgeist.
“At the same time, the Cold War created the specific situation where beating the Soviets in prestige projects was an important priority, important enough to divert massive resources to it. J.F. Kennedy’s rousing (future-influencing) 1961 prediction of putting a man on the moon by the end of the decade motivated and galvanized the United States, and the resulting Gemini and Apollo programs made this not only a human achievement but a successful prediction. As a result, analysts of all stripes were quick to project the trend and predict a moon base, lunar communities by 2000, followed soon by trips to Mars and beyond, and on to the limits of space. . . .
“The last man to set foot on the moon was in 1973. The Space Shuttle tried to maintain forward momentum under the guise of scientific research, not without disaster, and an almost inconsequential international space station has been built. To this day there are many who cry into their soup over the lack of space exploration and conquest. So what happened? The groundswell of prediction was wrong because it failed to see that putting a few U.S. men into orbit did not add enough value to enough peoples’ lives to justify the expense—particularly in the economically uncertain 1970s. In the end, the majority of consumers voted with their wallets to postpone, if not entirely eviscerate, human space exploration.”

One could go into great detail, but simply put, the intertwined elements resulting in this poor view of the future were:

1. Failure to recognize user utility and the choice consumers make in determining the future. That is, for most people the cost of any space venturing is not worth the benefit (i.e. what benefit?) The fact that we “can do it” is hardly relevant. The real futures question is always: do most people want it? In the 1960s space was “worth it” (particularly in that the goal was clear and bounded) because spending billions on a prestige project made sense at a time of (a) absolute US economic prosperity and (b) ideological dispute with the USSR.

2. Projecting trends without considering the strength of underlying drivers. Space exploration was, apparently, on-the-up in the 1950s and 60s. But trends are only as good as the drivers that support them. When the drivers go away (lack of public support due to cost/benefit issues) the trend stops. In fact, there is no real, dependable, trend to space exploration. There was a blip in the 1960s when conditions temporarily favored a national prestige extravaganza. There wasn’t a trend before, and there hasn’t been any since.

3. Forecasting mired in the conditions or spirit of the present, the zeitgeist. Space was important in the golden-era 50s and 60s; and particularly in that it was arena of competition with the Soviets. But it’s always a mistake to assume the framing conditions of the present will exist in the future, and in this case 40 years later, they most certainly don’t.

Don’t hold your breath

What of 40 years time? It is quite likely that “space flip” flights into orbit will be safe and cheap enough to commercialized in the next decade. Unmanned probes (again safe and relatively cheap) will continue, and popular access to their images and experiences will be greatly enhanced. But that’s all that will happen until such time as costs and other conditions of possibility change fundamentally, which implies a completely new form of space travel, of energy, of materials, and of human resilience and longevity. Not in this century.

Wired Science ran a July 20 article “40 Years After Apollo 11, NASA Maps Out the Future,” which puts the best possible spin on  this unmanned-probe future. It is careful to end without crushing the feelings of space junkies, saying: “Any American landing on Mars through the Constellation program would come some time after 2030.” It won’t happen, and here’s another secret: if anyone is going to land anywhere it will be a Chinese person. China still has prestige projects ahead of it, and human space exploration could be one of them.

Samuel, L., Future: A Recent History, University of Texas Press, 2009

I recently received a copy of Future: A Recent History to review. True confession: what hit me first on picking up the book was (a) “wow, the title Future is not already taken!? And (b) what a fabulous job the University of Texas Press has done producing this book. It is beautifully designed, with an understated Art Deco motif, and carefully laid out with enough text on the page, on delightfully solid paper stock.
It may seem odd to go on about text on the page, but it’s much easier to read like an adult, in paragraphs. So many books, particularly business books, these days appear produced at 14-point, double spacing, like pre-school readers. Makes you wonder…

Anyway, author Larry Samuel’s project is to investigate the history of views of the future from 1920 to the present. (The book has an acknowledged US-centric focus, partially defended by the notion that future-mindedness is “a principle strand in America’s DNA.”) He organizes the book chronologically into six periods between then and now, and shows, with interesting examples, how each period had its own views of the future, and how the views shifted from period to period.

In tracing the history of “tommorowism,” in this way, Future is on a similar track to the classic book in this field: I.F. Clarke’s The Pattern of Expectation 1644-2001 (Jonathan Cape, 1979). It ultimately makes similar points, although Samuel’s argument is obviously drawn from more recent examples. As Samuel puts it: “A look back on how people looked forward reveals that while it possesses certain common themes … the future is not a fixed idea but a highly variable on that reflects the values of those who are imagining it.”

Happily I can say this chimes exactly with the argument of Future Savvy, particularly Chapter 4 “Zeitgeist & Perception,” where I argued how heavily the nature of the present and its topical issues frames how the future is seen (what is forecast, what is aspired to or feared, what counts as a valid method for thinking ahead, and so on). Which means the framing conditions of the present  should be carefully analyzed in assessing the validity of any future view.

Historiography

Historiography – investigating the meta-conditions surrounding what is recorded and how it is interpreted by historians – what counts as “history” and for whom –  is a well-understood part of doing good history. Unfortunately, there is no equivalent standard “futuriography” in the foresight field, despite it being absolutely fundamental to understanding the value of our own predictions as, similarly, highly determined by the epistemic configurations of their production. It is here that Samuel very competently fills a much needed gap.

The practical implication of this, which Future does not get into – it’s not that kind of book – is that to make better predictions (or make valid assessments of others’ predictions) we need to ask stiff questions as to how much of what we foresee is determined by the perspectives of today, and expect the answer to be “very much.” Understanding the limitations and biases of our own perspective is the sine-qua-non of a robust view of what tomorrow will actually bring.

Pic: thisislondon.co.uk

Google introduced “Google Flu Trends” (US) in November as a way to visualize correlation between flu infections and flu-related searches. It maintains search levels provide early warning of flu spread because search data can be gathered and analyzed almost instantly, unlike traditional epidemiological reporting methods. (More on the goal of the project is in a post on swine flu on the official Google blog.)

The predictive power of Google spikes is hardly clear. Yes, a spike could suggest increased levels of infection. But it could be cause by media coverage and rising levels of pandemic concern.

Google predicts “no pandemic”

More broadly, however, the Google search phenomenon, and information saturation that goes with it is, I believe, highly predictive in epidemic situations. It predicts they are very unlikely. Generally, knowledge is power. Specifically deep and easily searchable public knowledge of where the epidemic is, and what to do to avoid it, and avoid spreading it, is a new condition in human history, one which in fact reliably predicts that no pandemic will happen. Yes, strains become more virulent and dangerous and even drug resistant, and yes, airlines transport it around the world in hours. But the power of knowledge in the labs and in the public at large is immense and ubiquitous in a way it never was before.

One of the debates in futures studies is how much and in what way to look at the past as a guide to the future. Paul Saffo says: look back at least as twice as far as you are trying forecast, and I agree with that. In thinking about a major modern global health epidemic our minds are in fact deeply conditioned by a 90-year-old event: the 1918 Influenza Pandemic that killed an estimated 50 million worldwide. In that epidemic there were particular conditions, not least four year of devastating war where more were lost to disease than fighting; associated drain on resistance and infrastructure; and forced mobiization of troops under poor conditions, that greatly facilitated the spread of the disease. Most importantly, ordinary people were operating in a knowledge vaccum that is unimaginable today.

This is not to say that we should not be vigilant and prepared. But the future that we most likely face is many-and-regular outbreaks like the swine flu, the avian flu, and so on, which we will move fairly quickly to contain. The dystopia of world pandemic is appealing to the health crisis community and its service providers, but the future will not be history (1918-1920) repeating itself.

One doesn’t start reading a “Brief History of” book in a series that includes A Brief History of the Birth of the Nazis and A Brief History of British Kings & Queens, without a certain trepidation. But, in fact, A Brief History of the Future is well-considered and well-written summing up of the characters and concerns that have shaped and continue to shape the future studies field.

Strathern, is a British journalist-turned-futurist, based in Vienna. One of the key attributes she brings is a journalist’s (and sub-editor’s) critical “don’t-bullshit-me” faculties, which is welcome in a field that is often short on common sense.

The book is hardly brief (at 300 pages) so there’s no sense that it’s a potted history. And it’s not compromised by what one – alas – expects of this kind of setup: pandering to all characters in positive or equal terms. In fact a key value of the book is its clear-headed and plucky judgment of who the key figures are (and who are not) and what their contributions have each been (vs what they might have thought they were). It is also unusually even-handed in balancing US and European inputs.

The book follows the obvious structure, starting with the oracles of Ancient Greece, Plato, moving through Leonardo de Vinci, and Thomas Malthus and so on through to the 19th century (Jules Verne, Karl Marx, etc.) and on to the present. In this Strathern argues for and operates with a wide definition of futures work – including in the dreamers, social reformers, and sci-fi writers in addition the more formal analysts and planners.

20th Century Weltanschauung
The book really hits its straps in the 20th century – in discussions of Aldous Huxley, H.G. Wells, George Orwell, Arthur C. Clarke, Herman Kahn, Buckminster Fuller, Alvin Toffler, Isaac Asimov, Margaret Mead and many lesser known figures. What is most interesting here is how the links between foresight approaches and the evolving broader existential and political “weltanschauung” of the century is knitted together, inserting “futurology” into the 20th century world of ideas at each point.

Although the book deals with institutions of foresight pretty well, the one angle I missed was the development of foresight education over the past 40 years. Part or full university degrees in foresight methods are an important part of the evolution of the field. Much has been learned in the debates over what and how and where to teach it. Ironically, the book – as intelligent a summary of the “future studies” field as you will find – would be an ideal text for an introductory course in such a curriculum.