Future Savvy: Quality in Foresight

The short-term future in South Africa is the Fifa Soccer World Cup, and at the moment it is really hard to get anyone to see or think beyond it. Football is life. Nevertheless a few hundred intrepid thinkers gathered in Cape Town earlier this month to consider South Africa in 2030, under the auspices of the World Future Society, South Africa Chapter, and its very capable leader Mike Lee.

I was lucky enough to be asked to do the opening address at the conference, and even luckier in that this Web site: South Africa – The Good News summarized some of what I and others said:

“Adam Gordon, Foresight Project Director and author of “Future Savvy” gave us some pointers:

1. Beware of sector experts, they are deeply entrenched in the present.
2. The consumer and choice is the determinant, not technology.
3. Change is about overestimating followed by underestimating.
4. Trends are patterns in the data, behind the trend are enablers and drivers, but frictional forces exist and in front of the trend are turners and blockers.
5. Trend extrapolation is limited, don’t fall foul of the turkey syndrome.
6. There is well behaved and badly behaved change. Both can be predictable and unpredictable. The potential of sudden shifts always lurks.
7. Scenario planning wraps up the key uncertainties over which we have no control.

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“The ‘BIG’ question he asks is ‘when do we influence the future and when do we adapt?’ There are big predictable forces out there (like population growth / the diminishing availability of oil etc), and there are big unpredictable forces out there (ja, well no fine!). Importantly, we can design our ability to influence and we can design the way we adapt. It is critical that we are able to do both.

“But managing the future is more than just about scenario planning, it is also about the implementation of the plan. It is about developing a methodology that prioritises, engages with stakeholders, and enables proactive actions on the ground.

So how?

Some important considerations (from various speakers):

1. Often we know what causes the problem (poverty, crime, HIV) but we don’t know what to do about it.
2. Often the logic that gives rise to the problem is not the logic that will solve the problem.
3. Mostly the problem does not contain the makings of the solution.
4. Solutions in one area can exacerbate problems in another.
5. The current situation has momentum, change to the system should happen concurrently not suddenly.

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“What is critical is the foresight process, it must be well-informed so that the implementation strategies that follow have buy-in, are doable, are relevant and far-reaching. There is a very real danger of visions being disconnected, unachievable and, at the end of the day, a pipe-dream.”

Dr Elizabeth Dostal talked of a stakeholder democracy in which she promoted the design of a matrix that recognised different stakeholder levels on the vertical axis and different environmental dimensions on the horizontal axis. A multi-level, multi-dimensional model.

“Imagine” she said, “putting four Nobel Peace laureates together and asking them what the causes of global conflict are. One may argue poverty, another ideology, another resources, and another greed. In no time, they would all be in different silo’s defending their view, in one sense they are all right, but in another sense they have not looked at the whole picture. A multi-level, multi-dimensional model would reveal this, the gaps in their logic, and the opportunities for agreement.”

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The strategy world has mourned the sudden passing of C.K. Prahalad, Professor of Business Administration at the Ross School, University of Michigan, this week.

Front page 'Competing for the Future' Hamel & Prahalad, HBR 1994

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As many have commented, Prahalad made great strides in getting business to see the potential in emerging markets and ‘poor’ consumers, in The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid and allied work.

In our rush for the new and latest, early work often gets buried. So I would like, as my take on the passing of Prahalad, to go back to his fundamental testimony to the role of and need for foresight in management, which is to be found in his co-authored piece (with Gary Hamel) ‘Competing for the Future,’ Harvard Business Review, 1994, which became a very famous book of the same name. Sixteen years on and now in the wake of the credit crunch, this piece remains as relevant as it ever was:

“Ask yourself: Do senior managers in my company have a clear and shared understanding of how the industry may be different ten years from now? Is my company’ point of view about the future unique among competitors?

“On average managers devote less than 3% of their time building a corporate perspective on the future.

“The painful upheavals in so many companies in recent years reflect the failure of one-time industry leaders to keep up with the accelerating pace of industry change… Those companies were run by managers, not leaders, by maintenance engineers, not architects.

“If the future is not occupying senior managers, what is? Restructuring and reegineering. While both are legitimate and important tasks, they have more to do with shoring up today’s business than with building tomorrow’s industries. Any company that is a bystander on the road to the future will watch its structure, values, and skills become progressively less attuned to industry realities.

(therefore) “Most layoffs at large US companies have been the fault of managers who fell asleep at the wheel and missed the turnoff for the future.

“If senior executives don’t have reasonably detailed answers to the ‘future’ questions, and if the answers they have are not significantly different of the ‘today’ answers, there is little chance that their companies will remain market leaders.

“The Quest for Foresight: Why do we talk of foresight rather than vision? Vision connotes a dream or an apparition, and there is more to industry foresight than a blinding flash of insight. Industry foresight is based on deep insights into trends in technology, demographics, regulations, and lifestyles, which can be harnessed to rewrite industry rules and create new competitive space.”

Footnote: this from the FT: The last time CK spoke to the FT he was buzzing with intellectual energy. “Really, in all my career I have been interested in ‘next practices’, and not merely ‘best practices’,” he said.

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Normally I make a point of not reposting anything put up elsewhere, but this small list of foresight lessons deserves broader attention than just Electronics Weekly. According to EW blogger David Manners, Tsuyoshi Kawanishi, former CEO of Toshiba Semiconductors in his book Chip Management quotes 10 wisdoms of forecasting, see below.

They have a bit of the fashionable “SunTzu Art of War” feel to them, and some of the quotes may be apocryphal. But no matter. What’s really interesting in this very savvy list is how customer-focused the lessons are. As said in Future Savvy, and one can’t say it too many times, what customers (users, the public) want and the cost-benefit tradeoffs they will make is a MUCH more reliable guide to the future than any techno-fantasy.

The wisdoms also reflect a foresight industry insider truism and paradox: you seldom get to the future by asking the customer directly (e.g. in a focus group) what they would like to have. You have to leap for the customer (and use focus groups only to refine new offerings.)

The list:

“1. St Augustine said that it is a blessing from God that we can’t predict the future. If we predict prosperity, we will become complacent. If we predict evil, we will lose the ability to discriminate.

2 Sharp President Haruo Tsuji: ‘You cannot find out what the consumer wants only by doing market research. You need to pull the ideas out of your brain. Manufacturers of the future should not simply respond to market demands, they must create market demands.’

3. Konosuke Matsushita said: ‘Don’t try to fit your business to a forecast. Fit it to the needs of your customers.’

4. Toshiba President Sugiichio Watari: ‘Money doesn’t come falling into the headquarters of Toshiba. If you want money you need to go to the customers.’

5. President Yoshio Tateishi of Omron: ‘Learn from your customers. If you learn from internal resources you will become self-satisfied. If you learn from your competitors you will fall far behind.’

6. Professor Yoshiya Teramoto of Meiji Gakuin University: ‘When companies start a big market research project, it is one sign of the ‘big company’ disease.’

7. Tsuyoshi Kawanishi: ‘The way to predict the weather is to look at the sky. And, every once in a while, you can make your prediction by simply thinking.’

8. President Haruo Tsuji of Sharp says: ‘Don’t be a spider, be a honey bee.’

9. Takeshi Kaneda, a management critic, says: ‘After elaborate research to find out what the consumer wants, Ford produced the Edsel. It was a complete failure. Ford mistook what the customer wanted for what they would really buy. They ignored their insight and relied on consensus. Japanese tend to emphasize harmony and consensus. But insight and decisiveness can be more important.’

10. Someone says: ‘Figures do not lie. But liars often use figures.’”

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I’ve been quite careful not to use this blog as a “brag wall” for Future Savvy. I can say reviewers have all been glowing, without exception. But this review, below, which recently appeared in the St Andrews Management Institute’s Vector Magazine, I felt was worth reposting here because – more than just saying nice things – it also captures the essence of what the book is trying to do. Here it is:

Book reviews by SAMI fellows and associates
“Future Savvy” by Adam Gordon (American Management Association, 2009)

“Forecasts and predictions are ubiquitous. We are bombarded with views of the future on a plethora of subjects from myriad sources, with a diverse set of motivations and self-interests. Adam Gordon seeks to provide a practical users guide to the assessment and interpretation of all things about the future, with special emphasis on the cautions and ‘health warnings’ that need to be applied, so as not to be misled by forecasts. However, the author is careful not to veer towards over-cynical dismissal of all future projections; rather, he seeks to provide guidance to the reader on how to apply the necessary caveats, and in the author’s words “profit from change”.

The book covers a very broad field, from the basic issues of the misuse of data and statistics, covering the quality and validity of data as well as their misinterpretation, through technology forecasting, trend and horizon scanning to quantitative modelling and scenarios. The one theme common to all these activities is the need to be alert to bias, whether it be a deliberate motive to influence behaviour through a dire prediction; or a bias inherent in futurologists needing to see rapid and pervasive change in all areas of society – if it exists or not – and evangelising it.

The track record of much futurology is mixed. Well-known examples are quoted: television did not lead to the end of the cinema industry. Nor has space exploration led to people taking foreign holidays on other planets – yet! Bias may also lie in the beholder. The ‘Zeitgeist’ tendency, whereby we are all influenced by contemporary perceptions, affects not only how “experts” and professionals see the world, but also how the audience receives the views of the future – often with unprepared minds. The internal “official future” of an organisation can pose a real blind spot to its progress.

The weaknesses of much quantitative modelling are highlighted, with such forecasts only being as good as the assumptions on which they are based, but which are often not overtly stated. In contrast to the conceptual and practical errors inherent in much futures output, the role and advantages of scenario planning are emphasised as a tool for challenging assumptions and developing alternative futures: “It’s better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong”.

The penultimate chapter takes examples of relatively recent forecasts from a range of organisations, whose subjects range from US agricultural production to UK dementia sufferers. These are subjected to a form of ‘retro wind-tunnelling’ to illustrate the deficiencies in their construction and how they would have benefited from the application of methodologies described earlier in the book. The final chapter provides a summary checklist, or framework, to apply in evaluating forecasts and future predictions.

Adam Gordon has written a shrewd and perceptive book that deserves a wide readership, especially among managers in both the private and public sectors, as well as the familiar ‘general reader’. Those wishing a more detailed technical guide to the various forecasting and futurist methodologies will need to consult other standard works. Professionals in the fields of management and strategy consulting and scenario practitioners might well be familiar with many of the points made in the book. However, those with some savvy might do well to recommend the book to their clients.

Michael Owen, 20 April 2009

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Strategy and Management guru Gary Hamel recently had things to say on the WSJ blog about how management needs to evolve, as follows:

Says Hamel, “The experience of growing up online will profoundly shape the workplace expectations of “Generation F” – the Facebook Generation. At a minimum, they’ll expect the social environment of work to reflect the social context of the Web, rather than as is currently the case, a mid-20th-century Weberian bureaucracy.

“If your company hopes to attract the most creative and energetic members of Gen F, it will need to understand these Internet-derived expectations, and then reinvent its management practices accordingly.”

He cites 12 work-relevant “the post-bureaucratic realities” that tomorrow’s employees will use as yardsticks in determining whether your company is “with it” or “past it.” These are:

1. All ideas compete on an equal footing.
2. Contribution counts for more than credentials.
3. Hierarchies are natural, not prescribed.
4. Leaders serve rather than preside.
5. Tasks are chosen, not assigned.
6. Groups are self-defining and -organizing.
7. Resources get attracted, not allocated.
8. Power comes from sharing information, not hoarding it.
9. Opinions compound and decisions are peer-reviewed.
10. Users can veto most policy decisions.
11. Intrinsic rewards matter most.
12. Hackers are heroes.

One hesitates to question Hamel, whose edifice of work, bookended by Competing for the Future (1994) and The Future of Management (2007) is as eloquent and substantiated a guide for innovation and future-thinking in management as you will find.

But, what is startling, for those of us around long enough to remember the Web-excited 1990s, which includes Hamel of course, is that these 12 principles are really old stuff, the mantras of the Internet 1.0 … the needs of Gen F are apparently not different to the needs of Gen Y.

But, now it’s a dozen years later, and this future is still the future. Hmm.

New management, but not in old bottles

Actually, surely Hamel’s beef is with the Fortune 500 set particularly, because what has happened is that most small and niche companies have already embraced a big chunk of these new-management attributes. It’s specifically the Fortune 500 that lags: but then, running organizations with stakeholders and budgets resembling mid-sized countries seems to fly in the face of Gen F value set.

Looking abroad, it appears that a Chinese factory or an Indian call center are not about to convert to Gen-F values either. Command and control, and uncreative hyper-attention attention to margins — effected by the Weberian bureaucracy — is the route to profit for them. The old paradigm will rule, and rule well.

From the Future Savvy vantage point, the real future will have, broadly speaking, two types of firm, the Weberian and the Gen-F. Firms running 19th century-type businesses will run them in 19C ways. Funky firms exploiting new ideas have already changed management style significantly and will continue to do so.

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The International Herald Tribune (New York Times Global Edition / Reuters Business) last week ran an interesting foresight story headlined ‘Crisis complicates forecasting by luxury brands,’ reporting from the International Herald Tribune’s eighth conference on luxury in New Delhi. The gist was that although most of the famous brands continue to do well despite the recession, luxury sector executives are very uncertain about the future.

Christian Blanckaert, Executive Vice President at Hermès International was quoted as saying: “We have absolutely no visibility into 2009!”

On the one hand, fair enough. This economic downturn is steeper than previous down cycles, and the basic viability of the financial sector has been tested. Access to credit is normally easier in a recession, but in this one it is not. All of which makes luxury spending harder to predict.

No doubt the most unlikely prediction of all would have been that Hermès, Burberry, LVMH, Moët Hennessy, Louis Vuitton, and PPR (Gucci , Yves Saint Laurent) have all recently reported better-than-expected results.

Nevertheless luxury industry leaders have declined to provide investors and analysts with any official outlook. What’s curious, from an industry foresight point of view, is how executives such as Blanckaert thought they really had more “visibility” into any previous year, or that they will somehow gain it again when the financial crisis is over. They will not. The world will continue to surprise them and us. What they will gain, certainly, is a greater likelihood that the standard business-as-usual future assumptions they make will not be upset by reality.

Meanwhile, judging by the conference, the luxury goods industry has a very decent grip on current social and moral trends, and clear insight into the bigger picture of change in its industry over the next five to ten years. As they know from before, what happens in a recession is that luxury goes out of fashion. Conspicuous consumption wanes, or retreats further behind secluded walls. This is a basic pendulum swing that tracks the economy (witness how the early 1990s recession stimulated a return to “values” era after the “me, me, me” 1980s.)

Sustainable luxury

So we are again in a swing to modesty. But we also know that each swing of the pendulum also carries with it the specific issues of its time. Current key issues for consumers in this segment are sustainability, global warming, business ethics, and globalization (or fear thereof).

Therefore the luxury brands will be looking for ways of making, transporting, and displaying goods in an energy-efficient and socially conscious way, including a renewed emphasis on local artisans and traditional craftsmanship that speaks sustainability in both natural and human resources. This will be the basis of the “sustainable luxury,” positioning that the famous houses will define and compete in. Fabulous and renewable  – now there’s something you can charge top dollar for.

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Publication of the Institute for the Future’s “Map of Future Forces Affecting Sustainability” on the same day that it is revealed that Sir Fred Goodwin (50) of failed & baled Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) will get a £693,000 (about $1,000,000) a year payment for the rest of his life, gets me thinking about short-termism and its entrenchment.

The IFTF’s full map is available for download here.  Quick aside: these maps, putting complex forces into visuals, have defined IFTF’s public (and client, one presumes) communications for over five years, and have raised the bar of excellence in the foresight communications. The company has produced many such outstanding maps, some publicly available.

The new map and Sir Fred-gate are unrelated of course. But here was the connection for me: The IFTF map lists six “Key Driving Forces” (2007-2017) in the area of sustainability, and the first is:
“An Imperative for Looking Long: The 21st century will test our ability to grasp the future impacts of present choices, but even as we struggle to incorporate future knowledge into our day-to-day decisions, we’re tuning up our bodies and minds and even our cultural frameworks for a much longer view.”

My question is, “really?” Is the long view really a driver – something that will drive change and shape the future? Or do we hope it is. Are we trying to talk it into being?

No question that the long-term view is crucial. Solving just about any social, technological, or environmental problem requires sustained long-term action. And everyone who works in foresight keeps evangelizing long-termism. But, in fact, what we have in industry and government is rampant short-termism and there is no indication this will change, despite the crisis and many heartfelt calls.

Linking big to long

The problem with Sir Goodwin’s package (in career and in retirement) is that the reward numbers were based on short-term company returns. “Hey, we made lots of money this year, so you get a big bonus, and you get a big bonus,” etc. But a few years down the line  – in the long term – it turns out that no bonuses were valid (if a bonus is, truly, a reward for success).

Put it another way: in finance, as in other aspects of society, technology, and the environment, we don’t know if we’ve succeeded or failed until the long-term numbers are in. Few would have a problem with handsome rewards for a valuable job well done, but those rewards must surely be delayed, and delayed, until we are in command of the long view of the performance.

Easy in theory, hard in practice. Perhaps impossible in practice when most politicians and legislators are themselves on a short 3-7 year cycle, like CEOs. I have some inkling from the IFTF map that the thinking is that life-extending technologies will improve to the point where people will really see themselves in for the long haul, and so adopt a longer perspective on benefits and rewards.

Time on the clock

Perhaps. But, life-technologies aside, plenty of decision-makers – Goodwin included – still have a lot of time left on the clock and that doesn’t appear to stop them chasing and cashing in short-term incentives at the expense of the future. Or legislators (and the public who votes them in) structuring performance rating on our immediate perception of their performance.

What we have, and what we have increasingly had (the trend) over the past few decades, is systemic short-termism. Winning in the next annual report or the next election is what what leaders’ rewards are based on. Incentives for politicians or business leaders or even scientists or engineers to make a better world for 2025 or 2050 are negligable.

Until there is reason to anticipate that this fundamental underlying short-term incentive structure and mentality changes (that is – convince me – who will change it and how?) the future savvy perspective must say that the “long-term imperative” remains a nice sound-bite, but not a material driver of anything.

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All crises of the present can be viewed as a failure of foresight or planning at some previous point, and the current global economic crisis is no different.

The mood is justly sombre at the World Economic Forum’s Davos meeting this year, as grim-faced world leaders mull over the dismal state of the global economy and how to fix it. This is in marked contrast to recent years, when the top executives were warmly congratulating themselves on the general state of things.

In one sense this is perfectly understandable. The crisis is upon us and leaders should be directly and practically involved in tackling it. On another level it’s profoundly disturbing, because world leaders and senior managers should be doing more than merely responding to situations. When crises occur, crisis management becomes part of a leader’s job, but their real job is thinking ahead effectively to avoid crises and, on the positive side, develop opportunities.

Put another way: the heads of a companies or countries – Davos-level people – are tasked far beyond effective daily management. They are tasked, fundamentally, with negotiating the VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous) world on behalf of the rest of us. If not them, then who?

This requires foresight and vision. In this sense, many who are at Davos this week are responsible for the current crisis. They failed to foresee it, in fact they generally endorsed the growth of complex financial instruments, the shadow banking system, and private equity growth –- much of which bypassed SEC or equivalent regulation, and which is now seen to be the root cause of the meltdown.

In fact much of the “new finance” system was thought to spread and therefore actually lower risk. Turns out that was a poor view of the future. In fact the present situation as a whole is the result of key decision-makers operating on a poor view of future. As a group, their mental model was not open to bad outcomes, or even just alternative outcomes to what was commonly expected.

Could we have thunk it?

Their response might be: “nobody can predict the future!” “Easy to say after the event!” This is true. But it’s common knowledge that there were those who foresaw the mess — The Times identified at least 10. As Davos attendees might now be forced to agree, some forecasts are clearly better than others.

This is where executive leaders can learn from the foresight field and particularly the history of failed predictions. Everyone relies on predictions for their guide to the future – nobody can be an expert in every field. And there’s never a shortage of them – they are frequently published in the media, offered by consultancies and think tanks, and are a key part of Davos.

While getting a prediction is easy, the key leadership skill is to be able to tell a good one from a bad one: that’s what turns a forecast into a strategic resource. That is what leads to better decisions, better plans, and better actions.

Can one do that? Can one critically assess a particular or consensus-held view of the future, to identify its strengths and weaknesses? Absolutely yes. Among the tests one can run on a prediction are:

•    assessing motivation – who is speaking and what their agenda might be, particularly if they have an interest in maintaining a current system or shaping the emergence of a new one
•    determining whether the tools used are appropriate to the level and type of uncertainty faced. High-uncertainty situations and long-term views require different approaches to standard modeling
•    questioning consensus mental-models and forcing consideration of alternative outcomes. All foresight is swayed by “zeitgeist” – spirit of the times – and good forecasts swim against this tide.

These are just a few among the many forecast tests one can run, as detailed in Future Savvy.  But even if Davos attendees had been applying just these three in previous years, their foresight would have been greatly improved. It won’t help with this crisis, but it might forestall the next.

* This article, authored by Adam Gordon, was first edited and published by Bnet.co.uk

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Review: The Age of Heretics, (2nd Edition), Art Kleiner, Jossey-Bass, 2008

One of the conundrums of foresight work is that it demands a macro-perspective, but real change requires focus. In order to get the breadth of view across society and technology to think adequately about the future, the futures analyst is forced to forgo much of the detail, while implementers are thinking: “this 40,000 ft view is very illuminating, but how do I land the plane?” What changes do I make, in my organization, in my industry, on Monday morning, and how do I not get fired for making them?

Kleiner’s updated The Age of Heretics, (2nd edition, Jossey-Bass, 2008) is the modern history of people who find themselves – or put themselves – on the focus side of foresight: who work practically on the ground inside corporate institutions to achieve change, which means by definition challenging the methods and perspectives of their institution. It is not the story of foresight at the lofty level of ideas, but the altogether grittier and more interesting story of how macro-change consciousness meets real institutions, real organizational dynamics, real industry pressures, and real career considerations, in the history of US corporations since 1945.

Kleiner, the editor-in-chief of Booz Allen’s Strategy+Business, is no stranger to the foresight field. He is the ghost-writer behind an eye-popping portion of the futures canon, including The Art of the Long View; The Fifth Discipline, and its Fieldbook; and The Living Company, and so on, (source: http://www.well.com/~art/) so it’s no surprise that the fabric of his text is lush in its familiarity with the players and ideas in the field.

The common thread he follows – through figures like Herman Kahn, Willis Harman, Amory Lovins, Oliver Markley, and so on, is that of the heretic, the maverick against the machine. Intriguingly, along the way, Kleiner gives us a worm’s-eye view of the genesis of many new management ideas, from “lean production” to the “balanced scorecard” to “scenario planning’ – showing how they emerge from and have been engendered by the forces of institutions in productive conflict with their heretics.

The political history of truth, and its future

Philosopher Michel Foucault catapulted our understanding of institutions as a political field, using insights from the history of prisons, hospitals, and asylums to show the relationship between power and knowledge in the evolution of institutional forms. But he never dealt with the modern business corporation. It may be overstating it, but not by much, to say that Kleiner updates Foucault for corporate America. The themes he carries: the role of the deviant, transgression, the evolution of truth, and discursive struggles between insiders and outsiders, are highly resonant. In his previous book, Who Really Matters (Doubleday, 2003) Kleiner developed other parts of this same perspective: showing how every organization’s identity and choices can be understood as driven by the interests of its core group – its powerful insiders.

The Age of Heretics is an engrossing history of change-agents in companies in strategic and organizational transformation. But it’s not just a history. In the future – while the names of the players, and their issues, and the institutions themselves will change, the productive articulation between the heretic and the institution will remain the format of change in big groups. So the lessons of the book are well taken and very highly recommended.

[This review, authored by Adam Gordon, first appeared in The Association of Professional Futurist's Compass Magazine]

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Last week I ran a one-day workshop (view program blurb – item C9 – here) “How to Build and Use Scenarios” in the pre-conference courses at the WFS annual meeting in DC. We had 38 attendees and by all accounts much was learned (including by me of course).

This was a fairly typical example of the Intro Workshop in Scenarios program that I run, so I’ve decided to post it on SlideShare, see link below. Let me know what you think.

What is different about this course at this venue, particularly, is that the attendees come from a wide spectrum of industries and sectors (from Nestle strategist to the Canadian military planners, to Mauri sustainability experts, and beyond), and have a very wide background/preparation in futures tools and methods. There were relative experts in the room, and some absolute novices. … nothing like a challenge for the facilitator!

Slides from the day are at http://www.slideshare.net/adgo/how-to-build-and-use-scenarios-day-workshop

some pix:

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