Future Savvy: Quality in Foresight

The BBC has released a blueprint for its future, summarized in a 64-page ‘Director-General’s Report which can be downloaded here. The gist is the corporation plans to back off from many of its more commercial offerings, particularly closing digital radio stations such as 6Music and the Asian Network, and pruning its online presence. The money saved will go to funding more original content and shoring up the quality of the offerings not pruned.
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The BBC futures document is a careful and thoughtful piece of work, making bold foresight-oriented moves: saying, essentially, what are we here for? To provide quality media in the public interest. So what do we need to do/make/change to achieve it, that is, to deliver on our core mission, in the years ahead?
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To this end, the blueprint talks about “setting new boundaries:
• Recognising the lead role that commercial radio plays in serving popular music to 30-50 year-old audiences, through the proposed closure of 6 Music and the refocusing of Radio 1 and Radio 2
• Recognising the lead role that Channel 4 and other broadcasters can play in addressing the gap in public service television for younger teenagers, through the closure of targeted teen propositions
• Reducing spending on programmes from abroad by 20%, from £100m today to £80m in 2013, capping it thereafter at this level of 2.5p in every licence fee pound
• Setting a limit on what the BBC can spend on sports rights at an average of 9p in every licence fee pound
• Leaving room for local newspapers and others to develop in a digital world by keeping the BBC’s current pattern of local services, and not launching new services in England at any more local a level than today
• Focusing original content on BBC Online on the (five) content priorities only, and excluding whole categories of online activity such as web search, communications and non-content related social networking.”

Further in the document it talks about “a set of web-native activities that the BBC itself will not undertake, including:
• The BBC’s search activity will be limited to its own website and associated external links; it will not do general web search for all-web content
• It will not run its own general communications services such as email, webmail or instant messaging
• It will not create stand-alone social networking sites, with any social propositions on the BBC site only there to aid engagement with BBC content. The BBC will also ensure that its social activity works with external social networks
• There will be no specialist content for a specialist audience, such as business-critical information in specialist fields, legal, financial (including trading tools) or other professional content.”
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From the beeb’s perspective, it makes perfect sense. It can’t be the best at everything to everyone. That just means it will be working at the limits of its reach in many areas, against focused competitors, which dilutes its brand, and of course spending public money on commercial services already relatively well catered to.

The politics of engagement

It’s business strategy 101, and if it were a business that would be that. But the BBC is a multi-stakeholder public service body, and therein lies the rub. Everyone has a say in its future. And different stakeholders have different ideas of what is ‘in the public interest’: many think commercial radio etc., is in their interest, so protest is mounting, particularly among younger users under banners that read ‘BBC turns it’ back on a generation’ and so on. Twitter is humming.

Good multi-stakeholder future work requires engagement and consultation, and the BBC is offering a consultative process — from now until May 25 — see the page at https://consultations.external.bbc.co.uk

The future? Let’s not mince words that are usually minced. The future is political. That is part of the reason prediction is done so poorly — people miss the fact or extent of contention over outcomes, even ones you would think are in everyone’s interest (mitigating climate change, for example.)

When there are many interested parties with different interests, and therefore contending claims on the future — different visions of the ‘ideal’ future — the flavor of the future (in total or in compromise) will belong to the interest with the stronger hand. So depending on the power of the stakeholders soon-to-be-unhappy, the BBC will be forced to bend or not. But in the hardball world of multistakeholder change, chances are the Director General has set his stall out a bit further than he need to, and will be able to ‘compromise’ to a position that is more or less the plan. Good futuring all round.

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I have a fond little memory from one of the early multi-candidate debates in the last US election campaign. It was on prime-time TV: there were still about a dozen or so candidates in the running, including Obama and Hillary Clinton, each was standing behind a podium, and as the topic of climate change came up they were asked en masse: “So, who didn’t fly here today in a private plane, raise your hand?” The delegates all sheepishly kept their hands down but one – I forget which – raised his. “I came in yesterday,” he explained. (laughter)

So to the Copenhagen climate change summit, and all the luminaries and dignitaries and celebrities landing at København airport, many of them in private jets.

http://www.cph.dk/CPH/DK/MAIN

This tells us something about the future, and what it says is: ‘needs must.’ What are they going to do, row a boat to Copenhagen? Scale that up and you have the real, actual future. People will fly. In fact the entire new global middle class of billions will fly. And they will heat their homes. And they will eat meat, and so on. And any even remotely democratic system that tries to take away this will be out on its ear.

But we will of course move to cleaner, renewable, sustainable systems. How fast this happens depends essentially on money, which in turn depends on political will, which in turn depends on public concern. Money is required to fund new energy technology research, and — the core issue of Copenhagen this week — it is needed to buy off industrializing countries.

There’s no doubt that climate change (manmade or not) is real, and a real danger. But when scientists and academics are worried about it that means little in terms of changes to human practices. When the public gets concerned — as they now are — we get the possibility of fundamental change. This is true of the future generally, not just climate and the environment.

Between the public sentiment and the money lies political will. Essentially the political will of post-industrial economies on the one side, who find it politically easy, relatively, to pay the price of emissions constraints vs. that of developing economies which will be choked economically and therefore politically by those constraints.

Inequality

Correlating degrees warming with ecological and therefore social upheaval is important. But to think that is what the argument is about is to miss the point. The point is global inequality and its future, and how developing economies are not going to allow emissions constraints to further entrench it.

The future goes always to the most powerful side. That’s what power is for: determining the future. The sides are both strong in this dispute, so this battle will not be won or lost in Copenhagen this week. We are still in its early stages. The effects of climate change are incremental (unlike, say, nuclear holocaust) meaning there is plenty of room for postponement even if the planet can’t and won’t ultimately take it. And those who would occupy the moral high ground have burned public and private jet fuel to be there to do it, and will no doubt indulge in a bit of Smørrebrød and Frikadeller too. Needs must.

So expect the political clock to remain stuck as it has been for a while now, at ‘5 minutes to midnight,’ while the issue smolders slowly without definitive resolution — until technology advances get human energy, finally, off fossil fuels and the problem works its way out of environmental and human systems.

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The copy of USA Today, slipped under my Chicago hotel room door on Friday—failing which I would have missed the event entirely—marks the 40th anniversary of Apollo 11 putting man on the moon (July 20, 1969). It says: “40 years after Apollo 11: What’s our Next Step?” The strap goes on: “The moon again? Mars? An asteroid? Four decades after the moon landing, NASA seeks a new—and affordable—frontier in space.”

The failed “our-future-in-space prediction” cluster is useful because it is the poster child for bad predicting, nothing less than foresight idiocy in its purest form, worth mentioning only because it helps us to see smaller and more subtle future-thinking mistakes we make routinely.

This is what I said in Future Savvy (Chapter 5):

“The forecasts that surrounded the future of space travel and exploration are perhaps the most high-profile and comprehensively poor set of forecasts ever made, and therefore provide a good vantage point to consider what can go wrong in forecasting. From the 1950s, space was a huge topic of interest. All significant earthbound exploration challenges had been overcome, technology was moving rapidly, and what lay ahead, unconquered, was space. The need to explore it was deeply in the zeitgeist.
“At the same time, the Cold War created the specific situation where beating the Soviets in prestige projects was an important priority, important enough to divert massive resources to it. J.F. Kennedy’s rousing (future-influencing) 1961 prediction of putting a man on the moon by the end of the decade motivated and galvanized the United States, and the resulting Gemini and Apollo programs made this not only a human achievement but a successful prediction. As a result, analysts of all stripes were quick to project the trend and predict a moon base, lunar communities by 2000, followed soon by trips to Mars and beyond, and on to the limits of space. . . .
“The last man to set foot on the moon was in 1973. The Space Shuttle tried to maintain forward momentum under the guise of scientific research, not without disaster, and an almost inconsequential international space station has been built. To this day there are many who cry into their soup over the lack of space exploration and conquest. So what happened? The groundswell of prediction was wrong because it failed to see that putting a few U.S. men into orbit did not add enough value to enough peoples’ lives to justify the expense—particularly in the economically uncertain 1970s. In the end, the majority of consumers voted with their wallets to postpone, if not entirely eviscerate, human space exploration.”

One could go into great detail, but simply put, the intertwined elements resulting in this poor view of the future were:

1. Failure to recognize user utility and the choice consumers make in determining the future. That is, for most people the cost of any space venturing is not worth the benefit (i.e. what benefit?) The fact that we “can do it” is hardly relevant. The real futures question is always: do most people want it? In the 1960s space was “worth it” (particularly in that the goal was clear and bounded) because spending billions on a prestige project made sense at a time of (a) absolute US economic prosperity and (b) ideological dispute with the USSR.

2. Projecting trends without considering the strength of underlying drivers. Space exploration was, apparently, on-the-up in the 1950s and 60s. But trends are only as good as the drivers that support them. When the drivers go away (lack of public support due to cost/benefit issues) the trend stops. In fact, there is no real, dependable, trend to space exploration. There was a blip in the 1960s when conditions temporarily favored a national prestige extravaganza. There wasn’t a trend before, and there hasn’t been any since.

3. Forecasting mired in the conditions or spirit of the present, the zeitgeist. Space was important in the golden-era 50s and 60s; and particularly in that it was arena of competition with the Soviets. But it’s always a mistake to assume the framing conditions of the present will exist in the future, and in this case 40 years later, they most certainly don’t.

Don’t hold your breath

What of 40 years time? It is quite likely that “space flip” flights into orbit will be safe and cheap enough to commercialized in the next decade. Unmanned probes (again safe and relatively cheap) will continue, and popular access to their images and experiences will be greatly enhanced. But that’s all that will happen until such time as costs and other conditions of possibility change fundamentally, which implies a completely new form of space travel, of energy, of materials, and of human resilience and longevity. Not in this century.

Wired Science ran a July 20 article “40 Years After Apollo 11, NASA Maps Out the Future,” which puts the best possible spin on  this unmanned-probe future. It is careful to end without crushing the feelings of space junkies, saying: “Any American landing on Mars through the Constellation program would come some time after 2030.” It won’t happen, and here’s another secret: if anyone is going to land anywhere it will be a Chinese person. China still has prestige projects ahead of it, and human space exploration could be one of them.

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Samuel, L., Future: A Recent History, University of Texas Press, 2009

I recently received a copy of Future: A Recent History to review. True confession: what hit me first on picking up the book was (a) “wow, the title Future is not already taken!? And (b) what a fabulous job the University of Texas Press has done producing this book. It is beautifully designed, with an understated Art Deco motif, and carefully laid out with enough text on the page, on delightfully solid paper stock.
It may seem odd to go on about text on the page, but it’s much easier to read like an adult, in paragraphs. So many books, particularly business books, these days appear produced at 14-point, double spacing, like pre-school readers. Makes you wonder…

Anyway, author Larry Samuel’s project is to investigate the history of views of the future from 1920 to the present. (The book has an acknowledged US-centric focus, partially defended by the notion that future-mindedness is “a principle strand in America’s DNA.”) He organizes the book chronologically into six periods between then and now, and shows, with interesting examples, how each period had its own views of the future, and how the views shifted from period to period.

In tracing the history of “tommorowism,” in this way, Future is on a similar track to the classic book in this field: I.F. Clarke’s The Pattern of Expectation 1644-2001 (Jonathan Cape, 1979). It ultimately makes similar points, although Samuel’s argument is obviously drawn from more recent examples. As Samuel puts it: “A look back on how people looked forward reveals that while it possesses certain common themes … the future is not a fixed idea but a highly variable on that reflects the values of those who are imagining it.”

Happily I can say this chimes exactly with the argument of Future Savvy, particularly Chapter 4 “Zeitgeist & Perception,” where I argued how heavily the nature of the present and its topical issues frames how the future is seen (what is forecast, what is aspired to or feared, what counts as a valid method for thinking ahead, and so on). Which means the framing conditions of the present  should be carefully analyzed in assessing the validity of any future view.

Historiography

Historiography – investigating the meta-conditions surrounding what is recorded and how it is interpreted by historians – what counts as “history” and for whom –  is a well-understood part of doing good history. Unfortunately, there is no equivalent standard “futuriography” in the foresight field, despite it being absolutely fundamental to understanding the value of our own predictions as, similarly, highly determined by the epistemic configurations of their production. It is here that Samuel very competently fills a much needed gap.

The practical implication of this, which Future does not get into – it’s not that kind of book – is that to make better predictions (or make valid assessments of others’ predictions) we need to ask stiff questions as to how much of what we foresee is determined by the perspectives of today, and expect the answer to be “very much.” Understanding the limitations and biases of our own perspective is the sine-qua-non of a robust view of what tomorrow will actually bring.

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Top of the news yesterday along with Iran’s election protest was Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statement that he — as leader of the right-wing Likud party — could endorse a Palestinian state. It was framed in conditions on Jewish-state recognition, and requirements on security, borders, refugees and Jerusalem that are, from today’s vantage point, very difficult to imagine Palestinians or Arab states agreeing to. So no change is expected. Even the breaking-story reporters had to admit that, rhetoric aside, this is not a breakthrough.

There’s an old joke in journalism from the 1970s that goes: “You can write the same headline on any and every story about Israel’s relationship with its neighbors: ‘Prospects for Middle-East Peace Dim.’”

Sure, it’s partly Eeyeore-ish journalist wit. But what’s interesting from a foresight point of view is that, running the world forward 40 years shows it was a reasonable understanding of the future. Why? Solid foresight is always predicated on a solid understanding of the forces for and against change. “Prospects for peace dim” acknowledged that forces and enablers of change were overpowered by what was preventing anything fundamental from happening (friction and blockers in Future Savvy terms.)

The basic truth is that Israel-Middle East is a complex situation characterized by a more-or-less equal balance of power. Israel has military and nuclear superiority, and US backing. Arab countries have oil, population numbers and population growth, and a billion more-or-less sympathetic moslems around the world, and therefore time on their side. They also have, particularly in Gaza, relatively widespread poverty and low welfare and educational development, which is  a force against moderation and therefore a negotiated settlement.

A genuine balance of power means we have equilibrium, and therefore should expect no change. That’s why we’ve had plenty of skirmishes, but no change in 40 years.

Looking out for the next 40 years, is this still the case? Can we write “Prospects for Middle East Peace Dim” on all news stories for another two generations? Following the foresight logic above, this depends on whether anything breaks the fundamental equilibrium. There are four issues apparently large enough to threaten the status quo:

• Water shortages and water conflicts
• Change in US policy
• The end of oil-based transport energy
• Iran going toxic

Water is a favorite of trend-foresight sessions. It sounds like the key issue in a rising-population world. In theory yes, but it’s unclear whether it will lead to anything more than local conflicts or wars, which in Israels case, we have already. On US policy, the Obama administration is attempting to show even-handedness, but its strategic interest lies with Israel as military ally and ideologically temperate (democratic, at least) bastion in the region. So no change there either. On oil, we are definitely in an era where – for security and climate change reasons – fossil fuel is entering it’s twilight phase, which will erode revenues and therefore power of ME Arab states. But, as mentioned earlier, poverty is as great an obstacle to peace as any other. (Remember the Israeli “let’s-grow-our-way-out-of the-situation-together peace platform of the 1990s, seeing tackling the development issues as the root of creating moderate mindsets across the region.)

That leaves Iran which may change the balance if it really goes toxic (develops and uses nuclear weapons in terror strikes.) This is a low futures likelihood – it’s not just luck that nukes have stayed in their box since 1945 – no state wants to carry the stain of the nuclear pariah for all time. There’s a moral blocker on this outcome that has worked for generations. Nuclear powers rattle, but the don’t bite. But … what if the wildcard scenario of a massive nuclear strike on Israeli soft targets were to happen, what then? The current low-grade hostile standoff would become a supernova, but we’d still have power balance, and while we have that we’ll have status quo and  journalists can expect to write “Prospects for Middle East Peace Dim” on top of every story about the region for another 40 years.

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Apocalyptic predictions are designed to be wrong. The point of doing them, as with “1984,” “Brave New World,” “When the Wind Blows,” etc., is to raise consciousness to negative outcomes and engender action so that the prediction, by succeeding in purpose makes itself incorrect in fact. “The Age of Stupid” is this all over. See the trailer here:

There is also a documentary about how the movie was funded and made.

Set in 2055, post the environmental global climate change collapse, it features last-man-on-earth (Pete Postlethwaite) as an archivist in a tower refuge somewhere in the Arctic north of Norway sifting through records of human life before it was wiped out, trying to find out why people did nothing to stop the eco-catastrophe that was imminent. The plot device allows filmmaker Franny Armstrong, (director of McLibel, 2005, about environmentalists who successfully challenged McDonalds) to showcase a selection of real reportage and news clips from today to withering effect. Like any good scenario it gives granularity: dates, names, actions, timelines. It points fingers and mentally readies the reader-watcher to act.

By all accounts this is a punchier movie than Al Gore-fronted “An Inconvenient Truth (2006),” and punchy is what is required to effect the goals of a future-influencing forecasting, that is, an assault on the powers that be and/or on public complacency.

By the way, if you want to see the best activist consciousness-raising movie (ever!) see Pete Postlethwaite in the anti-Thatcherite “Brassed Off.”

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One of the more alarming mistakes in foresight work is that forecasters don’t see themselves as operating within their own world view, and the preconceptions and priorities of their own time. In fact the very idea of foresight – why do it and how to do it – has changed quite markedly through human history. Knowledge of this historiography is of course important in assessing current forecasts. This is why Oona Strathern’s A Brief History of the Future (Robinson, London, 2007) is an important book.

One doesn’t start reading a “Brief History of” book in a series that includes A Brief History of the Birth of the Nazis and A Brief History of British Kings & Queens, without a certain trepidation. But, in fact, A Brief History of the Future is well-considered and well-written summing up of the characters and concerns that have shaped and continue to shape the future studies field.

Strathern, is a British journalist-turned-futurist, based in Vienna. One of the key attributes she brings is a journalist’s (and sub-editor’s) critical “don’t-bullshit-me” faculties, which is welcome in a field that is often short on common sense.

The book is hardly brief (at 300 pages) so there’s no sense that it’s a potted history. And it’s not compromised by what one – alas – expects of this kind of setup: pandering to all characters in positive or equal terms. In fact a key value of the book is its clear-headed and plucky judgment of who the key figures are (and who are not) and what their contributions have each been (vs what they might have thought they were). It is also unusually even-handed in balancing US and European inputs.

The book follows the obvious structure, starting with the oracles of Ancient Greece, Plato, moving through Leonardo de Vinci, and Thomas Malthus and so on through to the 19th century (Jules Verne, Karl Marx, etc.) and on to the present. In this Strathern argues for and operates with a wide definition of futures work – including in the dreamers, social reformers, and sci-fi writers in addition the more formal analysts and planners.

20th Century Weltanschauung
The book really hits its straps in the 20th century – in discussions of Aldous Huxley, H.G. Wells, George Orwell, Arthur C. Clarke, Herman Kahn, Buckminster Fuller, Alvin Toffler, Isaac Asimov, Margaret Mead and many lesser known figures. What is most interesting here is how the links between foresight approaches and the evolving broader existential and political “weltanschauung” of the century is knitted together, inserting “futurology” into the 20th century world of ideas at each point.

Although the book deals with institutions of foresight pretty well, the one angle I missed was the development of foresight education over the past 40 years. Part or full university degrees in foresight methods are an important part of the evolution of the field. Much has been learned in the debates over what and how and where to teach it. Ironically, the book – as intelligent a summary of the “future studies” field as you will find – would be an ideal text for an introductory course in such a curriculum.

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Publication of the Institute for the Future’s “Map of Future Forces Affecting Sustainability” on the same day that it is revealed that Sir Fred Goodwin (50) of failed & baled Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) will get a £693,000 (about $1,000,000) a year payment for the rest of his life, gets me thinking about short-termism and its entrenchment.

The IFTF’s full map is available for download here.  Quick aside: these maps, putting complex forces into visuals, have defined IFTF’s public (and client, one presumes) communications for over five years, and have raised the bar of excellence in the foresight communications. The company has produced many such outstanding maps, some publicly available.

The new map and Sir Fred-gate are unrelated of course. But here was the connection for me: The IFTF map lists six “Key Driving Forces” (2007-2017) in the area of sustainability, and the first is:
“An Imperative for Looking Long: The 21st century will test our ability to grasp the future impacts of present choices, but even as we struggle to incorporate future knowledge into our day-to-day decisions, we’re tuning up our bodies and minds and even our cultural frameworks for a much longer view.”

My question is, “really?” Is the long view really a driver – something that will drive change and shape the future? Or do we hope it is. Are we trying to talk it into being?

No question that the long-term view is crucial. Solving just about any social, technological, or environmental problem requires sustained long-term action. And everyone who works in foresight keeps evangelizing long-termism. But, in fact, what we have in industry and government is rampant short-termism and there is no indication this will change, despite the crisis and many heartfelt calls.

Linking big to long

The problem with Sir Goodwin’s package (in career and in retirement) is that the reward numbers were based on short-term company returns. “Hey, we made lots of money this year, so you get a big bonus, and you get a big bonus,” etc. But a few years down the line  – in the long term – it turns out that no bonuses were valid (if a bonus is, truly, a reward for success).

Put it another way: in finance, as in other aspects of society, technology, and the environment, we don’t know if we’ve succeeded or failed until the long-term numbers are in. Few would have a problem with handsome rewards for a valuable job well done, but those rewards must surely be delayed, and delayed, until we are in command of the long view of the performance.

Easy in theory, hard in practice. Perhaps impossible in practice when most politicians and legislators are themselves on a short 3-7 year cycle, like CEOs. I have some inkling from the IFTF map that the thinking is that life-extending technologies will improve to the point where people will really see themselves in for the long haul, and so adopt a longer perspective on benefits and rewards.

Time on the clock

Perhaps. But, life-technologies aside, plenty of decision-makers – Goodwin included – still have a lot of time left on the clock and that doesn’t appear to stop them chasing and cashing in short-term incentives at the expense of the future. Or legislators (and the public who votes them in) structuring performance rating on our immediate perception of their performance.

What we have, and what we have increasingly had (the trend) over the past few decades, is systemic short-termism. Winning in the next annual report or the next election is what what leaders’ rewards are based on. Incentives for politicians or business leaders or even scientists or engineers to make a better world for 2025 or 2050 are negligable.

Until there is reason to anticipate that this fundamental underlying short-term incentive structure and mentality changes (that is – convince me – who will change it and how?) the future savvy perspective must say that the “long-term imperative” remains a nice sound-bite, but not a material driver of anything.

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Review: The Age of Heretics, (2nd Edition), Art Kleiner, Jossey-Bass, 2008

One of the conundrums of foresight work is that it demands a macro-perspective, but real change requires focus. In order to get the breadth of view across society and technology to think adequately about the future, the futures analyst is forced to forgo much of the detail, while implementers are thinking: “this 40,000 ft view is very illuminating, but how do I land the plane?” What changes do I make, in my organization, in my industry, on Monday morning, and how do I not get fired for making them?

Kleiner’s updated The Age of Heretics, (2nd edition, Jossey-Bass, 2008) is the modern history of people who find themselves – or put themselves – on the focus side of foresight: who work practically on the ground inside corporate institutions to achieve change, which means by definition challenging the methods and perspectives of their institution. It is not the story of foresight at the lofty level of ideas, but the altogether grittier and more interesting story of how macro-change consciousness meets real institutions, real organizational dynamics, real industry pressures, and real career considerations, in the history of US corporations since 1945.

Kleiner, the editor-in-chief of Booz Allen’s Strategy+Business, is no stranger to the foresight field. He is the ghost-writer behind an eye-popping portion of the futures canon, including The Art of the Long View; The Fifth Discipline, and its Fieldbook; and The Living Company, and so on, (source: http://www.well.com/~art/) so it’s no surprise that the fabric of his text is lush in its familiarity with the players and ideas in the field.

The common thread he follows – through figures like Herman Kahn, Willis Harman, Amory Lovins, Oliver Markley, and so on, is that of the heretic, the maverick against the machine. Intriguingly, along the way, Kleiner gives us a worm’s-eye view of the genesis of many new management ideas, from “lean production” to the “balanced scorecard” to “scenario planning’ – showing how they emerge from and have been engendered by the forces of institutions in productive conflict with their heretics.

The political history of truth, and its future

Philosopher Michel Foucault catapulted our understanding of institutions as a political field, using insights from the history of prisons, hospitals, and asylums to show the relationship between power and knowledge in the evolution of institutional forms. But he never dealt with the modern business corporation. It may be overstating it, but not by much, to say that Kleiner updates Foucault for corporate America. The themes he carries: the role of the deviant, transgression, the evolution of truth, and discursive struggles between insiders and outsiders, are highly resonant. In his previous book, Who Really Matters (Doubleday, 2003) Kleiner developed other parts of this same perspective: showing how every organization’s identity and choices can be understood as driven by the interests of its core group – its powerful insiders.

The Age of Heretics is an engrossing history of change-agents in companies in strategic and organizational transformation. But it’s not just a history. In the future – while the names of the players, and their issues, and the institutions themselves will change, the productive articulation between the heretic and the institution will remain the format of change in big groups. So the lessons of the book are well taken and very highly recommended.

[This review, authored by Adam Gordon, first appeared in The Association of Professional Futurist's Compass Magazine]

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In planning seminars and discussions about the future, a key topic is inevitably “technology change.” Participants will turn to each other, or perhaps to industry research or techno-tracking Web sites or “technology roadmaps” to consider technology changes in their industry and in the world at large, and how this may change the future.

So far so good. Tracking technology change is an important stage in scanning the external environment and anticipating sources or change and/or disruption. But no technology ever changed itself. History is littered with fabulous mind-bending, world-changing technologies that didn’t make it out of the lab. In fact, technologies only change because humans or human institutions want them to change AND (two separate hurdles here) they allow them to change.

Most people, most of the time, want technologies to change because they change for the better, improving products and services and/or making them cheaper. Companies want new technologies because improvements offer new sales options and (sometimes) industry competitive advantage, among other things. Societies express the desire for technology to go forward by stimulating and facilitating change in many ways (for example through government or industry funding of R&D or protecting intellectual property or making capital markets more transparent.)

Technology filtered by human choice
Once a technology breakthrough emerges, that’s hardly the end of the story. In fact it is still very much the beginning. New technologies of any importance are subject to public scrutiny and choices. Individually, or as a society, we ask ourselves, is this technology good for us? Debates happen, and power and politics and regulation takes its course, but one way or another technologies that most people like – mobile phone’s for example – will go forward while technologies such as GMOs will stall. Also, in a market economy, technologies are inescapably subject to consumer economics: those that raise user benefit (pass a buyer;s cost-benefit analysis) will be adopted. Those that don’t sit in the lab.

In other words, technology possibility is a matter of science and engineering, and the possibility frontier is expanding all the time, but the road from possibility to actuality is the rocky road of human ideas, preferences, and choices. Technology change means technology adoption, that is, it is a form of social change.

Why is this distinction important? Because one of the main reasons forecast fail is they see the technology possibility frontier as the future, underestimating the forces of social triage. There are two sites that I love that illustrate this wonderfully. Check out Paleo-Future (A Look into the Future that Never Was) and Modern Mechanics (Yesterday’s Tomorrow Today). Both are crammed with failed forecasts of this type. This is not to say that we cannot forecast usefully – much more to come on this in this journal – but it does give us pause in viewing many of today’s techno-inspired forecasts which make the same type of error. (Pics credit to the sites mentioned.)

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