Future Savvy: Quality in Foresight

I was lucky enough to have Future Savvy included in a lengthy review of critical thinking in forecasting & foresight, done on the SmithySmithy “info-savvy” blog. The post also included Nassim Taleb’s ‘The Black Swan’ (2007) and ‘Fooled By Randomness’ (2005); Kenneth Posner’s ‘Stalking the Black Swan’ (2010), and Chris Luebkeman’s Drivers of Change (2009).

As Stoyko’s is head-and-shoulders the most insightful and thorough assessments of the book itself, and the book in context, I’m reposting it here, with thanks. There are also fabulous graphics added, such as these (see more below):

“My search led to Adam Gordon’s Future Savvy. Like Posner, Gordon challenges Taleb’s blanket dismissal of forecasting. Gordon does not deny the existence of Black Swan events. And his book is a giant compendium of all of the things that usually go wrong with predictions. Moreover, Gordon offers a sceptical discussion of the subject that chastises simple-minded futurists, tech enthusiasts, and various other prophets of doom and boom. The difference between Taleb and Gordon is that Gordon doesn’t dismiss out-of-hand the usefulness of structured thinking about the future. Many important decisions require us to speculate about what the future might hold. Gordon wants us to be savvy in the way we anticipate the future instead of flying by the seats of our pants, so to speak.

“To set the stage, Gordon talks about how the forecasting industry is rife with problems. There are no standards, no accepted methods, no standard terminology. There are no penalties for failure given that people tend to forget forecasts by the time they can be proven wrong. And when dealing with the forecasts offered by pundits, stakeholders, and activists, Gordon reminds us, “we are knee deep in predictive wishful thinking, scare-mongering, or blatant self-promotion.” (p. 5) Buyer beware.

“Then there are the data problems. Forecasters use data from the past to project trends into the future. They rely heavily on data gathered for other purposes, not gathered for the task at hand. Availability is patchy. The data comes from multiple sources and is created using different methods. Important statistical caveats get lost. The context of the original studies gets forgotten. Variables are often defined loosely … and change over time … and are measured differently in different places. Data gathering methods often change over time in ways that exaggerate or obscure a trend. Sensationalist “newsy” data often commands the most attention. Some things are inherently difficult or impossible to measure accurately. All sorts of assumptions get embedded in data projected into the future. Furthermore, Gordon talks about the ways in which numbers can be finessed in an underhanded way. He advocates “number scepticism”, warning: “But no matter how scientific the data appears, choices have been exercised at every point about what to observe, what to count, how to measure it, and how to report it. … But numbers are not bedrock. There is no bedrock.” (p. 59)

“As an aside, statisticians have a snide nickname for analysts who mix’n’match statistics from a hodgepodge of sources to create complicated models or story-lines. That nickname is junk-yard dog. Gordon gives the impression that the forecasting business is, by necessity, heavily populated with these collectors.

“The sources of potential error don’t end with data. Our biases cause us to misinterpret and misreport the data.

“Some bias is intentional manipulation. Rascally analysts ignore or downplay countervailing evidence. They give evidence less scrutiny if it confirms the desired result. Emotionally charged language and associations are used. Terms are defined in leading ways. Extreme cases are used to represent the norm. Forecasts that don’t accord with an agenda get ignored, especially if the forecast is sponsored by a powerful interest. Organisational incentives can cause those being scrutinised to fudge the numbers. When forecasts are presented to the media, the most extreme trends get attention and important caveats remain unreported. Gordon is particularly critical of the so-called futurists who use “stretch thinking” and “big-picture thinking” to imagine a world full of only big changes. Many have a technophile bias, or the assumption that technology is the sole motive-force of large-scale societal change. Gordon’s advice is to keep your guard up and be wary of motives.

“Setting aside the thinness of this advice, Gordon has a strange attitude when talking about manipulation. He makes a distinction between forecasts that attempt to be accurate and forecasts that attempt to influence. Employee-prodding managers, partisan policy wonks, and alarmist activists use loaded forecasts to move minds. Humility, qualification, and tentativeness don’t have a place in these circles. There may be a legitimate reason for using leading forecasts, such as communicating the art-of-the-possible or giving someone an ambitious target to strive for. However, leading forecasts without full disclosure are instruments of underhanded manipulation. Gordon is eerily agnostic. His advice and tone of voice suggests that he is oblivious to the ethical problems posed by the manipulative use of forecasts. It’s a strange contrast with Gordon’s advice about being careful and pragmatically sceptical. [Editor's note: Agnostic? Moi? Hardly, but perhaps the chill of my irony was not chilly enough.]

“Back to the sources of error.

“Gordon itemises a number of cognitive biases that are inherent to the way we think. We often miss Black Swan events and abrupt changes in prevailing wisdom (“paradigm shifts”), he argues, because we are always filtering information based on perceived relevance. This “inattentional blindness” causes us to not notice important influences on the future. We also overemphasize recent happenings over older events (the recency effect). We’re susceptible to herd thinking and faddish ideas. A few chance events are often mistakenly interpreted as a trend or other pattern. Gordon places particular emphasis on how our current context frames the way we see and think (situational bias), especially how the prevailing mindset and preoccupations of an era skew the way we think about the future (Zeitgeist bias). For example, nuclear-powered airplanes may have seemed inevitable to someone living in the 1950s, a time preoccupied with thoughts of nuclear technology, suggests Gordon. That notion seems absurd today. To counter this problem, he argues for the need to extract the assumptions underpinning our expectations. Those assumptions need to be questioned and tested. And one good test is to reverse the assumption; that is, consider how the future would be different if the opposite (or very different) assumption were used.

I would add that people habitually rely on lazy assumptions about the future in general. As Howard Segal points out in his book Technological Utopianism in American Culture (2005), late-19th and early-20th-Century intellectuals assumed a technological plateau when describing the future. Even today, we assume our arrival at some destination—a future steady state—instead of a world of on-going change that is unevenly distributed and erratically paced, as exists now.

Gordon invites us to consider the utility people derive from a particular technology before jumping to conclusions about how it will revolutionise everyone’s lives. Tech-happy futurists are too quick to assume broad public acceptance of a new technology while ignoring the trade-offs of adoption. There are costs to be considered. In many cases, the price is too high and existing technologies do a good enough job. Or old technologies have an inertia, such as when users are “locked in” to a particular technology. Or social values change. Or switching creates undue inconvenience and aggravation. Or the technology has uneven appeal across diverse groups in society. Or, or … Gordon reminds us that simple technological domino effects almost never happen. The pace of change is usually slower than anticipated. A variety of factors determine how successful an innovation will be.

That leads us to the dynamics of change. I’m not going to describe each dynamic in detail. Gordon devotes a lot of space to them. Instead, I’ve listed them iconographically in the following diagram. Note that the darker lines signify consequences (and consequences of consequences; a.k.a. second-order and third-order events).

“A trend observed today may not continue onward along a straight-forward path. Trends peter out … change course … hit limits … get caught in reinforcing loops … have side-effects … provoke reactions … et cetera. The same goes for underlying causes. Trends can be particularly difficult to track within the complex systems that govern our lives. Thus, Gordon offers a chapter on system analysis.

“As someone who studies organisations, I’m often seeing policies and strategies change with sadly predictable pendulum swings. Gung-ho leaders push in one direction with gusto only to get a lesson in humility. Their efforts hit limits and opposition. Their assumptions hit reality. Subsequent leaders see wreckage everywhere and push in the opposite direction, looking for balance. Balance alludes them and they go to far. Another pendulum swing begins. Some swings happen from season to season. Others happen over decades. These swings may be predictable, but their exact timing certainly isn’t.

“Gordon rounds out Future Savvy with a utilitarian survival-guide of sorts. His big advice is that “it’s better to be vaguely right than exactly wrong.” Success is being alert to important changes and being prepared to cope, not with having accurate predictions. Narrowing down the things that need to be prepared for is an important practical benefit. In that spirit, Gordon talks about the strengths and weaknesses of using multiple scenarios instead of pat forecasts. He steps the reader through the analysis of some forecasts while looking for weaknesses. A chapter-long battery of questions is offered to guide the analysis. These questions do a good job of summarising the book.

“All told, Future Savvy is an excellent textbook for those who want to discipline the way they think about the future. I disagree with Gordon’s tangents about the inherently subjective nature of truth. I also have a few qualms about his take on scepticism. But these tangents rarely get in the way of his stock-taking exercise. That exercise has led me to be even more suspicious of forecasting, especially forecasts in volatile industries where data is patchy and assumptions are legion. I’d love to know the success rate of high-tech cheer-leaders … er, research firms that peddle forecasting numbers. Gordon dismisses the tracking of forecast failures as “smirk lists”. I’m with Taleb and his tsk tsking. If these numbers are just part of the hype machine and have a dismal track-record, then what good are they? Validation for reckless investment strategies? Fodder for misleading Power­Point slides? Numbers that give a false sense of being in-touch with the market? Tsk tsk.

“That said, Future Savvy has increased my interest in foresight more generally. Gordon’s guide left me wondering how I can better prepare groups of decision-makers to think about the future. How do we get them to see the many changes afoot with greater foresight?”

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Preliminary results of the European banking stress test are to be published by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors tomorrow (July 23.) Although the exact nature of the tests have remained under wraps — not without controversy — the essence is clear. Regulators are simulating various forms of adverse financial conditions (GNP performances, interest rates, currency values and flows, and other money metrics) to see if important banks have the resources to withstand these conditions.

Controversy has resulted from lack of transparency in the tests, leading to speculation that they are designed to have most banks “pass” in order to boost confidence — as clear an example of mixing up judgment and advocacy as one is likely to get.

The key measure for determining which of the 91 banks fail the test — and need to raise capital — is whether their Tier 1 capital ratio would fall below 6% under the “loss assumptions” imposed by the test. This is the same level that was required in the stress tests of U.S. banks in its similar May 2010 test.

Model worlds

Anyhow, what is particularly interesting to this author is that the concept “scenario planning” has not been used through the bank test process, but these tests are fundamentally future scenarios, this is what scenarios are all about: creating model future worlds that express the evolution of important uncertainties towards somewhere at the limits (but not beyond) of plausibility, with the specific intent to use these worlds to stress test current decisions as to what a company is and does — from its business model to its resource base to product line to marketing, and so on.

If the organization’s key decisions would hold up (produce profitability or however success is defined) in different, alternative tests, this tells managers theirs are probably good decisions for the future. If they would flop in any test, this points to what needs to be urgently addressed. In this way an organization explores and becomes robust to its unknowable and unpredictable future.

Notably, it is precisely the stress-test purpose of scenarios that stops this foresight technique becoming (as it does all-too-often in the wrong hands) a “wishing well” for better times. When scenarios cease to be direct stress tests of present decisions, they become floaty indeed.

Full scenarios

Having said all this, the difference between the US and European banking stress tests and full scenario work is the bank tests are considering only economic factors, only adverse (risk) conditions, and only “known unknowns.” Full scenarios would include the full range of important drivers of change — and potential surprises — outside of economics or finance in their construction. In operating as stress tests, they would look at threats to the status quo as the bank tests do, but also provide a testbed for exploring opportunities in change.

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I’m taken with these pictures of an experimental apartment created by institutes at the University of Karlsruhe, as featured in ArchDaily and Detail.

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The point is, this is not the future of housing. Many hyper-efficient solutions have been designed over the years — many such “machines for living in,” that worked perfectly as rational solutions but failed the social-market adoption test, and therefore did not become part of the future. The future is always what we (as a whole) choose from among what designers and technologists can create.

This prototype will fail it’s future-adoption test. Humans don’t live rationally. If I rolled my desk to the ceiling, I’d be showered with papers and headphones and flying coffee cups. You would too, no doubt.

Having said that, the inventive thinking here is intense and admirable. This prototype is like a good scenario in that it functions in the liminal zone between the plausible and implausible, allowing us to consider options and problems (and their solutions) that otherwise we would be blind to.

I can see some elements of this prototype finding their way into urban hyper-density new-build apartments, and when they do it will be fair to say the “futures thinking” was done here, in this project.
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The short-term future in South Africa is the Fifa Soccer World Cup, and at the moment it is really hard to get anyone to see or think beyond it. Football is life. Nevertheless a few hundred intrepid thinkers gathered in Cape Town earlier this month to consider South Africa in 2030, under the auspices of the World Future Society, South Africa Chapter, and its very capable leader Mike Lee.

I was lucky enough to be asked to do the opening address at the conference, and even luckier in that this Web site: South Africa – The Good News summarized some of what I and others said:

“Adam Gordon, Foresight Project Director and author of “Future Savvy” gave us some pointers:

1. Beware of sector experts, they are deeply entrenched in the present.
2. The consumer and choice is the determinant, not technology.
3. Change is about overestimating followed by underestimating.
4. Trends are patterns in the data, behind the trend are enablers and drivers, but frictional forces exist and in front of the trend are turners and blockers.
5. Trend extrapolation is limited, don’t fall foul of the turkey syndrome.
6. There is well behaved and badly behaved change. Both can be predictable and unpredictable. The potential of sudden shifts always lurks.
7. Scenario planning wraps up the key uncertainties over which we have no control.

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“The ‘BIG’ question he asks is ‘when do we influence the future and when do we adapt?’ There are big predictable forces out there (like population growth / the diminishing availability of oil etc), and there are big unpredictable forces out there (ja, well no fine!). Importantly, we can design our ability to influence and we can design the way we adapt. It is critical that we are able to do both.

“But managing the future is more than just about scenario planning, it is also about the implementation of the plan. It is about developing a methodology that prioritises, engages with stakeholders, and enables proactive actions on the ground.

So how?

Some important considerations (from various speakers):

1. Often we know what causes the problem (poverty, crime, HIV) but we don’t know what to do about it.
2. Often the logic that gives rise to the problem is not the logic that will solve the problem.
3. Mostly the problem does not contain the makings of the solution.
4. Solutions in one area can exacerbate problems in another.
5. The current situation has momentum, change to the system should happen concurrently not suddenly.

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“What is critical is the foresight process, it must be well-informed so that the implementation strategies that follow have buy-in, are doable, are relevant and far-reaching. There is a very real danger of visions being disconnected, unachievable and, at the end of the day, a pipe-dream.”

Dr Elizabeth Dostal talked of a stakeholder democracy in which she promoted the design of a matrix that recognised different stakeholder levels on the vertical axis and different environmental dimensions on the horizontal axis. A multi-level, multi-dimensional model.

“Imagine” she said, “putting four Nobel Peace laureates together and asking them what the causes of global conflict are. One may argue poverty, another ideology, another resources, and another greed. In no time, they would all be in different silo’s defending their view, in one sense they are all right, but in another sense they have not looked at the whole picture. A multi-level, multi-dimensional model would reveal this, the gaps in their logic, and the opportunities for agreement.”

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I couldn’t resist reposting this yesterday’s bit o’ fluff from the cleantech news portal Greenbang, itself reproduced from Forum for the Future, first, well because it cites yours truly; but even more agonizingly because the headline is exactly what I should have called Future Savvy if I knew the first thing about marketing, which I obviously don’t.

So may I say, this is what I was trying to say: When trying to predict the future, watch for dog poop!

Or perhaps: apparently helpful guides to the future are often dog poop disguised as chocolate, and here’s how to know the difference.

Something like that.

Note that this Greenbang story, below, is damaged by letting the most extreme predictions (the howlers) stand in for the general item. Prediction howler-spotting is sobering, but misses how many people got the future right, or right enough to make excellent decisions, and therefore overly damages the foresight field.

Also, howlers are actually the low-hanging fruit. Being future savvy is ultimately about the more subtle job of correcting weighing apparently very credible and well-founded predictions, some of which are excellent, but others of which are far flimsier than they appear.

There are various other minor problems such as not knowing the difference between the Gartner Hype Cycle and Zeitgeist bias, etc. And I would never call myself, not even in my most self-deprecating moments, a “futurologist.” But anyway, as I said, just a bit of fun:

Greenbang (13th April 2010) by Trish Lorenz & Martin Wright: Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.” Niels Bohr’s words are a wise warning to reckless forecasters.

“Combining a nuclear reactor with a home boiler is no longer a problem. It would heat and cool the house, provide unlimited hot water and melt the snow from sidewalks and driveways. All that could be done for six years on a single charge of fissionable material costing about $300.” — Robert Ferry, US Institute of Boiler and Radiator Manufacturers, 1955

“Nuclear-powered vacuum cleaners will probably be a reality in ten years.” — Alex Lewyt, President of vacuum cleaner company Lewyt Corp, also 1955

Lewyt and Ferry both stumbled into a risky habit of all amateur futurists: extrapolating from present trends. In this case, they were caught up in the surge of excitement over the rise of nuclear power. They were not alone. In the tech-fuelled optimism of the ’50s, magazines, radio and the infant TV were buzzing with predictions of flying cars and lunar settlements.

They had fallen victim to what later became known as the Gartner Hype Cycle. This maps the enthusiasm and subsequent disillusionment typical in the introduction of new technology — a useful reality check for those caught up in “irrational optimism.”

By contrast, there are those whose feet are too firmly rooted in present realities, and fail to see how innovation can combine with social changes to speed the widespread adoption of new technology.

“The Americans need the telephone, but we do not. We have plenty of messenger boys.” — Sir William Preece, Chief Engineer, Royal Mail, 1878

“The horse is here to stay, but the automobile is only a novelty, a fad.” — President of the Michigan Savings Bank, advising Henry Ford’s lawyer not to invest in Ford Motors, 1903

It is difficult to consider any factor that doesn’t apparently exist at the time of making a prediction, but that’s essentially what looking ahead requires. It wasn’t all that long ago when people were predicting a bright future for teletext and fax machines. Few would have anticipated that both would be made almost obsolete by the internet and email. And yet the weak signals were there for those who chose to hear them. A fax machine, after all, is simply a modem with a rather complex print interface attached. It only evolved as it did because people were unused to reading information solely on screen, and computers were too big to carry around with them. Once laptops took off in the early ’90s, the fax was doomed.

“There is no reason why anyone would want a computer in their home.” — Ken Olson, Chairman, Digital Equipment Corp, 1977

Australian Senator Dr Russell Trood sums it up neatly when he says: ” ‘Nowism’ is a serious occupational hazard for those in the prediction game.”

Today’s futurologists no longer try to predict a single outcome for the future; instead they map a variety of scenarios. For Adam Gordon of Future Savvy, scenario-based thinking gives people “permission to think through alternative outcomes without necessarily predicting them.” Instead of trying to forecast precisely what might happen, he says, “we can ask ‘What if it does?,’ and then explore the outcomes and our responses.” Such thinking characterises much of the strategy adopted by forward-looking governments on tackling climate change.

James Goodman, head of Futures at Forum for the Future, agrees: “People think it’s the output that’s important, but actually it’s the process.” And, he adds, “All future planning has uncertainty at its heart.”

Or as Martin Raymond, Strategy and Insight Director at The Future Laboratory, says, “We always try to spot the dog
poop in our forecast.”

Greenbang Editor’s note: This was a guest article by Trish Lorenz and Martin Wright at Forum for the Future. This piece originally appeared in Green Futures, which is published by Forum for the Future and is the leading magazine on environmental solutions and sustainable futures. Its aim is to demonstrate that a sustainable future is both practical and desirable — and can be profitable, too.

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We owe a debt to Nassim Taleb for memorably encapsulating the demerits of predicting by extrapolating trends as “The Turkey Problem,” and now seems the moment to reiterate it:

Imagine you are a turkey. Every day someone comes to feed you. Every day you get bigger. Your portion sizes get bigger too, brought by a nice man at regular intervals. You extrapolate the trend and you confidently predict a bigger you, with more to eat. Regularly too.

But what happens is … Thanksgiving. Or Christmas

Taleb, N., The Fourth Quadrant: a Map of the Limits of Statistics, Edge Foundation, September 2008

The hard reality for those who predict the future by extrapolating trends (and those gullible enough to believe them) is that even if our turkey had excellent data points (carefully observed and accurately recorded in, for example, a time series analysis) and, moreover, even if our turkey was a mathematically sophisticated — not merely simply projecting trends, but applying all the latest modeling techniques, from moving averages to compound regression — he is still going to be wrong about the future. Dead wrong.

All the data analysis in the world, all the fancy computer software, all the consulting time paid for, and he is still a dead duck.

Ouch. The lesson: there may be (or, vexingly, may not be) something outside the trend, a framing condition, which where it does exist is invisible within the trend projector’s mental model. The only way to get a view of the future that is “robust to Thanksgiving” is (a) to question assumed framing conditions, for example through properly done scenarios, and (b) to hold a view of the future which assumes fundamental ‘game-changing’ surprises can and will occur.

If, as they say, “the trend is your friend” it is assuredly only your fair-weather friend.

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In a recent Times article ‘The future was never going to be the C5‘ actor-comedian Ben Millar offers a familiar criticism of foresight work. Inter alia he says: “For all our achievements in art, science, and technology, the human race has always been spectacularly bad at predicting the future. Literature is littered with shockingly wide-of-the-mark utopias, dystopias, shiny suits, flying saucers and whole meals contained in a single pill. As a child of the Seventies, I was taught that as an adult in a world run by machines my main challenge would be how to spend my endless hours of leisure time…”

Yes, Ben. I’m sure you know this has all been said before ad nauseam. But more importantly, 40 years on many lessons have been learned, and it wouldn’t run foul of quality journalism standards to reflect this.

First, let’s be clear: nobody can predict the future. Anyone who says they can is a charlatan. Also, yes, unconscionably dreadful and irresponsible predictions have been made and are continually being made. But there are three problems with the ‘no-flying-car-so-there-we-can’t-predict-the-future’ argument:

(1) The kinds of predictions Millar cites are a product of a particular moment in Western thought and therefore foresight. The 1960s and early 70s were a time of Post-War American emergence, unleashing for a while a techno-futurist predictive rapture, most of which has indeed proved to be rubbish. There are still people, very famous talking-head futurists, promoting techno-rapture for the 21st century (caveat emptor) but as a whole the foresight field has moved on to become much more circumspect about what can be predicted.

Balancing techno-fantasy

Foresight practitioners are these days more likely to balance technology wowee with economic, social, and environmental friction; see systemic (often indirect or counter-intuitive) effects where once only simple cause-and-effect was seen; and create scenarios of key alternative outcomes rather than predict one.

(2) The second thing that is missed in gleefully deriding foresight work, is how many people and institutions get it right, or right enough.  It’s axiomatic that in order to be successful a person or organization must have correctly assessed both key changes and rate of change in their operating environment. To take a famous case, as quoted in Future Savvy, while Nixon’s Vice President Spiro Agnew in 1972 erroneously forecast super-sonic passenger air travel, Herb Kelleher, founder of SouthWest Airlines, foresaw the low-cost air travel industry. Bingo. Billionaire. Similarly, behind every success one can find future thinking that, while sometimes latent, was present and correct.

(3) The purpose of foresight work is misunderstood. We cannot predict the future and it’s pointless to try. We can only assess signals of change, trends, and potential for surprises and reversals, including challenging our all-too-easily calcified mental models, and take this into a process of understanding alternative outcomes and pre-considering best strategic actions. In other words, actively stimulating the investigation and analysis of future conditions in order to create the basis of better decision-making today.

In fact sometimes the ‘strategic conversation’ that results from poor predictions is instructive to managers. As I say to clients: the goal of foresight work is better decisions not better predictions.

Back-street abortionists

The reality is that there is good and bad foresight work. Yes, some futurists are the technical and moral equivalent of back street abortionists. But the good work remains, and quality foresight is a critical advantage to decision-makers. The key thing is to be able to tell good foresight work from bad.

Simplistic trashing of foresight work en bloc ignores the weight of case evidence that people and organizations can improve their management of future uncertainty and/or create a situation where they manage the future better than competitors. Further, it encourages managers to fly blind into changing environments, often resulting in spectacularly poor decisions that deeply and widely punish their dependent stakeholders.

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One of the benefits of scenario-based future thinking is the ‘permission’ to think through alternative future outcomes without necessarily predicting them. ‘Predictors’ focus, by contrast, on isolating the highest probability future in order not to have to think through or plan for less likely outcomes.

Predictions of the dollar’s demise are as old as the greenback itself of course, but over recent weeks the specter of the dollar heading way way below its trading range — a dollar crunch — has entered the zone of the credible, or, in scenario terms, the ‘cone of plausible uncertainty.’ That means decision-makers with lots at stake are taking it seriously.

Like the British pound, the dollar has been under a cloud due to perceptions of economic fallout from the credit crunch and global recession, but particular questions about the US currency have recently surfaced, driven by reports [Robert Fisk's 'The Demise of the Dollar' story in The Independent (Oct 6)]  that “Gulf Arabs are planning – along with China, Russia, Japan and France – to end dollar dealings for oil, moving instead to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan, the euro, gold and a new, unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council” (Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar).

The subtext is far from merely financial. Practically, it would mean that on any day, the real cost of oil to US consumers and businesses would go up or down depending on the strength of the currency. This is something America is not used to. But, more deeeply, dropping dollar-denomination of oil is a direct shot across the bows of Washington’s say over oil affairs, and the hegemony of the dollar as the dominant global reserve currency.

De-dollarizing oil would not in itself push the US currency below its 25-year range. But it is portentous of the clear trend to a genuinely multi-power world, for better or worse, in which the dollar will get no favors. That will push the dollar down, at least while the news and fallout make their way through the financial and real economic systems.

Rumors of de-dollarization have been hotly denied, as further reported here, but as the Independent points out, denials are to be expected, and are always issued in these situations. They mean nothing. Even cub reporters know that.

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Scenario thinking

What’s particularly interesting to me is that a ‘scenario’ of dollar demise has become not only plausible in the mainstream view of the future, but scenario thinking is being used as a way to consider the nature of this outcome, and how best to respond without predicting the outcome either way. As recently as directly pre-credit crunch, the media question would have been: ‘what is the best prediction for the dollar (or the housing market, or credit default swaps?) and that, rather then scoping out the implications of the lesser-likelihood, would have dominated the discussion.

So, what struck me forcefully in the Business Week video interview above, where BW Chief Economist Mike Mandel interviews the news magazine’s Economics Editor Peter Coy (see Coy’s underlying story here), is how the less-likely, non-predicted, but very significant outcome is actively addressed:

Says Coy: “It’s so hard to know what the dollar is going to do. We don’t argue that we know… what we do is we say, ‘it could happen’ and let’s take that possibility seriously, in the same way we should have taken the possibility of falling housing prices seriously…”

This is not formal scenario-building of course. But it is, fundamentally an adoption of the framework, saying in the classic ‘scenarios’ way: “we can’t predict if it will happen or it won’t, but if it does it will have significant impact. So let’s just ask: ‘what if ‘ it does and explore the outcomes and our responses. What will the word look like? What would be the implications, the knock-ons and spinoffs? If it comes to pass, what would be wish we had done today?”

Perhaps failing to predict the credit crunch has dented predictors’ halos enough to cause a mini-zeitgeist-shift towards the only real way to cope with important uncertainty: exploring all outcomes that pass the plausibility and significance test, whether or not we actually believe they will happen.

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There’s been a storm in the past few days over Amazon.com excluding “adult” books from its sales rankings. Among the almost 60,000 books affected was not just Erotica. Feminist books, Gay & Lesbian titles, and books in Health, Mind & Body, and Reproductive & Sexual Medicine also disappeared from the rankings

Amazon the new Wal-Mart? pic:Huffington Post

According to yesterday’s LA Times Amazon says the whole thing was a cataloging error. But when author Mark Probst had previously contacted Amazon for an explanation, he got this: “In consideration of our entire customer base, we exclude “adult” material from appearing in some searches and best seller lists.”

Aside: Everyone is trying to figure out what Twitter is good for, or how it will be used, and it has become clear that one application is to quickly aggregate mass protest, evidenced in the anti-Amazon outrage, see Twitter “Amazonfail.”

Author Maya Reynolds has been connecting the dots in the future of publishing, watching Amazon move via acquisitions such as Abe Books, Audible, BookFinder, BookSurge, Brilliance Audio, FillZ, GoJaba, Library Thing, Mobipocket and Shelfari.

She is among various industry watchers who claim, with fair evidence, that Amazon is following a “Wal-Mart” strategy – the well-documented essence of which is to gain enough retailer power to be able to pressure suppliers (telling them what to make or what to charge, or exacting special discounts) to achieve better retail prices and get more retailer power, in a reinforcing spiral which, inter alia, squeezes all the healthy mom-’n-pop-shop diversity and other balances of power out of the industry.

In a post of July 08 she paints the full dystopia scenario:
“1. First, the smaller presses, POD presses and e-publishers will disappear as Amazon’s margins squeeze them out of business. Amazon will help the process along by offering better terms to authors if they will use BookSurge’s POD press and Kindle’s e-book to publish. Even if authors don’t embrace Amazon initially, as their publishers go out of business, they will be forced to do so.
“2. Brick-and-mortar stores have two constraints which Amazon does not: (1) limited shelf space and (2) a limited geographic range. Bookstores carry books “on spec,” filling their shelves with stock they hope readers will seek. Amazon, on the other hand, has unlimited virtual shelf space and unlimited geographic reach. Amazon does not have to warehouse stock. They can wait until a book is actually ordered and the money is in hand before using a digital file and BookSurge to print the book. Because they cannot match the deep discounts Amazon offers, bricks-and-mortar bookstores–already under siege–will be squeezed out of existence.
“3. Like Wal-Mart, Amazon will continue to apply pressure on publishers to give more favorable terms. Wal-Mart’s suppliers used cheaper materials and out-sourced to cheaper overseas labor. As the publishing houses’ profit margins are squeezed, their cost-cutting efforts will take three directions: (1) Focus even more attention on signing best-selling authors whose work is guaranteed to sell; (2) Begin to pressure their mid-list authors to accept lower advances and lower royalty percentages; and (3) Sign fewer and fewer new authors because of the uncertainty and the expense of growing a new writer.

Where will they go?

“4. Mid-list authors and new authors, unable to either find a publisher or unwilling to accept the low royalties, will seek to self-publish. Where will they go? Since, by that time, most of the self-publishing houses will have gone out of business, they will go to Amazon’s BookSurge or to Amazon’s e-book division, Kindle. Amazon will welcome them.
“5. The next death on the food chain will be the publishers and agents themselves. First the mid-level publishers will die. Well-known agents and the larger houses will be protected for a period of time by their best-selling authors who are loyal to them. However, as those cash cows die off, so will the agents and larger houses. A new paradigm will emerge: Amazon as both publisher and retailer.
“6. Eventually Amazon will have so much power, they will be able to decide WHAT is worthy of being published. Welcome to the future of publishing.”

Is this the future of publishing? The logic of unregulated industry power suggests it is. But Future Savvy says response – regulation – is also likely. As with Microsoft and many before them, when Amazon gets too powerful, anti-trust regulators should be in business. But only if their hand is pushed. Articulate and persuasive dystopias such as Reynolds’ are the single most powerful mechanism by which the word is spread (spread it! forward it, tweet it!) so that enough consumers get to see and believe threatening future outcomes early enough, and pressure regulators to act.

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Microsoft - Computer Electronics Show 2009

Product prototype communication is a close cousin of scenario building. Typically the company creates their product or service in action, in the future, being used by happy customers, their “preferred future” scenario. Prototype communication doesn’t typically build in alternative scenarios, the litmus test of strategy-based scenario work. It’s more a kite-flying exercise, designed to put out a future-oriented message to stakeholders and the public, garner broad feedback, and (if you’re powerful like Microsoft) put up “this-is-the-future-of-the-industry” markers.

Nevertheless, with the caveat that they are one among many plausible outcomes, product showcase scenarios can be an eye-opening guide to what’s actually possible and what the future will be like.

A newly released Microsoft “Future of Computing” video, showcased at CES 2009 in Las Vegas in the past few days, is an example. The 10-minute piece, presented by Janet Galore, Program Manger: Strategic Prototyping, takes us through a scenario of interactive education in the future (when, exactly, is not said but the implication is it’s not too far off) showing how participants would find, use, and share information across devices and across platforms.

What we see is a tablet PC that can communicate seamlessly with other electronics and interact with Web info on the fly. Okay nothing new there. What’s interesting is how it’s all held together by surface computing, a smart desk with a screen, which allows information to be viewed in the process of collaboration, sharing, and filing.  In some futurist fantasies it is thought that communication is ideally invisible (my phone e-handshakes your phone without me doing anything, etc.) But actually humans mostly seem to prefer to see what’s happening, and to have the choice to interact with what is happening while it’s happening – not least so they know what machines have done and don’t have to pull their hair out before they find their precious work buried four subdirectories into the Temp folder… sheesh. But I digress.

The scenario focuses on organizing and sharing multiple inputs, therein making a pretty clear statement about the future: what will be really valuable is not access to information anywhere, anytime (an assumed, table-stakes factor), but a way to share and collaborate with the information in an productive way. It refreshingly assumes that whiz-bang graphics – they are there too – are the easy stuff, but that collaboration and teamwork are the hard things to get right, and the truly valuable service given the chaos of billions of voices and trillions of data objects that pertain in any human-work future.

The other real strength of the prototype and related scenario is its close attention to natural (or, at least, strongly socialized, conventional, classic) human ways of doing things, which are slow to change, and therefore will change slowly. The smart desk is something one can really see oneself sitting around, because this is what we already do. Also this future of computing envisages no stylus, no mouse, no magic wand to master. Rather, we move digital stuff around the desk with our hands. We point to it and we shift it. That is, digital capability accommodates and interlaces with Stone Age human and organizational patterns. That’s why this view of the future is persuasive.

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