Fukushima plant, Japan. Picture: digitalglobe.com

At the time of writing, Japan is battling a nuclear meltdown and radiation emergency, and Fukushima could become a word suddenly the whole world knows, like Chernobyl.

Bloomberg News has called the whole tsunami crisis Naoto Kan’s “Katrina moment,” and one can only hope and pray for all concerned that the Japanese prime minister is a more competent leader than Bush was at this moment of human catastrophe.

As to the nuclear meltdown: If ever we have been warned about anything in the future, we have been warned about nuclear plant catastrophes. Not only have there been, as it were, verbal warnings going all the way back to the 1950s, but real-world events such as Three-Mile-Island and Chernobyl have fully fleshed out the scenario of nuclear reactor failure or near failure in populated areas.

If nuclear-generated electricity makes sense anywhere, it makes sense in Japan, which famously has no coal or gas reserves. But these are nuclear plants … built right on the Pacific Ring of Fire? Japan is a small island with 125 million people densely packed into urban areas. As we face the possibility of this many people put at risk, however the next few days play out it’s clear the risk and reward of nuclear energy here is out of alignment.

This is hardly news. The question is, why are the plants are there? And the answer is not a simple one of collusion or corruption of government, or shenanigans of power companies, although there may be some of that. It comes down to a misapprehension of probability and risk among leaders and decision-makers such that it appears that risk and reward are in balance, when in fact they are not.

Year 869AD

To think about this, consider yesterday’s BBC Story: Japan tsunami ‘could be 1,000-year event,” saying last week’s tidal wave was equivalent to a giant wave that hit the Sendai coast in 869AD. The report says: ”It is not unusual for undersea earthquakes to generate tsunamis in this part of Japan. Offshore quakes in the 19th and 20th centuries also caused large walls of water to hit this area of coastline. But previous research by a Japanese team shows that (only) in the 869 ‘Jogan’ disaster, tsunami waters moved some 4km inland, causing widespread flooding.”

The point is, tsunamis are common, but “the big one” is a one-in-thousand year event — an extremely low probability outcome.

Here I’m strongly reminded of the days following the depth of the Credit Crunch, Bear Stearns’ collapse, and general world financial system meltdown of 2008. If bankers said one thing sensible through the whole period it was: “this was a one-in-ten-(hundred, etc.)-thousand probability outcome, and extreme ‘outlier’ event!”

A low-probability event means we can relax, right? Wrong. The problem is probability says zilch about impact. “Wild Cards,” or now more famously in Nassim Taleb’s terms, “Black Swan” events are low probability but of game-changing impact.

Taleb’s point, made repeatedly across his various books and articles, is that standard probability theory and Gaussian statistics lull analysts into thinking that because an event is low probability – an outlier in a normal bell-curve distribution – it is of low or lower consequence.

Ignoring the tail of the Bell Curve is okay if events are genuinely assessed as low impact. If they are high-impact aka “fat-tailed” events, they are the most important events we face in the future, in building or maintaining any system or organization.

A probabilistic framework misleads decision-makers because it degrades their attention to crucial events (by tagging them low-probability,) which means next thing they are betting banks on mortgage-backed securities, or building nuclear plants on earthquake fault lines.

There’s an old joke in journalism from the 1970s that goes: “You can write the same headline on any and every story about Israel’s relationship with its neighbors: ‘Prospects for Middle-East Peace Dim.’”

Sure, it’s partly Eeyeore-ish journalist wit. But what’s interesting from a foresight point of view is that, running the world forward 40 years shows it was a reasonable understanding of the future. Why? Solid foresight is always predicated on a solid understanding of the forces for and against change. “Prospects for peace dim” acknowledged that forces and enablers of change were overpowered by what was preventing anything fundamental from happening (friction and blockers in Future Savvy terms.)

The basic truth is that Israel-Middle East is a complex situation characterized by a more-or-less equal balance of power. Israel has military and nuclear superiority, and US backing. Arab countries have oil, population numbers and population growth, and a billion more-or-less sympathetic moslems around the world, and therefore time on their side. They also have, particularly in Gaza, relatively widespread poverty and low welfare and educational development, which is  a force against moderation and therefore a negotiated settlement.

A genuine balance of power means we have equilibrium, and therefore should expect no change. That’s why we’ve had plenty of skirmishes, but no change in 40 years.

Looking out for the next 40 years, is this still the case? Can we write “Prospects for Middle East Peace Dim” on all news stories for another two generations? Following the foresight logic above, this depends on whether anything breaks the fundamental equilibrium. There are four issues apparently large enough to threaten the status quo:

• Water shortages and water conflicts
• Change in US policy
• The end of oil-based transport energy
• Iran going toxic

Water is a favorite of trend-foresight sessions. It sounds like the key issue in a rising-population world. In theory yes, but it’s unclear whether it will lead to anything more than local conflicts or wars, which in Israels case, we have already. On US policy, the Obama administration is attempting to show even-handedness, but its strategic interest lies with Israel as military ally and ideologically temperate (democratic, at least) bastion in the region. So no change there either. On oil, we are definitely in an era where – for security and climate change reasons – fossil fuel is entering it’s twilight phase, which will erode revenues and therefore power of ME Arab states. But, as mentioned earlier, poverty is as great an obstacle to peace as any other. (Remember the Israeli “let’s-grow-our-way-out-of the-situation-together peace platform of the 1990s, seeing tackling the development issues as the root of creating moderate mindsets across the region.)

That leaves Iran which may change the balance if it really goes toxic (develops and uses nuclear weapons in terror strikes.) This is a low futures likelihood – it’s not just luck that nukes have stayed in their box since 1945 – no state wants to carry the stain of the nuclear pariah for all time. There’s a moral blocker on this outcome that has worked for generations. Nuclear powers rattle, but the don’t bite. But … what if the wildcard scenario of a massive nuclear strike on Israeli soft targets were to happen, what then? The current low-grade hostile standoff would become a supernova, but we’d still have power balance, and while we have that we’ll have status quo and  journalists can expect to write “Prospects for Middle East Peace Dim” on top of every story about the region for another 40 years.