Future Savvy: Quality in Foresight

We owe a debt to Nassim Taleb for memorably encapsulating the demerits of predicting by extrapolating trends as “The Turkey Problem,” and now seems the moment to reiterate it:

Imagine you are a turkey. Every day someone comes to feed you. Every day you get bigger. Your portion sizes get bigger too, brought by a nice man at regular intervals. You extrapolate the trend and you confidently predict a bigger you, with more to eat. Regularly too.

But what happens is … Thanksgiving. Or Christmas

Taleb, N., The Fourth Quadrant: a Map of the Limits of Statistics, Edge Foundation, September 2008

The hard reality for those who predict the future by extrapolating trends (and those gullible enough to believe them) is that even if our turkey had excellent data points (carefully observed and accurately recorded in, for example, a time series analysis) and, moreover, even if our turkey was a mathematically sophisticated — not merely simply projecting trends, but applying all the latest modeling techniques, from moving averages to compound regression — he is still going to be wrong about the future. Dead wrong.

All the data analysis in the world, all the fancy computer software, all the consulting time paid for, and he is still a dead duck.

Ouch. The lesson: there may be (or, vexingly, may not be) something outside the trend, a framing condition, which where it does exist is invisible within the trend projector’s mental model. The only way to get a view of the future that is “robust to Thanksgiving” is (a) to question assumed framing conditions, for example through properly done scenarios, and (b) to hold a view of the future which assumes fundamental ‘game-changing’ surprises can and will occur.

If, as they say, “the trend is your friend” it is assuredly only your fair-weather friend.

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Peter Bernstein, the author of “Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk,” died recently at the age of 90. In memoriam McKinsey Quarterly reposted this recent Bernstein interview. I put it up here because it’s a timely and timeless lesson in thinking about uncertainty and threats, and avoiding simplistic (quantitative) approaches to managing them – one of core themes of “Future Savvy.” Bernstein offers and endorsement of real options and explains why sophisticated Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) mathematical models to control risk created “a math dependency” that was blind to, among other things, unexpected systemic feedback to its own emergence:

One of the first things Bernstein says is that risk implies that we don’t know what will happen, which could be good things happening too. Risk management, as it is currently understood, gets executives to look at what could go wrong in the uncertain future of the enterprise. (Somehow threats are easier than opportunties to get departmental budget for.) The standard approach is to break risks down into commonly understood threat categories: a typical analysis would illuminated risks posed by technology failure, communications failure, security failure, natural disasters, accidents, or market/reputation risk, liability risk, financial/credit risk, and so on. This negative-outcome identification is typically followed by strategies to monitor, minimize, or control the risk event or its impact.

Doing all this is great, BUT it is just a narrow part of enterprise and industry foresight. Why? First, industry foresight or futures studies for business is focused as much on the opportunities change offers as on threats. Second, foresight tools (when correctly applied) set themselves the task of enlarging perspectives or mental maps so that we can see more things, or more possibilities than the generally expected set (whether good or bad). Set against this, risk management is little more than the catalog of known threats. The unknown or poorly understood threat, or unseen opportunity missed (and grabbed by others) is likely to be more damaging to the enterprise.

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Strategy and Management guru Gary Hamel recently had things to say on the WSJ blog about how management needs to evolve, as follows:

Says Hamel, “The experience of growing up online will profoundly shape the workplace expectations of “Generation F” – the Facebook Generation. At a minimum, they’ll expect the social environment of work to reflect the social context of the Web, rather than as is currently the case, a mid-20th-century Weberian bureaucracy.

“If your company hopes to attract the most creative and energetic members of Gen F, it will need to understand these Internet-derived expectations, and then reinvent its management practices accordingly.”

He cites 12 work-relevant “the post-bureaucratic realities” that tomorrow’s employees will use as yardsticks in determining whether your company is “with it” or “past it.” These are:

1. All ideas compete on an equal footing.
2. Contribution counts for more than credentials.
3. Hierarchies are natural, not prescribed.
4. Leaders serve rather than preside.
5. Tasks are chosen, not assigned.
6. Groups are self-defining and -organizing.
7. Resources get attracted, not allocated.
8. Power comes from sharing information, not hoarding it.
9. Opinions compound and decisions are peer-reviewed.
10. Users can veto most policy decisions.
11. Intrinsic rewards matter most.
12. Hackers are heroes.

One hesitates to question Hamel, whose edifice of work, bookended by Competing for the Future (1994) and The Future of Management (2007) is as eloquent and substantiated a guide for innovation and future-thinking in management as you will find.

But, what is startling, for those of us around long enough to remember the Web-excited 1990s, which includes Hamel of course, is that these 12 principles are really old stuff, the mantras of the Internet 1.0 … the needs of Gen F are apparently not different to the needs of Gen Y.

But, now it’s a dozen years later, and this future is still the future. Hmm.

New management, but not in old bottles

Actually, surely Hamel’s beef is with the Fortune 500 set particularly, because what has happened is that most small and niche companies have already embraced a big chunk of these new-management attributes. It’s specifically the Fortune 500 that lags: but then, running organizations with stakeholders and budgets resembling mid-sized countries seems to fly in the face of Gen F value set.

Looking abroad, it appears that a Chinese factory or an Indian call center are not about to convert to Gen-F values either. Command and control, and uncreative hyper-attention attention to margins — effected by the Weberian bureaucracy — is the route to profit for them. The old paradigm will rule, and rule well.

From the Future Savvy vantage point, the real future will have, broadly speaking, two types of firm, the Weberian and the Gen-F. Firms running 19th century-type businesses will run them in 19C ways. Funky firms exploiting new ideas have already changed management style significantly and will continue to do so.

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One of the more alarming mistakes in foresight work is that forecasters don’t see themselves as operating within their own world view, and the preconceptions and priorities of their own time. In fact the very idea of foresight – why do it and how to do it – has changed quite markedly through human history. Knowledge of this historiography is of course important in assessing current forecasts. This is why Oona Strathern’s A Brief History of the Future (Robinson, London, 2007) is an important book.

One doesn’t start reading a “Brief History of” book in a series that includes A Brief History of the Birth of the Nazis and A Brief History of British Kings & Queens, without a certain trepidation. But, in fact, A Brief History of the Future is well-considered and well-written summing up of the characters and concerns that have shaped and continue to shape the future studies field.

Strathern, is a British journalist-turned-futurist, based in Vienna. One of the key attributes she brings is a journalist’s (and sub-editor’s) critical “don’t-bullshit-me” faculties, which is welcome in a field that is often short on common sense.

The book is hardly brief (at 300 pages) so there’s no sense that it’s a potted history. And it’s not compromised by what one – alas – expects of this kind of setup: pandering to all characters in positive or equal terms. In fact a key value of the book is its clear-headed and plucky judgment of who the key figures are (and who are not) and what their contributions have each been (vs what they might have thought they were). It is also unusually even-handed in balancing US and European inputs.

The book follows the obvious structure, starting with the oracles of Ancient Greece, Plato, moving through Leonardo de Vinci, and Thomas Malthus and so on through to the 19th century (Jules Verne, Karl Marx, etc.) and on to the present. In this Strathern argues for and operates with a wide definition of futures work – including in the dreamers, social reformers, and sci-fi writers in addition the more formal analysts and planners.

20th Century Weltanschauung
The book really hits its straps in the 20th century – in discussions of Aldous Huxley, H.G. Wells, George Orwell, Arthur C. Clarke, Herman Kahn, Buckminster Fuller, Alvin Toffler, Isaac Asimov, Margaret Mead and many lesser known figures. What is most interesting here is how the links between foresight approaches and the evolving broader existential and political “weltanschauung” of the century is knitted together, inserting “futurology” into the 20th century world of ideas at each point.

Although the book deals with institutions of foresight pretty well, the one angle I missed was the development of foresight education over the past 40 years. Part or full university degrees in foresight methods are an important part of the evolution of the field. Much has been learned in the debates over what and how and where to teach it. Ironically, the book – as intelligent a summary of the “future studies” field as you will find – would be an ideal text for an introductory course in such a curriculum.

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Review: The Age of Heretics, (2nd Edition), Art Kleiner, Jossey-Bass, 2008

One of the conundrums of foresight work is that it demands a macro-perspective, but real change requires focus. In order to get the breadth of view across society and technology to think adequately about the future, the futures analyst is forced to forgo much of the detail, while implementers are thinking: “this 40,000 ft view is very illuminating, but how do I land the plane?” What changes do I make, in my organization, in my industry, on Monday morning, and how do I not get fired for making them?

Kleiner’s updated The Age of Heretics, (2nd edition, Jossey-Bass, 2008) is the modern history of people who find themselves – or put themselves – on the focus side of foresight: who work practically on the ground inside corporate institutions to achieve change, which means by definition challenging the methods and perspectives of their institution. It is not the story of foresight at the lofty level of ideas, but the altogether grittier and more interesting story of how macro-change consciousness meets real institutions, real organizational dynamics, real industry pressures, and real career considerations, in the history of US corporations since 1945.

Kleiner, the editor-in-chief of Booz Allen’s Strategy+Business, is no stranger to the foresight field. He is the ghost-writer behind an eye-popping portion of the futures canon, including The Art of the Long View; The Fifth Discipline, and its Fieldbook; and The Living Company, and so on, (source: http://www.well.com/~art/) so it’s no surprise that the fabric of his text is lush in its familiarity with the players and ideas in the field.

The common thread he follows – through figures like Herman Kahn, Willis Harman, Amory Lovins, Oliver Markley, and so on, is that of the heretic, the maverick against the machine. Intriguingly, along the way, Kleiner gives us a worm’s-eye view of the genesis of many new management ideas, from “lean production” to the “balanced scorecard” to “scenario planning’ – showing how they emerge from and have been engendered by the forces of institutions in productive conflict with their heretics.

The political history of truth, and its future

Philosopher Michel Foucault catapulted our understanding of institutions as a political field, using insights from the history of prisons, hospitals, and asylums to show the relationship between power and knowledge in the evolution of institutional forms. But he never dealt with the modern business corporation. It may be overstating it, but not by much, to say that Kleiner updates Foucault for corporate America. The themes he carries: the role of the deviant, transgression, the evolution of truth, and discursive struggles between insiders and outsiders, are highly resonant. In his previous book, Who Really Matters (Doubleday, 2003) Kleiner developed other parts of this same perspective: showing how every organization’s identity and choices can be understood as driven by the interests of its core group – its powerful insiders.

The Age of Heretics is an engrossing history of change-agents in companies in strategic and organizational transformation. But it’s not just a history. In the future – while the names of the players, and their issues, and the institutions themselves will change, the productive articulation between the heretic and the institution will remain the format of change in big groups. So the lessons of the book are well taken and very highly recommended.

[This review, authored by Adam Gordon, first appeared in The Association of Professional Futurist's Compass Magazine]

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One of the questions I’m asked a lot is whether Future Savvy would have helped to predict the credit crunch. My response, as in this INSEAD interview, has been that the book gives readers the tools to judge the merits of predictions, so wouldn’t have directly helped predict the financial crisis, but it would have been a key resource in drawing attention to the poor view of the future that bankers and regulators were acting on.

In many ways, focusing on whether “this” or “that” is predicted, or not predicted, is to put the cart before the horse. The horse is the adequacy of our approach to anticipating outcomes and the quality of our foresight as a whole. When this is good, the cart – not missing important changes – will follow.

Credit: http://www.lewrockwell.com/blog

In this, it’s important to realize that many did predict the financial crisis (as many predicted 9/11 in various ways). Sticking with the financial crunch for now: it has generally been portrayed it as a “why-didn’t-anyone-see-it-coming” event. It wasn’t. Hats off to The Times for their October 12 piece: “10 People Who Predicted the Financial Meltdown”. Allowing for a fairly loose definition of “predicted,” the article shows that among those who foresaw the crunch were: Vince Cable, deputy leader of the Liberal Democrats (2003); US congressman Ron Paul (2003); Stephen Roach, senior executive at Morgan Stanley (2004); Christopher Wood – chief strategist of a broking firm in the Asia-Pacific Market (2005); and Nouriel Roubini, economics professor at NYU (2006)… and there were many others.

A different problem

So this reframes the problem entirely. It’s not that the predictions were not there. It was that not enough people believed them and, particularly, important decision-makers didn’t believe them or didn’t have the institutional capacity to respond. So there are two halves to the problem: the ability to see the full spectrum of what may happen, including unexpected outcomes; and the ability to act on what we see. Quality in foresight work – the raison d’etre of Future Savvy – makes it possible to see more outcomes more clearly, and to act with more confidence in choosing what to prepare for. (In the real world we can’t prepare for every outcome.)

There was a good letter published in the FT from eminent futurist Peter Schwartz on December 2, which describes this very well. It shows predictions for what they are (one-horse scenarios), and how decision-makers are typically bound into inaction or wrong action not only by working on the basis of a wrong prediction, but by the predictive mindset itself. This mindset – the habit or culture of picking “one right answer” in the face of a complex situation with many competing outcomes, prematurely closes alternatives and leaves us open to surprise. As Schwartz says, as scenario planners have always said (and he was one of the people who defined the field in the first place), a compelling set of alternative future scenarios encourages decision-makers to recognize unlikely and unpopular outcomes, along with expected outcomes, and therefore to be able to respond earlier and more effectively whatever happens.

Scenarios also contribute to the “act” side of the problem. In a well-done set for the banking industry, a financial-meltdown scenario would at least have been in play, institutionalizing the consideration of less unlikely, less popular outcomes in company and government forums, forcing serious consideration of necessary strategies and contingencies, and therein creating the ability to act early and effectively without having predicted the crisis.

The letter is well worth quoting in full:

Sir, The real question regarding the financial crisis is not, as the Queen asked: “Why did nobody see this coming?” In fact, any number of thoughtful people in academia, politics and business had been compiling the data and sounding warnings for several years.
The question we should be asking is: “Why didn’t decision-makers believe that a global financial meltdown was increasingly likely and then act on that belief?” Or, to put it another way: “What would it take to make decision-makers both believe and act?”

The problem is that decision-makers believe that they are forced to pick one right answer: the most likely scenario. Their approach to decision-making does not afford them the opportunity to consider apparently low probability but highly consequential scenarios. The answer, therefore, to the “believe” half of the question is a decision-making process that considers several scenarios: compelling stories about alternative futures that incorporate the analysis of “outliers” and describe three or four plausible paths forward.
Good scenarios force decision-makers to challenge their own assumptions and reconsider what is possible. As a result, they can take seriously those scenarios that seemed less likely at first, but whose plausibility increases over time.

The second part of the question – “What would it take to act?” – is much harder to address. Suppose that Ben Bernanke or Hank Paulson had come to believe a year or two ago that the house of cards was about to collapse and trigger cascading, global failures. What would they have done, given the realities of the complex interconnected systems at the heart of the problem? Perhaps if they had good scenarios with appropriate indicators to start with, they could have rehearsed different strategies and contingencies. Importantly, these decision-makers could have used these scenarios to persuade others on all sides of the issue also to recognise the complexity of the impending crisis in a more timely way. It’s never easy to convince everyone around you that the game they have been playing to their great benefit is about to change. But with a shared recognition of the magnitude of the risks and the ways they might unfold, they could have acted far earlier to prevent some of the dire consequences that have occurred, let alone what is to come.

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The futurist Edie Weiner says, if one wants to see the world, and therefore the future, as it really is, one must look “through the eyes of children or aliens.” That is, strip away our “educated incapacity” – the mental disability that comes with being over-familiar with a situation and therefore embedded in its associations and traditions, which makes it hard to see future change.

I was reminded of this when, as my wife and I were talking happily about the Obama “Yes-We-Can” victory speech, our 3-year-old daughter piped up: “Bob-the-Builder”! [The economy's in crisis, can we fix it?] “Yes we can!” [The war in Iraq, can we fix it?] “Yes we can!”

If this means nothing to you, see http://www.bobthebuilder.com/ca/english/index.asp

This is not subtle stuff, this speechwriting. And politics is nothing if not the art of appealing to the 3-yr-old in all of us. But, as they say, “a win is a win.”

Anyway, it is for the foresight community to to get past the day’s euphoria and ask, what does this mean for the future? I think the win has trend tipping-point implications and allows some future-thinking insights to be accumulated.

The “Hawaiian” Future

One of the things Jim Dator and the Hawaii Research Center for Future Studies have long been saying is, “the future of the world is brown.” The running, long-term trend they are referring to is the movement of power and money from the white West to the brown East, and (eventually) South. And, on similar lines, we have seen rise in number of inter-racial couples (and more acceptance of), and the strong fashion and pop-star chic-ness of being “mixed” race. This aspect of the world’s future has been more obvious, earlier, in Hawaii than other places in the US (and the Obama-Hawaii connection is pertinent here), but now it’s mainstream. This in itself is a lesson that the future is to be seen earlier in some places than others. Anyway, November 4, 2008, is surely the moment where the trend tips and accelerates.

This is not to be naive. Nothing about the result is going to kill racism or ethnic affiliation. The world is a competitive place, and people organize and identify into groups to compete (and restrict access to benefits) more effectively. Whitey halls of privilege will continue to exist. Islamic identification and action will continue to be a huge force, and so on. But now that there is (and in future always will have been) a black person in the world’s top job, nobody can ever look at another person of color and see an intrinsic limitation on what that person can do, be, influence, or own.

Images of the future

For at least half a century the world has known this in theory of course. But theory doesn’t move the world. Pictures move the world. That is, pictures of the future bring the future closer. Obama making the president-elect victory speech, or seeing him and his family move into the White House, will undo more mental models – more educated incapacity – in the area of race than anything that has gone before. For driving the future, the Obama success image is more powerful than a thousand well-meaning affirmative-action programs.

The ratchet effect

The other, simultaneous, foresight principle at work is that change proceeds by ratchet effect. Sticking with politics, the Suffragette movement gathered momentum and finally swept aside millennia of tradition after women were seen to do traditionally “male” jobs during WW1. Here again we have the change-power of images of the future. After women were seen in these new roles there was no way to put the genie back. Yes, social changes can be reversed or stalled (Roe vs Wade is in the mire) but once the image of the future is out there, and minds have absorbed and habituated to it, it may be opposed but never removed. And this is what November 4 promises: visually ratcheting forward the world-wide acceptance of the potential of all people regardless of race as fact not theory – thereby tipping and accelerating the long-term trend to “The Hawaiian Future.”

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In my previous post, below, I threatened myself with the penance that I’d have to come back and think about the zeitgeist effect as a further limit on the use and validity of prediction markets. (Once again, I’m basically sold that prediction markets are a fabulous way to think about the short-term and/or contained system future, but it’s worth being clear about the limits of this tool.)

Zeitgeist, German for “spirit of the times,” refers to the often unconscious spectrum of intellectual views, analytical approaches, political and social concerns, etc., that people in any era share. Evidence from the checkered history of predicting the future shows that forecasters have been very heavily biased by their then-current conditions, current issues, and current state of the world, that is by their zeitgeist. They see reality and therefore the future through the lens of their times. The key marker of this effect at work is when many forecasts are not only wrong, but are wrong in the same way.

The zeitgeist effect, by the way, is not a peculiar condition. It is part of the many common human and social cognitive-perceptual biases that exist. (For a longer list and their effects in forecasting, see Future Savvy.) Zeitgeist is in fact sometimes more broadly known as “situational bias,” where situations that people find themselves in frame what they see and how they interpret events. In a depression, famously, it is difficult to see any source of upturn; in boom times it is hard to see the crash.

The Zeitgeist of the 1990s
Just one example of zeitgeist bias in forecasting can be seen in predictions made in the 1990s, when the fall of Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War provoked new hope about global interaction and growth, and this, combined with the rise of digital technologies, the Internet, WTO agreements, and the dot.com market boom, fueled a new zeitgeist of optimism. It was very common, in this era to predict global prosperity, international peace and harmony, rising standards of living, enhanced personal freedoms, and a better environment. By the end of 2001, the NASDAQ bubble had burst, Al-Qaeda had struck buildings that symbolized U.S. power, the “War on Terror” had begun, and the entire rosy 1990s and all the forecasts that went with it, were finished. Zeitgeist or situation has, evidently, a very strong pull on what people think is possible and likely in the world at large, and in their own sector or industry. It frames the questions people ask, the topics they think are important, the outcomes they expect, and how they interpret signals of change.

The point is, do prediction markets somehow counter this well-known perceptual-cognitive bias in forecasting? No. The outcomes people think more plausible – that they will “buy up” in a prediction market – are deeply affected by situational conditions. This is sure to be a factor when, for example, Google sets up a market to tap its employees for forecasts. The people involved, smart as they are, will be strongly by situational factors – and this will affect which future outcomes look more likely.

Herd Effects
Moreover, they will be pulled in the same direction. As prediction markets, like Delphi studies, are particularly a consensus-based method (forecasters drawing predictive results from the study/game are going on what most people say/do), they are by definition deeply vulnerable to the zeitgeist effect. This dovetails with another well-known social cognitive bias, the “herd effect” or “bandwagon effect,” or “groupthink,” where people to believe or do things because many other people are doing or appear to be doing them. The only way to avoid groupthink is to isolate people from each other (as Delphi studies attempt to do by not disclosing others’ responses while the study is live.) But in prediction markets the player can, of course, see what others are doing. When buying a “stock” that is getting more expensive they may be reassured that others are buying it too — leading them to buy more, producing a classic herd-effect situation.

These biases – and various others, as detailed in Future Savvy, are among the many perceptual and cognitive biases that people bring to the world. They are part of (and evidence of) perception being active and constituent in our understanding of the world, and therefore of the future. We can chip away at our perceptual framwork, particularly by questioning our assumptions and investigating the basis of our knowledge (possibly through scenario planning.) However, no matter how astutely we look and how consciously we try to eliminate them, our paradigms exist, and they color our forecasts, and prediction markets do not make them go away.

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I was struck by this picture

which is produced by a group called Squint/Opera, as part of a set of images of how London population would adapt to raised sea levels. The images, set in the year 2090, are on exhibition at the Medcalf Gallery in Clerkenwell, and the full set can be found here.

The “Flooded London 2090″ images are, of course, a scenario of the future. They evoke a time long after the impact of global warming / a rising sea has past. People have adapted and London is a tranquil utopia. It is not all bad – the rat race gone – swept away with other forms of current (2008) worldly obsessions in a kind of Noah’s flood. The world has become a slower, less complicated place.

As a piece of futures work there are various things to say. First of course, this is a scenario not a prediction. Nobody can predict 2090. Yet, as a scenario, with that intrinsic license to explore the margins of plausibility, it fabulously fulfils one of the primary functions of scenarios: to evoke a mental and possibly even an emotional response. Most scenarios – for example about global warming – are backed up by data and spreadsheets and citations (often necessary and correct) but these images tell the story in a somehow more direct and therefore compelling way, and the old adage a picture is worth 1000 words was never more apt. As all classic scenario analysts, from Pierre Wack to Peter Schwartz to … etc, say: a good scenario should provide a gentle jolt to management – forcing them to consider unexpected events and outcomes and prepare themselves mentally and practically to respond, and these images do that.

Scenarios: the artistic function
Now the question I pose myself – and anyone out there reading – is what is the relationship between scenario’s and art? Is the picture of the future that jolts – whether in a written narrative form or by pictures or film – not jolting in the same way as art does and for the same reason. Isn’t this the classic defamiliarization function of art (possibly mixed with social critique. Here of course it is not merely a warming about global warming that is being communicated, but also commentary about the pace of life, stress, time-crunch, and how this may not be so in the future. Everyone sees the future as more, faster, complexity. But maybe it is not.) Anyway, these images are a scenarios, and they are art, and all good scenarios should work in part “artistically” to defamiliarize the world as art does. (For background on Schklovsky and defamiliarization in art see here)

Squint/Opera is an interestingly multi-disciplinary group. It is a film and media studio that makes visualisations about the built environment, in their terms: “combining humour and narration with imaginative design, innovative visual effects and illustrative techniques.” A scenario firm, in other words, with apologies to the scenario planning traditionalists.

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This is a how-to book: how to evaluate predictions about the future – how to assess which ones are credible and/or how credible they are (how likely the future will turn out similar to the prediction). It is not just a guide to bad forecasts, it is also about how to identify and extract what is valuable in any forecast. This benefits readers who are required to manage professional or  personal situations that depend on correctly anticipating change. Whatever we want to achieve – help a company be more profitable – solve the world’s problems – develop their career – success depends on a good reading of the future. There are many guides to the future (predictions) but no guides to the guides. This book fills that gap. It helps readers assess predictions so they can make better judgments about the future for themselves and their organizations.

Decision success always implies congruence between decisions and the world in which those decisions play out. If we decide today to launch a product, buy a house, study for a degree, build a new light rail system, or take any similar decision of significance, the environment of tomorrow will be a key factor in the success or failure of that decision. What we do will be tested by the future conditions that emerge. Where there is a good “fit” between the initiative and the environment it plays out in — “the right product at the right time” — we can expect success. If not, we should expect to fail. Our decisions are only as good as the view of the future they rest on. All opportunities and successes and profits are realized in the future. All threats, failures, and losses are in the future.

In a fast-moving world, we know that the future environment will be different to that of today in big or small ways. New technologies, market shifts, changes in legislation, or evolving social values damage or destroy the traditional good fit we have between ourselves and the world. To achieve “future fit” we therefore use forecasts to position ourselves and our organizations, creating (or renewing) the fit between our initiatives and environment. In some cases we may be strong enough also to influence future events and outcomes for our own future benefit, and forecasts help us do this too.

All enterprises benefit from narrowing down what they must adapt to and plan for – all effort spent preparing for a future that will not emerge is a waste of personal or organizational resources. Good forecasts are a key ingredient in limiting the vagaries of uncertainty, and therein working smarter not harder, avoiding surprises, exploiting new opportunities and plugging weaknesses in fitting in with the future, and where possible influencing the future to suit the organization. This is true not only of business. People and institutions of all types position themselves for success by anticipating and adapting to events, or shaping them. Whether it is an NGO raising money for developing-world children, an urban planner advocating a light rail system, a homeowner deciding to sell a house, or a student making a career choice, identical principles apply — a higher-quality reading of the future operating environment in which these decisions will play out is what separates winners from losers. We should all be vitally concerned with forecasts as we are all effectively betting significant resources on their validity.

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