Posted by Adam Gordon on Sep 7, 2010 in all, economy & finance, failed predictions, forecast filtering, strategic foresight
Here’s a video of Arthur C. Clark in 1964, remarkably predicting that in 50 years we would be able to communicate equally from anywhere on the planet, and so work from Tahiti or Bali equally well as from London. He predicts brain surgeons in Edinburgh operating on patients in New Zealand as technology collapses distance. Fabulous foresight? To a point, yes. This has all become possible, and in the time frame specified.
But, making one of the classic mistakes of technology-driven futures thinking, Clarke lets his technological imagination blur basic insight into human nature and social service/product adoption. Specifically, he goes on to say that because of communications technology advances, “the city of 2000 may not even exist at all. The traditional role of the city as meeting place for a man will cease to make any sense.”
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Note the gender paradigm blinkers. But anyway – the end of cities? Fat chance. One of the defining issues of the early 21st century is urban growth and the emergence of 10+ million-population mega-cities. And across the world, a higher proportion of the human population live in cities than at any point in history (and that proportion has just crossed 50% making humans for the first time a primarily urban species.) Hello? Arthur?
Urban concentrations 2007. Source: The Guardian
Why the miscue? First Clarke makes the classic error of holding key variables still while running technology forward. The key variable here is population growth. The number of people on the planet has doubled, at least, since 1964.
But that population could all be comfortably telecommuting from rural idylls, so there is another problem. Clarke fails to factor in social and economic pressures which sometimes run counter to technology advancement or, as in this case, merely absorb technology shift with no change. No matter how good communications get, nothing in the information-communications revolution has changed the age-old social truth that proximity matters. It matters to community welfare. It matters to social opportunities. It matters to career advancement, and so on. It mattered in the past. It will matter in the future. That’s why people are in jam-packed into into Los Angeles and São Paulo and Johannesburg and Seoul, etc., but not Tahiti.
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Posted by Adam Gordon on Jul 29, 2010 in all, decision-making, failed predictions, forecast filtering, Future Savvy, managing uncertainty, scenario planning, strategic foresight, trend tracking
I was lucky enough to have Future Savvy included in a lengthy review of critical thinking in forecasting & foresight, done on the SmithySmithy “info-savvy” blog. The post also included Nassim Taleb’s ‘The Black Swan’ (2007) and ‘Fooled By Randomness’ (2005); Kenneth Posner’s ‘Stalking the Black Swan’ (2010), and Chris Luebkeman’s Drivers of Change (2009).
As Stoyko’s is head-and-shoulders the most insightful and thorough assessments of the book itself, and the book in context, I’m reposting it here, with thanks. There are also fabulous graphics added, such as these (see more below):

“My search led to Adam Gordon’s Future Savvy. Like Posner, Gordon challenges Taleb’s blanket dismissal of forecasting. Gordon does not deny the existence of Black Swan events. And his book is a giant compendium of all of the things that usually go wrong with predictions. Moreover, Gordon offers a sceptical discussion of the subject that chastises simple-minded futurists, tech enthusiasts, and various other prophets of doom and boom. The difference between Taleb and Gordon is that Gordon doesn’t dismiss out-of-hand the usefulness of structured thinking about the future. Many important decisions require us to speculate about what the future might hold. Gordon wants us to be savvy in the way we anticipate the future instead of flying by the seats of our pants, so to speak.
“To set the stage, Gordon talks about how the forecasting industry is rife with problems. There are no standards, no accepted methods, no standard terminology. There are no penalties for failure given that people tend to forget forecasts by the time they can be proven wrong. And when dealing with the forecasts offered by pundits, stakeholders, and activists, Gordon reminds us, “we are knee deep in predictive wishful thinking, scare-mongering, or blatant self-promotion.” (p. 5) Buyer beware.
“Then there are the data problems. Forecasters use data from the past to project trends into the future. They rely heavily on data gathered for other purposes, not gathered for the task at hand. Availability is patchy. The data comes from multiple sources and is created using different methods. Important statistical caveats get lost. The context of the original studies gets forgotten. Variables are often defined loosely … and change over time … and are measured differently in different places. Data gathering methods often change over time in ways that exaggerate or obscure a trend. Sensationalist “newsy” data often commands the most attention. Some things are inherently difficult or impossible to measure accurately. All sorts of assumptions get embedded in data projected into the future. Furthermore, Gordon talks about the ways in which numbers can be finessed in an underhanded way. He advocates “number scepticism”, warning: “But no matter how scientific the data appears, choices have been exercised at every point about what to observe, what to count, how to measure it, and how to report it. … But numbers are not bedrock. There is no bedrock.” (p. 59)
“As an aside, statisticians have a snide nickname for analysts who mix’n’match statistics from a hodgepodge of sources to create complicated models or story-lines. That nickname is junk-yard dog. Gordon gives the impression that the forecasting business is, by necessity, heavily populated with these collectors.
“The sources of potential error don’t end with data. Our biases cause us to misinterpret and misreport the data.
“Some bias is intentional manipulation. Rascally analysts ignore or downplay countervailing evidence. They give evidence less scrutiny if it confirms the desired result. Emotionally charged language and associations are used. Terms are defined in leading ways. Extreme cases are used to represent the norm. Forecasts that don’t accord with an agenda get ignored, especially if the forecast is sponsored by a powerful interest. Organisational incentives can cause those being scrutinised to fudge the numbers. When forecasts are presented to the media, the most extreme trends get attention and important caveats remain unreported. Gordon is particularly critical of the so-called futurists who use “stretch thinking” and “big-picture thinking” to imagine a world full of only big changes. Many have a technophile bias, or the assumption that technology is the sole motive-force of large-scale societal change. Gordon’s advice is to keep your guard up and be wary of motives.
“Setting aside the thinness of this advice, Gordon has a strange attitude when talking about manipulation. He makes a distinction between forecasts that attempt to be accurate and forecasts that attempt to influence. Employee-prodding managers, partisan policy wonks, and alarmist activists use loaded forecasts to move minds. Humility, qualification, and tentativeness don’t have a place in these circles. There may be a legitimate reason for using leading forecasts, such as communicating the art-of-the-possible or giving someone an ambitious target to strive for. However, leading forecasts without full disclosure are instruments of underhanded manipulation. Gordon is eerily agnostic. His advice and tone of voice suggests that he is oblivious to the ethical problems posed by the manipulative use of forecasts. It’s a strange contrast with Gordon’s advice about being careful and pragmatically sceptical. [Editor's note: Agnostic? Moi? Hardly, but perhaps the chill of my irony was not chilly enough.]
“Back to the sources of error.
“Gordon itemises a number of cognitive biases that are inherent to the way we think. We often miss Black Swan events and abrupt changes in prevailing wisdom (“paradigm shifts”), he argues, because we are always filtering information based on perceived relevance. This “inattentional blindness” causes us to not notice important influences on the future. We also overemphasize recent happenings over older events (the recency effect). We’re susceptible to herd thinking and faddish ideas. A few chance events are often mistakenly interpreted as a trend or other pattern. Gordon places particular emphasis on how our current context frames the way we see and think (situational bias), especially how the prevailing mindset and preoccupations of an era skew the way we think about the future (Zeitgeist bias). For example, nuclear-powered airplanes may have seemed inevitable to someone living in the 1950s, a time preoccupied with thoughts of nuclear technology, suggests Gordon. That notion seems absurd today. To counter this problem, he argues for the need to extract the assumptions underpinning our expectations. Those assumptions need to be questioned and tested. And one good test is to reverse the assumption; that is, consider how the future would be different if the opposite (or very different) assumption were used.
I would add that people habitually rely on lazy assumptions about the future in general. As Howard Segal points out in his book Technological Utopianism in American Culture (2005), late-19th and early-20th-Century intellectuals assumed a technological plateau when describing the future. Even today, we assume our arrival at some destination—a future steady state—instead of a world of on-going change that is unevenly distributed and erratically paced, as exists now.
Gordon invites us to consider the utility people derive from a particular technology before jumping to conclusions about how it will revolutionise everyone’s lives. Tech-happy futurists are too quick to assume broad public acceptance of a new technology while ignoring the trade-offs of adoption. There are costs to be considered. In many cases, the price is too high and existing technologies do a good enough job. Or old technologies have an inertia, such as when users are “locked in” to a particular technology. Or social values change. Or switching creates undue inconvenience and aggravation. Or the technology has uneven appeal across diverse groups in society. Or, or … Gordon reminds us that simple technological domino effects almost never happen. The pace of change is usually slower than anticipated. A variety of factors determine how successful an innovation will be.
That leads us to the dynamics of change. I’m not going to describe each dynamic in detail. Gordon devotes a lot of space to them. Instead, I’ve listed them iconographically in the following diagram. Note that the darker lines signify consequences (and consequences of consequences; a.k.a. second-order and third-order events).

“A trend observed today may not continue onward along a straight-forward path. Trends peter out … change course … hit limits … get caught in reinforcing loops … have side-effects … provoke reactions … et cetera. The same goes for underlying causes. Trends can be particularly difficult to track within the complex systems that govern our lives. Thus, Gordon offers a chapter on system analysis.
“As someone who studies organisations, I’m often seeing policies and strategies change with sadly predictable pendulum swings. Gung-ho leaders push in one direction with gusto only to get a lesson in humility. Their efforts hit limits and opposition. Their assumptions hit reality. Subsequent leaders see wreckage everywhere and push in the opposite direction, looking for balance. Balance alludes them and they go to far. Another pendulum swing begins. Some swings happen from season to season. Others happen over decades. These swings may be predictable, but their exact timing certainly isn’t.
“Gordon rounds out Future Savvy with a utilitarian survival-guide of sorts. His big advice is that “it’s better to be vaguely right than exactly wrong.” Success is being alert to important changes and being prepared to cope, not with having accurate predictions. Narrowing down the things that need to be prepared for is an important practical benefit. In that spirit, Gordon talks about the strengths and weaknesses of using multiple scenarios instead of pat forecasts. He steps the reader through the analysis of some forecasts while looking for weaknesses. A chapter-long battery of questions is offered to guide the analysis. These questions do a good job of summarising the book.
“All told, Future Savvy is an excellent textbook for those who want to discipline the way they think about the future. I disagree with Gordon’s tangents about the inherently subjective nature of truth. I also have a few qualms about his take on scepticism. But these tangents rarely get in the way of his stock-taking exercise. That exercise has led me to be even more suspicious of forecasting, especially forecasts in volatile industries where data is patchy and assumptions are legion. I’d love to know the success rate of high-tech cheer-leaders … er, research firms that peddle forecasting numbers. Gordon dismisses the tracking of forecast failures as “smirk lists”. I’m with Taleb and his tsk tsking. If these numbers are just part of the hype machine and have a dismal track-record, then what good are they? Validation for reckless investment strategies? Fodder for misleading PowerPoint slides? Numbers that give a false sense of being in-touch with the market? Tsk tsk.
“That said, Future Savvy has increased my interest in foresight more generally. Gordon’s guide left me wondering how I can better prepare groups of decision-makers to think about the future. How do we get them to see the many changes afoot with greater foresight?”
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Nov 24, 2009 in all, failed predictions, managing uncertainty, Perils of Prediction, risk management, scenario planning, strategic foresight, trend tracking, wildcards & black swans
We owe a debt to Nassim Taleb for memorably encapsulating the demerits of predicting by extrapolating trends as “The Turkey Problem,” and now seems the moment to reiterate it:
Imagine you are a turkey. Every day someone comes to feed you. Every day you get bigger. Your portion sizes get bigger too, brought by a nice man at regular intervals. You extrapolate the trend and you confidently predict a bigger you, with more to eat. Regularly too.
But what happens is … Thanksgiving. Or Christmas
The hard reality for those who predict the future by extrapolating trends (and those gullible enough to believe them) is that even if our turkey had excellent data points (carefully observed and accurately recorded in, for example, a time series analysis) and, moreover, even if our turkey was a mathematically sophisticated — not merely simply projecting trends, but applying all the latest modeling techniques, from moving averages to compound regression — he is still going to be wrong about the future. Dead wrong.
All the data analysis in the world, all the fancy computer software, all the consulting time paid for, and he is still a dead duck.
Ouch. The lesson: there may be (or, vexingly, may not be) something outside the trend, a framing condition, which where it does exist is invisible within the trend projector’s mental model. The only way to get a view of the future that is “robust to Thanksgiving” is (a) to question assumed framing conditions, for example through properly done scenarios, and (b) to hold a view of the future which assumes fundamental ‘game-changing’ surprises can and will occur.
If, as they say, “the trend is your friend” it is assuredly only your fair-weather friend.
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Nov 19, 2009 in all, decision-making, emerging technologies, failed predictions, foresight tools & methods, Future Savvy, Perils of Prediction, scenario planning, strategic foresight, technology change
In a recent Times article ‘The future was never going to be the C5‘ actor-comedian Ben Millar offers a familiar criticism of foresight work. Inter alia he says: “For all our achievements in art, science, and technology, the human race has always been spectacularly bad at predicting the future. Literature is littered with shockingly wide-of-the-mark utopias, dystopias, shiny suits, flying saucers and whole meals contained in a single pill. As a child of the Seventies, I was taught that as an adult in a world run by machines my main challenge would be how to spend my endless hours of leisure time…”
Yes, Ben. I’m sure you know this has all been said before ad nauseam. But more importantly, 40 years on many lessons have been learned, and it wouldn’t run foul of quality journalism standards to reflect this.
First, let’s be clear: nobody can predict the future. Anyone who says they can is a charlatan. Also, yes, unconscionably dreadful and irresponsible predictions have been made and are continually being made. But there are three problems with the ‘no-flying-car-so-there-we-can’t-predict-the-future’ argument:
(1) The kinds of predictions Millar cites are a product of a particular moment in Western thought and therefore foresight. The 1960s and early 70s were a time of Post-War American emergence, unleashing for a while a techno-futurist predictive rapture, most of which has indeed proved to be rubbish. There are still people, very famous talking-head futurists, promoting techno-rapture for the 21st century (caveat emptor) but as a whole the foresight field has moved on to become much more circumspect about what can be predicted.
Balancing techno-fantasy
Foresight practitioners are these days more likely to balance technology wowee with economic, social, and environmental friction; see systemic (often indirect or counter-intuitive) effects where once only simple cause-and-effect was seen; and create scenarios of key alternative outcomes rather than predict one.
(2) The second thing that is missed in gleefully deriding foresight work, is how many people and institutions get it right, or right enough. It’s axiomatic that in order to be successful a person or organization must have correctly assessed both key changes and rate of change in their operating environment. To take a famous case, as quoted in Future Savvy, while Nixon’s Vice President Spiro Agnew in 1972 erroneously forecast super-sonic passenger air travel, Herb Kelleher, founder of SouthWest Airlines, foresaw the low-cost air travel industry. Bingo. Billionaire. Similarly, behind every success one can find future thinking that, while sometimes latent, was present and correct.
(3) The purpose of foresight work is misunderstood. We cannot predict the future and it’s pointless to try. We can only assess signals of change, trends, and potential for surprises and reversals, including challenging our all-too-easily calcified mental models, and take this into a process of understanding alternative outcomes and pre-considering best strategic actions. In other words, actively stimulating the investigation and analysis of future conditions in order to create the basis of better decision-making today.
In fact sometimes the ‘strategic conversation’ that results from poor predictions is instructive to managers. As I say to clients: the goal of foresight work is better decisions not better predictions.
Back-street abortionists
The reality is that there is good and bad foresight work. Yes, some futurists are the technical and moral equivalent of back street abortionists. But the good work remains, and quality foresight is a critical advantage to decision-makers. The key thing is to be able to tell good foresight work from bad.
Simplistic trashing of foresight work en bloc ignores the weight of case evidence that people and organizations can improve their management of future uncertainty and/or create a situation where they manage the future better than competitors. Further, it encourages managers to fly blind into changing environments, often resulting in spectacularly poor decisions that deeply and widely punish their dependent stakeholders.
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Oct 19, 2009 in 2015, all, economy & finance, failed predictions, foresight tools & methods, managing uncertainty, scenario planning, strategic foresight
One of the benefits of scenario-based future thinking is the ‘permission’ to think through alternative future outcomes without necessarily predicting them. ‘Predictors’ focus, by contrast, on isolating the highest probability future in order not to have to think through or plan for less likely outcomes.
Predictions of the dollar’s demise are as old as the greenback itself of course, but over recent weeks the specter of the dollar heading way way below its trading range — a dollar crunch — has entered the zone of the credible, or, in scenario terms, the ‘cone of plausible uncertainty.’ That means decision-makers with lots at stake are taking it seriously.
Like the British pound, the dollar has been under a cloud due to perceptions of economic fallout from the credit crunch and global recession, but particular questions about the US currency have recently surfaced, driven by reports [Robert Fisk's 'The Demise of the Dollar' story in The Independent (Oct 6)] that “Gulf Arabs are planning – along with China, Russia, Japan and France – to end dollar dealings for oil, moving instead to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan, the euro, gold and a new, unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council” (Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar).
The subtext is far from merely financial. Practically, it would mean that on any day, the real cost of oil to US consumers and businesses would go up or down depending on the strength of the currency. This is something America is not used to. But, more deeeply, dropping dollar-denomination of oil is a direct shot across the bows of Washington’s say over oil affairs, and the hegemony of the dollar as the dominant global reserve currency.
De-dollarizing oil would not in itself push the US currency below its 25-year range. But it is portentous of the clear trend to a genuinely multi-power world, for better or worse, in which the dollar will get no favors. That will push the dollar down, at least while the news and fallout make their way through the financial and real economic systems.
Rumors of de-dollarization have been hotly denied, as further reported here, but as the Independent points out, denials are to be expected, and are always issued in these situations. They mean nothing. Even cub reporters know that.
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Scenario thinking
What’s particularly interesting to me is that a ‘scenario’ of dollar demise has become not only plausible in the mainstream view of the future, but scenario thinking is being used as a way to consider the nature of this outcome, and how best to respond without predicting the outcome either way. As recently as directly pre-credit crunch, the media question would have been: ‘what is the best prediction for the dollar (or the housing market, or credit default swaps?) and that, rather then scoping out the implications of the lesser-likelihood, would have dominated the discussion.
So, what struck me forcefully in the Business Week video interview above, where BW Chief Economist Mike Mandel interviews the news magazine’s Economics Editor Peter Coy (see Coy’s underlying story here), is how the less-likely, non-predicted, but very significant outcome is actively addressed:
Says Coy: “It’s so hard to know what the dollar is going to do. We don’t argue that we know… what we do is we say, ‘it could happen’ and let’s take that possibility seriously, in the same way we should have taken the possibility of falling housing prices seriously…”
This is not formal scenario-building of course. But it is, fundamentally an adoption of the framework, saying in the classic ‘scenarios’ way: “we can’t predict if it will happen or it won’t, but if it does it will have significant impact. So let’s just ask: ‘what if ‘ it does and explore the outcomes and our responses. What will the word look like? What would be the implications, the knock-ons and spinoffs? If it comes to pass, what would be wish we had done today?”
Perhaps failing to predict the credit crunch has dented predictors’ halos enough to cause a mini-zeitgeist-shift towards the only real way to cope with important uncertainty: exploring all outcomes that pass the plausibility and significance test, whether or not we actually believe they will happen.
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Aug 4, 2009 in 2025, all, economy & finance, failed predictions, lifestyles & values, social change, technology change
In all the predictions of the future that I have ever read or heard, and all the scenarios I have been exposed to, it’s almost unheard of to see one that says “the squeezed middle class keeps their eye on a good deal, as they always have.”
I’m thinking about this as I see the Guardian today featuring a story about how “Poundland” has doubled it’s profits. Poundland is a copy-cat of the venerable US institution, the “dollar store,” where everything cost the same price, in this case £1.
The merchandising of these stores is not unsubtle. There are definite too-good-to-be-true loss leaders, but these more than offset by the many items that cost pennies wholesale. Fair enough. And recently reported doubling of profits is because more people are buying at these stores (downshifting) due to recessionarly squeeze and/or because of the current “sense of thrift” in the zeitgeist which makes pennywatching more “the done thing.”
But neither merchandising, nor consumer psychology is our primary concern here. From a foresight point of view, the point is that forecasts of 2010 that were around around a decade or two ago didn’t quite get around to saying anything about Poundstretcher leading a healthy economic life. It’s as unsexy as anything, compared to “peak oil” or advancing “singularity,” or nano-babble, and so on into the glorious future – or its polar alternative: crash & burn, soup kitchens, urban warlords rampaging, and so on.
But here we are coming to the end of the decade and a basic retailing gimmick for the squeezed middle-class consumer is well trafficked and very much part of the future. Yes, it’s success correlates with tougher times, but economic cycles will be with us repeatedly through the rest of the century and beyond.
This doesn’t mean there won’t be breakthroughs in technology or in consumer behavior. In fact, looking at the picture, one surely would not have got a pound for any amount of plain bottled water in a retail environment 20 years ago. Things do change. They just change slowly, or unevenly, against the gritty reality of savvy agregate choices made by a wary (global and growing) middle class.
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Jul 3, 2009 in all, failed predictions, forecast filtering, foresight tools & methods, Future Savvy, history, lifestyles & values, Perils of Prediction, politics of the future, social change, strategic foresight, technology change
I recently received a copy of Future: A Recent History to review. True confession: what hit me first on picking up the book was (a) “wow, the title Future is not already taken!? And (b) what a fabulous job the University of Texas Press has done producing this book. It is beautifully designed, with an understated Art Deco motif, and carefully laid out with enough text on the page, on delightfully solid paper stock.
It may seem odd to go on about text on the page, but it’s much easier to read like an adult, in paragraphs. So many books, particularly business books, these days appear produced at 14-point, double spacing, like pre-school readers. Makes you wonder…
Anyway, author Larry Samuel’s project is to investigate the history of views of the future from 1920 to the present. (The book has an acknowledged US-centric focus, partially defended by the notion that future-mindedness is “a principle strand in America’s DNA.”) He organizes the book chronologically into six periods between then and now, and shows, with interesting examples, how each period had its own views of the future, and how the views shifted from period to period.
In tracing the history of “tommorowism,” in this way, Future is on a similar track to the classic book in this field: I.F. Clarke’s The Pattern of Expectation 1644-2001 (Jonathan Cape, 1979). It ultimately makes similar points, although Samuel’s argument is obviously drawn from more recent examples. As Samuel puts it: “A look back on how people looked forward reveals that while it possesses certain common themes … the future is not a fixed idea but a highly variable on that reflects the values of those who are imagining it.”
Happily I can say this chimes exactly with the argument of Future Savvy, particularly Chapter 4 “Zeitgeist & Perception,” where I argued how heavily the nature of the present and its topical issues frames how the future is seen (what is forecast, what is aspired to or feared, what counts as a valid method for thinking ahead, and so on). Which means the framing conditions of the present should be carefully analyzed in assessing the validity of any future view.
Historiography
Historiography – investigating the meta-conditions surrounding what is recorded and how it is interpreted by historians – what counts as “history” and for whom – is a well-understood part of doing good history. Unfortunately, there is no equivalent standard “futuriography” in the foresight field, despite it being absolutely fundamental to understanding the value of our own predictions as, similarly, highly determined by the epistemic configurations of their production. It is here that Samuel very competently fills a much needed gap.
The practical implication of this, which Future does not get into – it’s not that kind of book – is that to make better predictions (or make valid assessments of others’ predictions) we need to ask stiff questions as to how much of what we foresee is determined by the perspectives of today, and expect the answer to be “very much.” Understanding the limitations and biases of our own perspective is the sine-qua-non of a robust view of what tomorrow will actually bring.
Posted by Adam Gordon on Jun 16, 2009 in 2025, all, economy & finance, Future Savvy, policy, politics of the future, strategic foresight
Top of the news yesterday along with Iran’s election protest was Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statement that he — as leader of the right-wing Likud party — could endorse a Palestinian state. It was framed in conditions on Jewish-state recognition, and requirements on security, borders, refugees and Jerusalem that are, from today’s vantage point, very difficult to imagine Palestinians or Arab states agreeing to. So no change is expected. Even the breaking-story reporters had to admit that, rhetoric aside, this is not a breakthrough.
There’s an old joke in journalism from the 1970s that goes: “You can write the same headline on any and every story about Israel’s relationship with its neighbors: ‘Prospects for Middle-East Peace Dim.’”
Sure, it’s partly Eeyeore-ish journalist wit. But what’s interesting from a foresight point of view is that, running the world forward 40 years shows it was a reasonable understanding of the future. Why? Solid foresight is always predicated on a solid understanding of the forces for and against change. “Prospects for peace dim” acknowledged that forces and enablers of change were overpowered by what was preventing anything fundamental from happening (friction and blockers in Future Savvy terms.)
The basic truth is that Israel-Middle East is a complex situation characterized by a more-or-less equal balance of power. Israel has military and nuclear superiority, and US backing. Arab countries have oil, population numbers and population growth, and a billion more-or-less sympathetic moslems around the world, and therefore time on their side. They also have, particularly in Gaza, relatively widespread poverty and low welfare and educational development, which is a force against moderation and therefore a negotiated settlement.
A genuine balance of power means we have equilibrium, and therefore should expect no change. That’s why we’ve had plenty of skirmishes, but no change in 40 years.
Looking out for the next 40 years, is this still the case? Can we write “Prospects for Middle East Peace Dim” on all news stories for another two generations? Following the foresight logic above, this depends on whether anything breaks the fundamental equilibrium. There are four issues apparently large enough to threaten the status quo:
Water is a favorite of trend-foresight sessions. It sounds like the key issue in a rising-population world. In theory yes, but it’s unclear whether it will lead to anything more than local conflicts or wars, which in Israels case, we have already. On US policy, the Obama administration is attempting to show even-handedness, but its strategic interest lies with Israel as military ally and ideologically temperate (democratic, at least) bastion in the region. So no change there either. On oil, we are definitely in an era where – for security and climate change reasons – fossil fuel is entering it’s twilight phase, which will erode revenues and therefore power of ME Arab states. But, as mentioned earlier, poverty is as great an obstacle to peace as any other. (Remember the Israeli “let’s-grow-our-way-out-of the-situation-together peace platform of the 1990s, seeing tackling the development issues as the root of creating moderate mindsets across the region.)
That leaves Iran which may change the balance if it really goes toxic (develops and uses nuclear weapons in terror strikes.) This is a low futures likelihood – it’s not just luck that nukes have stayed in their box since 1945 – no state wants to carry the stain of the nuclear pariah for all time. There’s a moral blocker on this outcome that has worked for generations. Nuclear powers rattle, but the don’t bite. But … what if the wildcard scenario of a massive nuclear strike on Israeli soft targets were to happen, what then? The current low-grade hostile standoff would become a supernova, but we’d still have power balance, and while we have that we’ll have status quo and journalists can expect to write “Prospects for Middle East Peace Dim” on top of every story about the region for another 40 years.
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Jun 3, 2009 in all, economy & finance, failed predictions, forecast filtering, Future Savvy, leadership, management, Perils of Prediction
Normally I make a point of not reposting anything put up elsewhere, but this small list of foresight lessons deserves broader attention than just Electronics Weekly. According to EW blogger David Manners, Tsuyoshi Kawanishi, former CEO of Toshiba Semiconductors in his book Chip Management quotes 10 wisdoms of forecasting, see below.
They have a bit of the fashionable “SunTzu Art of War” feel to them, and some of the quotes may be apocryphal. But no matter. What’s really interesting in this very savvy list is how customer-focused the lessons are. As said in Future Savvy, and one can’t say it too many times, what customers (users, the public) want and the cost-benefit tradeoffs they will make is a MUCH more reliable guide to the future than any techno-fantasy.
The wisdoms also reflect a foresight industry insider truism and paradox: you seldom get to the future by asking the customer directly (e.g. in a focus group) what they would like to have. You have to leap for the customer (and use focus groups only to refine new offerings.)
The list:
“1. St Augustine said that it is a blessing from God that we can’t predict the future. If we predict prosperity, we will become complacent. If we predict evil, we will lose the ability to discriminate.
2 Sharp President Haruo Tsuji: ‘You cannot find out what the consumer wants only by doing market research. You need to pull the ideas out of your brain. Manufacturers of the future should not simply respond to market demands, they must create market demands.’
3. Konosuke Matsushita said: ‘Don’t try to fit your business to a forecast. Fit it to the needs of your customers.’
4. Toshiba President Sugiichio Watari: ‘Money doesn’t come falling into the headquarters of Toshiba. If you want money you need to go to the customers.’
5. President Yoshio Tateishi of Omron: ‘Learn from your customers. If you learn from internal resources you will become self-satisfied. If you learn from your competitors you will fall far behind.’
6. Professor Yoshiya Teramoto of Meiji Gakuin University: ‘When companies start a big market research project, it is one sign of the ‘big company’ disease.’
7. Tsuyoshi Kawanishi: ‘The way to predict the weather is to look at the sky. And, every once in a while, you can make your prediction by simply thinking.’
8. President Haruo Tsuji of Sharp says: ‘Don’t be a spider, be a honey bee.’
9. Takeshi Kaneda, a management critic, says: ‘After elaborate research to find out what the consumer wants, Ford produced the Edsel. It was a complete failure. Ford mistook what the customer wanted for what they would really buy. They ignored their insight and relied on consensus. Japanese tend to emphasize harmony and consensus. But insight and decisiveness can be more important.’
10. Someone says: ‘Figures do not lie. But liars often use figures.’”
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on May 15, 2009 in all, lifestyles & values, politics of the future
Apocalyptic predictions are designed to be wrong. The point of doing them, as with “1984,” “Brave New World,” “When the Wind Blows,” etc., is to raise consciousness to negative outcomes and engender action so that the prediction, by succeeding in purpose makes itself incorrect in fact. “The Age of Stupid” is this all over. See the trailer here:
There is also a documentary about how the movie was funded and made.
Set in 2055, post the environmental global climate change collapse, it features last-man-on-earth (Pete Postlethwaite) as an archivist in a tower refuge somewhere in the Arctic north of Norway sifting through records of human life before it was wiped out, trying to find out why people did nothing to stop the eco-catastrophe that was imminent. The plot device allows filmmaker Franny Armstrong, (director of McLibel, 2005, about environmentalists who successfully challenged McDonalds) to showcase a selection of real reportage and news clips from today to withering effect. Like any good scenario it gives granularity: dates, names, actions, timelines. It points fingers and mentally readies the reader-watcher to act.
By all accounts this is a punchier movie than Al Gore-fronted “An Inconvenient Truth (2006),” and punchy is what is required to effect the goals of a future-influencing forecasting, that is, an assault on the powers that be and/or on public complacency.
By the way, if you want to see the best activist consciousness-raising movie (ever!) see Pete Postlethwaite in the anti-Thatcherite “Brassed Off.”
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on May 6, 2009 in all, decision-making, failed predictions, forecast filtering, foresight tools & methods, Future Savvy, leadership, management, strategic foresight
I’ve been quite careful not to use this blog as a “brag wall” for Future Savvy. I can say reviewers have all been glowing, without exception. But this review, below, which recently appeared in the St Andrews Management Institute’s Vector Magazine, I felt was worth reposting here because – more than just saying nice things – it also captures the essence of what the book is trying to do. Here it is:
Book reviews by SAMI fellows and associates
“Future Savvy” by Adam Gordon (American Management Association, 2009)
“Forecasts and predictions are ubiquitous. We are bombarded with views of the future on a plethora of subjects from myriad sources, with a diverse set of motivations and self-interests. Adam Gordon seeks to provide a practical users guide to the assessment and interpretation of all things about the future, with special emphasis on the cautions and ‘health warnings’ that need to be applied, so as not to be misled by forecasts. However, the author is careful not to veer towards over-cynical dismissal of all future projections; rather, he seeks to provide guidance to the reader on how to apply the necessary caveats, and in the author’s words “profit from change”.
The book covers a very broad field, from the basic issues of the misuse of data and statistics, covering the quality and validity of data as well as their misinterpretation, through technology forecasting, trend and horizon scanning to quantitative modelling and scenarios. The one theme common to all these activities is the need to be alert to bias, whether it be a deliberate motive to influence behaviour through a dire prediction; or a bias inherent in futurologists needing to see rapid and pervasive change in all areas of society – if it exists or not – and evangelising it.
The track record of much futurology is mixed. Well-known examples are quoted: television did not lead to the end of the cinema industry. Nor has space exploration led to people taking foreign holidays on other planets – yet! Bias may also lie in the beholder. The ‘Zeitgeist’ tendency, whereby we are all influenced by contemporary perceptions, affects not only how “experts” and professionals see the world, but also how the audience receives the views of the future – often with unprepared minds. The internal “official future” of an organisation can pose a real blind spot to its progress.
The weaknesses of much quantitative modelling are highlighted, with such forecasts only being as good as the assumptions on which they are based, but which are often not overtly stated. In contrast to the conceptual and practical errors inherent in much futures output, the role and advantages of scenario planning are emphasised as a tool for challenging assumptions and developing alternative futures: “It’s better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong”.
The penultimate chapter takes examples of relatively recent forecasts from a range of organisations, whose subjects range from US agricultural production to UK dementia sufferers. These are subjected to a form of ‘retro wind-tunnelling’ to illustrate the deficiencies in their construction and how they would have benefited from the application of methodologies described earlier in the book. The final chapter provides a summary checklist, or framework, to apply in evaluating forecasts and future predictions.
Adam Gordon has written a shrewd and perceptive book that deserves a wide readership, especially among managers in both the private and public sectors, as well as the familiar ‘general reader’. Those wishing a more detailed technical guide to the various forecasting and futurist methodologies will need to consult other standard works. Professionals in the fields of management and strategy consulting and scenario practitioners might well be familiar with many of the points made in the book. However, those with some savvy might do well to recommend the book to their clients.
Michael Owen, 20 April 2009
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Apr 30, 2009 in all, forecast filtering, history
There’s an interesting Information Week article Google Tracking System Suggests Swine Flu Is Spreading posted yesterday (April 29) that investigates the possible predictive power of Googling (human search) activity, suggesting increased searching / monitoring of swine flu on Google could be predictive of rising levels of infection. Google says country-specific (Mexico) data for 19-25 April shows a spike in flu searches.

Pic: thisislondon.co.uk
Google introduced “Google Flu Trends” (US) in November as a way to visualize correlation between flu infections and flu-related searches. It maintains search levels provide early warning of flu spread because search data can be gathered and analyzed almost instantly, unlike traditional epidemiological reporting methods. (More on the goal of the project is in a post on swine flu on the official Google blog.)
The predictive power of Google spikes is hardly clear. Yes, a spike could suggest increased levels of infection. But it could be cause by media coverage and rising levels of pandemic concern.
Google predicts “no pandemic”
More broadly, however, the Google search phenomenon, and information saturation that goes with it is, I believe, highly predictive in epidemic situations. It predicts they are very unlikely. Generally, knowledge is power. Specifically deep and easily searchable public knowledge of where the epidemic is, and what to do to avoid it, and avoid spreading it, is a new condition in human history, one which in fact reliably predicts that no pandemic will happen. Yes, strains become more virulent and dangerous and even drug resistant, and yes, airlines transport it around the world in hours. But the power of knowledge in the labs and in the public at large is immense and ubiquitous in a way it never was before.
One of the debates in futures studies is how much and in what way to look at the past as a guide to the future. Paul Saffo says: look back at least as twice as far as you are trying forecast, and I agree with that. In thinking about a major modern global health epidemic our minds are in fact deeply conditioned by a 90-year-old event: the 1918 Influenza Pandemic that killed an estimated 50 million worldwide. In that epidemic there were particular conditions, not least four year of devastating war where more were lost to disease than fighting; associated drain on resistance and infrastructure; and forced mobiization of troops under poor conditions, that greatly facilitated the spread of the disease. Most importantly, ordinary people were operating in a knowledge vaccum that is unimaginable today.
This is not to say that we should not be vigilant and prepared. But the future that we most likely face is many-and-regular outbreaks like the swine flu, the avian flu, and so on, which we will move fairly quickly to contain. The dystopia of world pandemic is appealing to the health crisis community and its service providers, but the future will not be history (1918-1920) repeating itself.
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Apr 22, 2009 in 2015, 2025, all, emerging technologies, failed predictions, forecast filtering, Future Savvy, horizon scanning, innovation, lifestyles & values, Perils of Prediction, social change, technology change
A basic tool of foresight work is horizon scanning, that is, scanning for signals of change, early portent of trends, straws in the wind of change. Futurists do it habitually, and if not habitually then – the wisdom is – do it routinely by consciously scanning sources of information you don’t normally. Buying an agricultural weekly or teen idol rag at the airport, rather than your standard dose of the Economist.
It was in this spirit that I picked up the UK launch issue (aka May 2009) of Wired. Actually it’s not the first launch. Wired was in the UK ten years ago, but Condé Nast withdrew it in the dot.com crash. In the US at the time, I remember when Wired, the poster child of the Silicon Valley / Nasdaq bonanza, was almost as thick as a phone book each month. But those days were soon over.
Anyway, who could resist an offering that was about to tell me about my “Life in the future. “Fake Meat, Robots and Electro-Sex: the World is About to Change.” On the cover are, I kid you not, flying cars!
Now, I wouldn’t take this stuff seriously for a moment, if everyone else promised not to. But they don’t. So here we go. In the “What’s Next?” cover story 46 experts make 99 predictions about the next 40 years, and none of them will happen, or not in the time frame expressed.
Oh, moon settlement?
I shrink from sharing the list. Meal replacement patches, check. Moon settlement, check. The male pill, check. Every techno-fantasy of the jockish sci-fi world, check. Well, let’s stop on the male pill for a moment. Can we not do it? Sure we can do it – today. What’s stopping it is not technology. It is attitudes (machismo, essentially). So Wired experts are telling us that this will go away in a decade. Puh-leez.
I hardly need mention there’s no method given behind any of these expert forecasts.
Don’t you think Wired should be asking themselves why, in 2009, they are producing 186 pages of dead tree and carting it around the country in carbon-emitting trucks? Technology-vision may lead you to a view of the future. But it’s unreliable. The future is determined by what consumers are ready for. Well, that’s one of the 20-or-so key forecast filtering principles of Future Savvy.
Perhaps we should look at the cover story for what it is really about – which is selling magazines. Because, there’s no doubt that tech is changing, and many new capabilities are coming on stream, and this is very, very fascinating to imagine uses for. And this fascination is what Wired packages and sells. Don’t bet any money on the predictions though, certainly not their timeline.
But sturdy in some areas
Aside from the predicting lark, it’s a good magazine of its kind. The features are well-conceived, well-written, for example, one about how the BBC iPlayer business was built; a feature on sea salvage; a profile of PayPal founder Elon Musk; the David X Li formula and how it mis-calculated risk, and so on. Great stuff. Actually quite a sturdy business-oriented-view of techno-change, if you can get past the boys-with-toys riff of the magazine as a whole.
So, actually, much to like. Just, please, don’t think a lad’s mag is going to tell you anything coherent about the future.
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Mar 16, 2009 in 2025, all, economy & finance, emerging technologies, forecast filtering, lifestyles & values, Perils of Prediction, policy, social change, technology change, trend tracking
It’s all in a day’s irony when Guinness releases its 250-year view of the future on the day that the UK Chief Medical Officer pleads for a minimum price for alcohol (and Gordon Brown, for now, says no, but don’t bet on that holding for long.)
The Guinness Pub-of-the-Future is a St. Patrick’s day (March 17) promotion. Nothing wrong with a little bit of fantasy foresight. But what they come up is so “20th-century-futurism” it’s hilarious. Among various reports on the project – for example in the Telegraph – the following features are foreseen:
- robotic doorman, greets you by name
- cash obsolete; orders via RFID; payments deducted automatically
- your product tailored to you on the spot
- touch-sensitive tables, send your order straight to the bar
- socializing via virtual / hologram technology
- a running tally of the number of units consumed.
Yawn. Even on it’s own terms (minimal constraints of realism) this is a totally derivative piece of foresight. These “innovations” are the staples of an infotech view of the future, and they have all been thought and spoken of countless times. Also many of the elements and services cited are already here, or not more than a decade away. What we have is the current pub assumptions + digital steriods, while the year 2259 will be, truly, another world.
The limits to growth
But all this leads us to more interesting industry foresight problem. Will there be pubs in even a generation, never mind 250 years? What the Telegraph dryly observes at the bottom of its report is that 39 pubs are closing every week Why? A number of driving forces are coming together:
First is strict drink-driving limits, which makes “the local” literally local or nothing. Second, pubs in the UK have traditionally been a refuge from housing that was poor and/or underheated. Unprecedented waves of affluence (credit-crunch notwithstanding) have led to widespread housing “do-ups.” It’s now a valid option for most people to spend their leisure time at home and entertain at home.
Then there’s the where’s-my-friend trend. You’re likely to go down the pub if your friends are there, but not if they are where most people’s friends are: on Facebook.
The social-legislative clock
Fourth, no matter how you dress it up, pubs are retail outlets. So, like all retail they are under the cosh in a Wal-mart / Tesco world. The price gap between store and pub has become too great for most consumers to cross with good conscience.
Which brings us to the current price-floor legislation bid. Alcohol is a huge social cost in terms of health care and violence. Drink costs the NHS £3bn a year, and the total price of alcohol to the taxpayer is estimated at five times that. Eventually these costs will become unjustifiable so, like smoking before it, the social-legislative clock is ticking for booze. As the 2-martini lunch has become the 2-seltzer lunch, the trend to social stigmatization is clear, and legislators will follow (not with Prohibition, but with a much more subtle community-endorsed squeeze).
Like the good politician he is, Gordon Brown won’t let his party get ahead of the trend. But the trend is clear and it bodes ill for pubs.
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Mar 10, 2009 in all, failed predictions, foresight tools & methods, history, Perils of Prediction, politics of the future, strategic foresight
One of the more alarming mistakes in foresight work is that forecasters don’t see themselves as operating within their own world view, and the preconceptions and priorities of their own time. In fact the very idea of foresight – why do it and how to do it – has changed quite markedly through human history. Knowledge of this historiography is of course important in assessing current forecasts. This is why Oona Strathern’s A Brief History of the Future (Robinson, London, 2007) is an important book.
One doesn’t start reading a “Brief History of” book in a series that includes A Brief History of the Birth of the Nazis and A Brief History of British Kings & Queens, without a certain trepidation. But, in fact, A Brief History of the Future is well-considered and well-written summing up of the characters and concerns that have shaped and continue to shape the future studies field.
Strathern, is a British journalist-turned-futurist, based in Vienna. One of the key attributes she brings is a journalist’s (and sub-editor’s) critical “don’t-bullshit-me” faculties, which is welcome in a field that is often short on common sense.
The book is hardly brief (at 300 pages) so there’s no sense that it’s a potted history. And it’s not compromised by what one – alas – expects of this kind of setup: pandering to all characters in positive or equal terms. In fact a key value of the book is its clear-headed and plucky judgment of who the key figures are (and who are not) and what their contributions have each been (vs what they might have thought they were). It is also unusually even-handed in balancing US and European inputs.
The book follows the obvious structure, starting with the oracles of Ancient Greece, Plato, moving through Leonardo de Vinci, and Thomas Malthus and so on through to the 19th century (Jules Verne, Karl Marx, etc.) and on to the present. In this Strathern argues for and operates with a wide definition of futures work – including in the dreamers, social reformers, and sci-fi writers in addition the more formal analysts and planners.
20th Century Weltanschauung
The book really hits its straps in the 20th century – in discussions of Aldous Huxley, H.G. Wells, George Orwell, Arthur C. Clarke, Herman Kahn, Buckminster Fuller, Alvin Toffler, Isaac Asimov, Margaret Mead and many lesser known figures. What is most interesting here is how the links between foresight approaches and the evolving broader existential and political “weltanschauung” of the century is knitted together, inserting “futurology” into the 20th century world of ideas at each point.
Although the book deals with institutions of foresight pretty well, the one angle I missed was the development of foresight education over the past 40 years. Part or full university degrees in foresight methods are an important part of the evolution of the field. Much has been learned in the debates over what and how and where to teach it. Ironically, the book – as intelligent a summary of the “future studies” field as you will find – would be an ideal text for an introductory course in such a curriculum.
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Sep 16, 2008 in all, emerging technologies, failed predictions, Future Savvy
In the MBA elective “Industry Foresight and Scenario Planning” that I teach, toward the beginning of Day One, I ask participant some very basic questions – basic questions being, of course, the hardest. One of them is: Can We Predict the Future, Yes or No?
Being graduate students, they’ve learned to prevaricate, and they do. It’s either No, with a bit of yes; or Yes with a bit of no. Both are correct or course. Clearly nobody can see the future perfectly, but there do seem to be times and/or situation where some see it much more clearly than others. (And therefore make better forecasts. How one can recognize this is a core topic of “Future Savvy.”)
Anyway, I’m reminded of this because I stumbled on two Web links, one after the other, that are salvos in this debate. The first is at:
http://picasso.rediffiland.com/blogs/2008/09/08/Predicting-the-Future-We-veall-hear.html
This is very much the standard, smirking, “look-see-bigCheese-got-egg-on-his-face” testimonial, of which there are many. Bloggers are, in many ways, journalists, and all journos like to see a big-shot egg-faced.
The other link is a fun 3-min video, posted on the Disney blog, see
which is at
http://thedisneyblog.com/2008/09/08/how-good-was-disney-at-predicting-the-future/
The clip argues, possibly slightly tongue in cheek, that the Disney forecasts as portrayed “Horizons,” EPCOT in 1983 – 25 years ago – were, in fact, not bad predictions. (Context is Disney’s tomorrow visions have, generally, been discredited.)
Back to the smirk site, above, which bears further thinking about. This one is hardly original (why do they all have the same 20 quotes? They also normally start with the Yogi Berra-ism “Predicting is hard, especially about the future.” Yawn) but at least they all correctly put us on our guard as to the poor future thinking of industry experts. In fact, the record of future prediction is littered with the most astounding mistakes. From underwater cities never built to rocket mail that never flew to Y2K disasters that never materialized – the list of laughable errors is a mile long. Experts aside, all of us are liable to confidently anticipate things that wont happen while missing what is brewing right under their noses.
Prediction-skepticism
Fair enough. But, the predictive nihilism behind these smirk sites is is dangerous in a number of ways.
First it promotes the skepticism that “we cant know anything” about the future. If the experts were so wrong – let’s all just give up. And therein we get the problem of many people, including highly-paid managers, justifying ignoring or under-funding future thinking. Sometimes managers, not wanting to look unprepared, suggest resources and expertise be channeled into “fast response” so that when the future becomes clear they can move rapidly to profit. This view is soundly rubbished in Hamel & Prahalad’s classic HBR 1994 article “Competing For The Future,” and I don’t think more needs to be said.
Second, there’s obviously no science behind the smirk. They pointedly do not show the number or extent of incorrect forecasts *in context of the total forecasts made*. We don’t know, in other words, how many people got it right or at least right enough to have profited or avoided losses. Wherever you have significant success, it is likely that there is a good-enough forecast behind it.
Finally the failed-forecast smirk lists also miss the fact that many forecasts are not meant to be an accurate anticipation of events. Many are trying to influence the future, that is, talk a particular outcome into being or shape it, or stop it from happening. People make predictions to sway an audience, or get a response from authorities or opposing forces. When Gates said: “640K should be enough for anyone,” who was he talking to, and what was he trying to achieve …? A real prediction of the future? I think not. Microsoft did not stop at 640, and nor did anyone think it would. And nor did Gates think anyone else would. Forecasts are often salvos in the games of power and influence, flagrantly used to marshal situations or promote self-interests, in situations where accuracy is not the point.
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Sep 4, 2008 in all, failed predictions, foresight tools & methods, Future Savvy, prediction markets
In my previous post, below, I threatened myself with the penance that I’d have to come back and think about the zeitgeist effect as a further limit on the use and validity of prediction markets. (Once again, I’m basically sold that prediction markets are a fabulous way to think about the short-term and/or contained system future, but it’s worth being clear about the limits of this tool.)
Zeitgeist, German for “spirit of the times,” refers to the often unconscious spectrum of intellectual views, analytical approaches, political and social concerns, etc., that people in any era share. Evidence from the checkered history of predicting the future shows that forecasters have been very heavily biased by their then-current conditions, current issues, and current state of the world, that is by their zeitgeist. They see reality and therefore the future through the lens of their times. The key marker of this effect at work is when many forecasts are not only wrong, but are wrong in the same way.
The zeitgeist effect, by the way, is not a peculiar condition. It is part of the many common human and social cognitive-perceptual biases that exist. (For a longer list and their effects in forecasting, see Future Savvy.) Zeitgeist is in fact sometimes more broadly known as “situational bias,” where situations that people find themselves in frame what they see and how they interpret events. In a depression, famously, it is difficult to see any source of upturn; in boom times it is hard to see the crash.
The Zeitgeist of the 1990s
Just one example of zeitgeist bias in forecasting can be seen in predictions made in the 1990s, when the fall of Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War provoked new hope about global interaction and growth, and this, combined with the rise of digital technologies, the Internet, WTO agreements, and the dot.com market boom, fueled a new zeitgeist of optimism. It was very common, in this era to predict global prosperity, international peace and harmony, rising standards of living, enhanced personal freedoms, and a better environment. By the end of 2001, the NASDAQ bubble had burst, Al-Qaeda had struck buildings that symbolized U.S. power, the “War on Terror” had begun, and the entire rosy 1990s and all the forecasts that went with it, were finished. Zeitgeist or situation has, evidently, a very strong pull on what people think is possible and likely in the world at large, and in their own sector or industry. It frames the questions people ask, the topics they think are important, the outcomes they expect, and how they interpret signals of change.
The point is, do prediction markets somehow counter this well-known perceptual-cognitive bias in forecasting? No. The outcomes people think more plausible – that they will “buy up” in a prediction market – are deeply affected by situational conditions. This is sure to be a factor when, for example, Google sets up a market to tap its employees for forecasts. The people involved, smart as they are, will be strongly by situational factors – and this will affect which future outcomes look more likely.
Herd Effects
Moreover, they will be pulled in the same direction. As prediction markets, like Delphi studies, are particularly a consensus-based method (forecasters drawing predictive results from the study/game are going on what most people say/do), they are by definition deeply vulnerable to the zeitgeist effect. This dovetails with another well-known social cognitive bias, the “herd effect” or “bandwagon effect,” or “groupthink,” where people to believe or do things because many other people are doing or appear to be doing them. The only way to avoid groupthink is to isolate people from each other (as Delphi studies attempt to do by not disclosing others’ responses while the study is live.) But in prediction markets the player can, of course, see what others are doing. When buying a “stock” that is getting more expensive they may be reassured that others are buying it too — leading them to buy more, producing a classic herd-effect situation.
These biases – and various others, as detailed in Future Savvy, are among the many perceptual and cognitive biases that people bring to the world. They are part of (and evidence of) perception being active and constituent in our understanding of the world, and therefore of the future. We can chip away at our perceptual framwork, particularly by questioning our assumptions and investigating the basis of our knowledge (possibly through scenario planning.) However, no matter how astutely we look and how consciously we try to eliminate them, our paradigms exist, and they color our forecasts, and prediction markets do not make them go away.
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Aug 20, 2008 in all, failed predictions, foresight tools & methods, Future Savvy, prediction markets
Hmm. As the 2008 White House race hots up, we’re going to be hearing more and more – and then even more – about who prediction markets forecast to win, so it’s time to put down a thought or two about uses and limitation of this forecasting tool.
First, what’s if all about? If you already know, skip this section. Let’s start with the example in yesterday’s Telegraph: “Predicting the future – with the power of betting” Paul Parsons, August 19, 2008. As Parson’s reports, the University of Iowa is running a market where investors can buy “shares” in the two major US election candidates, each priced between $0 and $1. On election day, traders holding stock in the winner – Obama or McCain – receive $1 per share while the others lose their money. Investors can buy and sell their shares along the way, and as they do this the candidate more people will want to own (because they think he will win) will get more expensive. In other words, market forces will drive up the price of the outcome more people think more likely. As of August 19, the trading value of the Obama, at $0.62, suggests participants expect a 62 percent chance he will win. (Another prediction market site, midasoracle.org, has the figure currently at 59.8 percent.)
Prediction markets mimic stock market and deploy much the same software. Where a real market trades shares in an underlying asset, in a prediction market it is future outcomes which are “securitized”. The key principle at work is the sage market wisdom that “the price of a stock captures all the information known about it” – that is, all information is factored into the price (notwithstanding that some may have more or better information than others; some may be acting more wisely on their information). Therefore price is our guide to the cumulative knowledge of all participants and, in prediction markets, this “price discovery” allows us to know what most people think the future holds. They allow the “the wisdom of crowds” to be turned to a future problem, and tapped.
Serious Success
What’s exciting about all this is its success rate. Prediction markets are amazingly accurate in many circumstances, and by all accounts consistently beat more conventional quantitative and extrapolative methods. Prediction markets have consistently out-predicted election opinion polls and exit polls. Of course the predictive potential goes way beyond polling. Forecasting markets can and have been set up to predict the dollar movements to the success of same-sex marriage legislation, to who will win best actor Oscar. At one point there was even a US government market in future terror targets (trying to elicit public predictions of likely targets so as to plan accordingly) but this was deemed inappropriate and taken down.
As it has become clear that this method outstrips conventional forecasting methods, prediction markets have taken root in forward-looking businesses. Companies such as Google and Hewlett-Packard routinely use (internal) prediction markets to forecast sales figures, customer preferences, product adoption, and so on. HP is on the record as saying prediction markets consistently outperform their official forecasts.
The method has other advantages too. First, it requires no special techniques or expense. There are no fancy models to apply or complex algorithms to … to do whatever one does with such things. Second the forecasts are available in real time, all the time, and constantly update themselves. There’s no waiting for data collectors to collect, or statisticians to emerge with their answers.
The Limits
In my book, Future Savvy, I show how and why humans are poor at predicting, for dozens of reasons. The record of predicting is littered with failure. But, is that now all in the past? Do prediction markets solve the perennial problem of predicting the future, or at least get us closer? Yes and no.
Yes where prediction markets are appropriate. They work best under two conditions: first where there is a clear view of the options and operating conditions; second (related) where the time frame predicted is relatively short, usually under 18 months depending how fast things are moving. Where predicting the future means choosing between known alternatives, such as an election winner, or anticipating a point along a known continuum, for example the level of next year’s sales, prediction markets are great.
Where prediction markets run dry is in dealing with unfamiliar conditions, or unknown variables, or potential game-changing disjunctures in the world. Where the future is seriously fuzzy, where there are many variables, and the way they interact unknown, and drivers, blockers, and lags are hidden, prediction markets are of limited use because the outcomes can’t be framed adequately so that people can bet on them or against them. A prediction market for US president in 2012 would be far less useful than 2008. Similarly, while a market for the oil price in 2009 would be helpful, by 2010 or beyond factors driving the price may be so different (viz. developments in sustainable energy or geopolitics) that the result of a prediction market conducted in 2008 would be undependable.
So while prediction markets sort out probabilities between known likelihoods, they are not adequate to the task of investigating complex situations where we cannot frame the likely outcomes, or at least can’t know if we’ve framed them right. Also while prediction markets do help us, on aggregate, avoid some perceptual/cognitive fallacies, they are as likely as any other predictive tool to fall into the Zeitgeist effect. More on this soon…
A good list of articles on prediction markets is available here: http://www.midasoracle.org/best/
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Aug 7, 2008 in all, foresight tools & methods, horizon scanning, scenario planning, trend tracking
I was interviewed at length about scenario building by a foresight firm in the UK a few weeks back. They took notes (more than I deserved, no doubt) and here they are, below.
In the notes, which are typed live and necessarily brief, I’m “AG”. The others are participants asking questions and making comments…
1. First, what do you use scenario planning for?
Initially stated everyone did scenario planning, every time you find yourself doing something unusual it implies you’ve done something wrong with scenario planning. We think about the future all the time, constantly making scenarios in head, if move to London think about what need to earn, where live, family, critical uncertainties. We run forward, think about various challenges, we rehearse the future.
CL wondered about ill thought through scenarios?
AG felt it was inevitable that people will disagree. End of day scenarios boil down to politics. Visionary scenario planning gets everyone talking – firstly need to find common threads (if not grounds), that most buy into – even if it is a low common denominator, thus creating a shared vision, then dystopias, but remember the end point is never total agreement.
RS Acknowledgment of importance of politics? Is that your experience of foresight?
AG believes he is a political animal, but no longer involved in protest. Belief is power is absolutely important when thinking about the future. He then amends it to power and money – as often groups without power have public opinions so they can shape the future. There is a danger that they only talk about market forces and technology and that’s it.
RS Is it a struggle working with other foresight groups – is that view not shared?
AG says they can give a shared opinion, but politics mostly overlooked by the groups
RS describes that we all have a political agenda (social inclusion, voices excluded) within this project – it makes it interesting to deal with those who have an economic/gov background, it’s difficult to pretend futures neutral.
2. Could you talk me through a brief overview of your scenario planning method? (How long does each stage take? What preparation is required for each stage? How many people are involved in each step?)
There is an underlying method – but each stage has some degree of flexibility and can use a variety of methods.
A. Handshaking stage
Firstly deciding what you’re doing, basic project stuff – who’s involved, what resources, what deliverables – key is choosing method and who’s involved, may have varying degree of democracy – heads or grass roots, be inter disciplinary or not, have a broad or narrow focus, and what type of input is required. Believes it needs to have mixed agenda. Note that relying totally on academics is bad.
Then you need to decide the dates your final scenarios will relate to – further in the future the more radical but less relevant to other people and harder to action. Most future scenarios are around 10 years ahead – as a rule not less than 5 or more than 20.
To decide the focus you must:
1) Drive management team towards understanding how much influence they have over the future, can they drive future or does external events influence them? Percentage, never exact but idea.
2) Based on the amount of control can decide if creating a visionary scenario or anticipatory (not good word) scenario building. Visionary trying to develop an idea, multiple stakeholders get shared ideal, easier if pressure group, one organisation, as they can develop enrich and jump on to focusing on how we would put this into practice. They create a vision and dystopia. Influence future (money, opinion etc).
In anticipatory, or “Businessy type scenario”, participants don’t mind how things turn out, what they want is to be successful in the world however it turns out. Within organisation goal is to anticipate broad set of possible worlds, particularly critical uncertainties. So they do have research scenarios and different takes on how things emerge, BUT no preferred future. Look at resource and competence so they may have preferences but can adapt. To same extent they look at legacy competencies but this is not a determining factor. Scope alternatives and plan.
The Handshaking stage takes a few meetings to do, small with key meeting, then larger with various stakeholders – perhaps half a day.
In terms of materials one could send out stimulating piece to encourage thought so not stone cold but which doesn’t colour the agenda. Could also have to read a synopsis of what the process is about and the sort of things to think about and expect.
B. Horizon scanning
There are 100s of ways of doing this. Basically need to go into world and do research on what’s going on in key dimensions, technology, markets – broad scan of world relevant to issue area, bring in people outside of own industry. Best tool in this area is “learning journey” – jazzy word for anthropology of own society, structured agenda for talking to people about concerns, what they know, what they’d like, focusing on future – so need to be carefully done to avoid reiteration of now or what they think you want to hear.
Note that you can commission this – but it is not market research.
No answer to how long, dependent on time and resources, but should budget third of total time.
C. Pulling it together
Mulch through the data gathered – preferably in funky creative meetings, collate, output into things like forces, drivers of change, trends, blockers of change, critical uncertainties. What comes out is a picture of world that’s relevant to us.
This activity could be whole group or just the scenario developing team – it’s to pull out what’s important.
The format could be something like workshop, sleep/gap, then another half day or so.
D. Separating critical from predetermined
This could require a Mini Delphi, talk to experts to find out what are the sorts of things in forces of change list that are predetermined – so things we know will happen in 2020, perhaps the number of students, or trends to sustainability.
The various issues will have lifecycles in being a key focus, they’ll always be there but the amount of interest will vary, eg sustainability. In the future sustainability will be less of a concern, but not less important, it will just be integrated into our expectations we won’t focus on it. An example relating to education is how we’ve shifted views on punishment; it was a stick, then detentions, then exclusion…
[Divergent conversation about the failure to correctly predict overpopulation – they just extrapolated – AG argues it was not a failed forecast, just bad forecasting - a failed forecast is interlocked bad assumptions. There was a discussion whether carbon credits will have the same results.]
E. Question all assumptions/Test lists
Note: This stage might highlight the need for more research or stakeholder engagement.
The goal is to end up with two lists that rank for importance. One is about predetermined things – things that we are sure about for our purposes – note that we may, or may not, need to talk about them. Then there are uncertainties (anything we can’t clarify with further research). They are sometimes called “strategic uncertainties”.
F. Create scenarios
These lists form basis of scenarios, they allow us to try out alternate resolutions of the unknowns. AG hates the 2 by 2 matrix approach (from Boston management), but it is sometimes a useful tool. Shell use a fork in the road approach, or possibly a roundabout, where there are clear alternatives. For example, they know sustainability will happen but they have various scenarios predicting the demand for resources. [RS comments that Shell also have a trilemma approach, so deal with three worries.]
More generally scenarios are structured round uncertainties. The van der Heijden approach is to list things and tell stories – NEEDS creative facilitators. He has a pack of cards which people develop stories around. Each group is given part of the puzzle to resolve. Basically you need judgement to choose how.
The groups then write stories and the facilitator ensures the scenarios cover the cone of plausible uncertainties. Note there must be multiple scenarios, a single story is not helpful.
The creation of scenarios will take a minimum of 2 days to talk through, write, draw or tell.
Note: Jump scenarios are conversations over a day. There is no learning journey and it’s hard work for the facilitator. The result is paragraphs rather than stories. These are good for management to emphasis the alternatives and broaden thinking
G. Check and test scenarios
Vital outside people criticise. What could and would work? This stakeholder analysis is meant to be a practical exercise.
H. Put them out
Visioning scenarios (including preferred outcome) get published, they need to get folks on board. Business ones tend to be more internal.
Then test existing strategic agenda within scenarios. They’re a test bed for strategy and choices. How would things work?
Or backcast using the scenarios – so how to reach or avoid scenarios.
AG keen to promote that there needs to be standards, just like testing a pram, you need to exhaust all the things that could happen before it gets its kite mark.
[There was a conversational aside over the time spent on this. AG worried not enough time spent using them and that politics will block change – “if broke don’t fix it”. People need to be desperate to be receptive.]
3. Do you use any tools for scenario planning? If so, can you briefly describe them?
Classic management tools – so getting people to communicate, being experienced based.
4. Are any of those tools online?
Nothing practical is online but there are resources and case studies (see his website). Although then amended that can do Delphi online. Note that learning journey is not market research, not supposed to be investigating people’s mental models – “good foresight is not predictive”.
5. What scenario planning tools would you ideally like to have available?
Something that follows stages explaining steps, timelines, who’s involved, explaining predetermined and uncertainties when listing – basically scaffolding.
6. If time was restricted for a scenario planning exercise, which parts would you keep because they’re the most important?
Would go through all stages (tick all boxes) but go lightly on some. However the less knowledge bought in the more focus on facilitation. The key is to get people to develop interesting motivating diverse stories appropriate to their needs.
7. What tools or approach would you recommend if a non-expert wanted to do scenario planning?
When asked AG said that don’t need a facilitator but would do better if had one. They focus the time and can support the whole process – not just when in workshops. Those involved aren’t experts and have a stake in the present so they’re going to struggle to change their minds.
When asked if it could be done alone AG said yes, BUT that it would be better if one could do at least step G, testing scenarios, with others.
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Jul 17, 2008 in 2015, all, emerging technologies, failed predictions, forecast filtering, innovation, systems dynamics, technology change
I was at the recent Media Futures Conference 2008 in London where a lively cross-section of delegates spent their time – as to be expected, this is the topic-du-jour – pondering the impact of social networking-based “citizen journalism” on the traditional media. In the era where everyone can “publish” all the time, what is the role and purpose of, for example, the BBC? As major news sites are scrambling to allow reader’s views, or eyewitness pictures and so forth, do they become dissolved in a sea of chat, blog, and tweet?
I don’t think so. There are many new communication modes to explore as established media outlets get to grips with the micro-publishing and social networking technological possibilities and consumer preferences, but the fear that traditional journalism or traditional media is “under threat” is, to me, overblown. Yes, anyone can publish news and views anytime, but most strive to put their 2c worth on the media sites associated with the major newspaper and electronic media brands. Why? To benefit from (a) the visibility, that is, presence of many readers, and (b) the editorial quality – the brand promise – of the established media outlet. A submitted picture that is seen, for example, on The Guardian site, is worth a thousand pictures on mynonameblog.com. This is all-the-more true if the publication editors flag readers attention to the citizen journo contribution: giving it an editorial stamp of approval.
The power of hubbing has been talked about a lot, not least by management guru Michael Porter, and there can be no doubting the reinforcing feedback loop at work in hubs. In this case, where more readers are that’s where more writer-contributors want to be, which makes the hub more valuable to readers, etc. What’s most valuable to readers in a world of a billion potential journalists? Little doubt it is what has always been valuable to readers, that is, the activities of editors providing oversight and quality control: filtering, choosing, framing and balancing information and viewpoints. Any content that is not subject to oversight is, well, just someone yapping.
From origination to “hubbing”
What will surely happen to the main media outlets is that the percentage of own-originated content will go down as the percentage of publicly contributed content goes up. They will have to adjust their game to include wider information quality management. In addition to providing what they always have (quality and timely and relevant content) they will need to be able to function less as own-content originators and more as hubs – providing editorial-quality oversight and therefore attracting many readers in the virtuous-cycle spoken of above. But they will still be in business, and still in essentially the same business of information collection, editorial processing and oversight.
The citizen journalist may effect what the media outlets says and does – for example by providing evidence that must be included in a story – but this does not change the balance of power. The value of the editorial oversight and synthesis is higher than ever. This is what branded media providers offer and the citizen journalist cannot. The principle of anticipating the future here is this: where a service provides a value, the service-provider will continue to exist into the future. Nothing has changed in the value of editorial oversight, in fact, it is more valuable than ever. That’s why major media outlets will be part of the future.
This is not to say the current major media brands will survive – they may well miss or mismanage the transition to information quality hub function – and fold, as brands or as companies, as new ones emerge. The general news brands may also, over time give way to narrower topic niche brands. But the concept of a centralized quality-enforcing media hub is not dissolving into citizen yapping any time soon.
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Jul 15, 2008 in 2015, 2025, all, emerging technologies, failed predictions, forecast filtering, horizon scanning, lifestyles & values, managing uncertainty, Perils of Prediction, politics of the future, social change, strategic foresight, technology change, trend tracking
In planning seminars and discussions about the future, a key topic is inevitably “technology change.” Participants will turn to each other, or perhaps to industry research or techno-tracking Web sites or “technology roadmaps” to consider technology changes in their industry and in the world at large, and how this may change the future.
So far so good. Tracking technology change is an important stage in scanning the external environment and anticipating sources or change and/or disruption. But no technology ever changed itself. History is littered with fabulous mind-bending, world-changing technologies that didn’t make it out of the lab. In fact, technologies only change because humans or human institutions want them to change AND (two separate hurdles here) they allow them to change.
Most people, most of the time, want technologies to change because they change for the better, improving products and services and/or making them cheaper. Companies want new technologies because improvements offer new sales options and (sometimes) industry competitive advantage, among other things. Societies express the desire for technology to go forward by stimulating and facilitating change in many ways (for example through government or industry funding of R&D or protecting intellectual property or making capital markets more transparent.)
Technology filtered by human choice
Once a technology breakthrough emerges, that’s hardly the end of the story. In fact it is still very much the beginning. New technologies of any importance are subject to public scrutiny and choices. Individually, or as a society, we ask ourselves, is this technology good for us? Debates happen, and power and politics and regulation takes its course, but one way or another technologies that most people like – mobile phone’s for example – will go forward while technologies such as GMOs will stall. Also, in a market economy, technologies are inescapably subject to consumer economics: those that raise user benefit (pass a buyer;s cost-benefit analysis) will be adopted. Those that don’t sit in the lab.
In other words, technology possibility is a matter of science and engineering, and the possibility frontier is expanding all the time, but the road from possibility to actuality is the rocky road of human ideas, preferences, and choices. Technology change means technology adoption, that is, it is a form of social change.
Why is this distinction important? Because one of the main reasons forecast fail is they see the technology possibility frontier as the future, underestimating the forces of social triage. There are two sites that I love that illustrate this wonderfully. Check out Paleo-Future (A Look into the Future that Never Was) and Modern Mechanics (Yesterday’s Tomorrow Today). Both are crammed with failed forecasts of this type. This is not to say that we cannot forecast usefully – much more to come on this in this journal – but it does give us pause in viewing many of today’s techno-inspired forecasts which make the same type of error. (Pics credit to the sites mentioned.)
Posted by Adam Gordon on Jul 11, 2008 in 2015, 2025, all, failed predictions, forecast filtering, foresight tools & methods, Future Savvy, managing uncertainty, Perils of Prediction, strategic foresight, technology change, trend tracking
This is a how-to book: how to evaluate predictions about the future – how to assess which ones are credible and/or how credible they are (how likely the future will turn out similar to the prediction). It is not just a guide to bad forecasts, it is also about how to identify and extract what is valuable in any forecast. This benefits readers who are required to manage professional or personal situations that depend on correctly anticipating change. Whatever we want to achieve – help a company be more profitable – solve the world’s problems – develop their career – success depends on a good reading of the future. There are many guides to the future (predictions) but no guides to the guides. This book fills that gap. It helps readers assess predictions so they can make better judgments about the future for themselves and their organizations.
Decision success always implies congruence between decisions and the world in which those decisions play out. If we decide today to launch a product, buy a house, study for a degree, build a new light rail system, or take any similar decision of significance, the environment of tomorrow will be a key factor in the success or failure of that decision. What we do will be tested by the future conditions that emerge. Where there is a good “fit” between the initiative and the environment it plays out in — “the right product at the right time” — we can expect success. If not, we should expect to fail. Our decisions are only as good as the view of the future they rest on. All opportunities and successes and profits are realized in the future. All threats, failures, and losses are in the future.
In a fast-moving world, we know that the future environment will be different to that of today in big or small ways. New technologies, market shifts, changes in legislation, or evolving social values damage or destroy the traditional good fit we have between ourselves and the world. To achieve “future fit” we therefore use forecasts to position ourselves and our organizations, creating (or renewing) the fit between our initiatives and environment. In some cases we may be strong enough also to influence future events and outcomes for our own future benefit, and forecasts help us do this too.
All enterprises benefit from narrowing down what they must adapt to and plan for – all effort spent preparing for a future that will not emerge is a waste of personal or organizational resources. Good forecasts are a key ingredient in limiting the vagaries of uncertainty, and therein working smarter not harder, avoiding surprises, exploiting new opportunities and plugging weaknesses in fitting in with the future, and where possible influencing the future to suit the organization. This is true not only of business. People and institutions of all types position themselves for success by anticipating and adapting to events, or shaping them. Whether it is an NGO raising money for developing-world children, an urban planner advocating a light rail system, a homeowner deciding to sell a house, or a student making a career choice, identical principles apply — a higher-quality reading of the future operating environment in which these decisions will play out is what separates winners from losers. We should all be vitally concerned with forecasts as we are all effectively betting significant resources on their validity.
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Jul 9, 2008 in 2015, 2025, all, decision-making, failed predictions, forecast filtering, foresight tools & methods, Future Savvy, horizon scanning, leadership, managing uncertainty, Perils of Prediction, scenario planning, strategic foresight, strategic planning, systems dynamics, technology change, trend tracking
The book Future Savvy shows readers how to critically judge forecasts for themselves. These are the chapters that take the reader there:
Chapter 1: Recognizing Forecast Intentions, deals with considerations of how forecasts come about, who makes them, and with what intention. Those who research and produce forecasts, those who invest in understanding trends and drivers of change, and those (including the media) who bring the forecasts and their implications to our attention, inevitably have reasons for doing so – to benefit from the knowledge by seizing opportunities or avoiding threats or by affecting outcomes in the world. Understanding a forecast’s “return on investment” gives us an important vantage point in assessing the merits of a forecast.
Chapter 2: The Quality of Information, shows how a forecast communicates information between forecaster and reader subject to the same standards of accuracy, truth-telling, and bias-control by which one would judge any communication. Forecasts can be very different in methods and goals, but all forecasts lay claim to factual truth, particularly truth in the data, and the argument deals with the various ways in which data can be less solid than it looks, even with the best intentions.
Chapter 3: Interpretation and Bias, considers how data – whether good or bad in itself – can be interpreted or misinterpreted in forecasting, that is, the “political” aspects of forecasting. Just as there is no value-free look at history, so too there is no value-free look to the future and asking the right questions allows us be ready to mentally rebalance forecasts that are presented.
Chapter 4: Paradigms and Perception, investigates how predictive statements are exposed to a broader form of interpretive bias that has to do with the forecaster’s mental model or “paradigm,” and the “zeitgeist” (spirit of the times) when the forecast is made. This chapter investigates situations where forecast failure is caused by failure to escape society’s current mental models – which often do not hold through the forecast period.
Chapter 5: The Utility Principle, considers economic and market forces, and the role of consumers, in promoting or resisting the future. Without reigning in creative thinking, some simple economic filters inevitably apply direction or timing realism to futurist flights of fancy.
Chapter 6: Drivers, Blockers, and Trends, consider drivers and blockers of change, and how viewing these dynamics improves forecast assessment. It identifies the roles of Drivers, Enablers, Friction, and Blockers acting on events to cause change or resist it, and problems in dumbly projecting current trends.
Chapter 7: The Limits of Quantitative Analysis, discusses the role of statistical analysis and quantitative modeling in predicting the future – where this is possible and useful and where it is not, and why not.
Chapter 8: The Systems Perspective, investigates “system effects,” which occur whenever different elements or variables that may appear isolated are in fact linked together, such that changes in one element cause changes in others. Anticipating future behavior of any variable hinges on identifying the broader systemic elements influencing it and failing to do this is a big part of what causes forecasts to fail.
Chapter 9: Living with Alternative Futures, investigates non-predictive ways of approaching change – where the tone is more about managing uncertainty than predicting the future. It acknowledges unfathomable complexity of most future questions and provides perspectives that raise chances of success in an inherently unpredictable future.
Chapter 10: Forecast Filtering in Action, illustrates the processes of the book by applying them in case studies to real-world sample forecasts that decision makers in business and policy areas might find themselves interacting with. This demonstrates how real everyday predictive material may be probed and critically evaluated, following the principles developed in previous chapters.
Chapter 11: A Forecast Filtering Checklist, is a cross-cutting checklist which summarizes the principles of the book in one convenient, thematic list.
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Jun 27, 2008 in all, Future Savvy
Predictive statements are all around us: in the newspapers, on TV, at conference presentations, in industry reports, consulting documents, think tank studies, and so on. All claim to be valid, but the record shows that many are not. This book is about how to critically interact with and evaluate forecasts. It’s a how-to book for policy people and managers, specifically, how to judge whether a forecast is valid or not, or under what conditions it can be depended on. It is written to help decision makers in commercial, policy, and nonprofit sectors, as well as ordinary people in daily life, make better judgments about predictions they read and hear, so they can appropriately plan for and profit from the future.
Obvious background to all this is that rapid change is a constant, ubiquitous feature of our lives. Important changes across society, technology, institutions, and products and services are constantly occurring. But the future is not merely interesting, it is competitive: the earlier and clearer we see future circumstances, the better we will be able to benefit by changing our current recipes for success – to keep up with the changes in the world. The better managers’ view of the future, the better their decisions will turn out to be. So, change matters, and managers in business or policy realms have to correctly anticipate change. And therefore they turn to and depend on predictions of others. One might say that forecasts are a crucial decision-success resource. But these forecasts are often badly done or done with a purpose to influence the future (that is, not just to predict it). Therefore decision-makers need to be able to judge how good a forecast is – so as to know how to or whether to factor it into their world view. Managers need to be able to critically judge predictive statements to be able determine which ideas are worth taking seriously – worth planning for and investing in.
The book sets out to communicate tools and approaches that the forecast consumer can use to filter and evaluate statements about the future, and thus judge what the real threats and opportunities are. It summarizes and orders the problems common in forecasting, as well as best practices, so that managers and decision makers of all types may be better able to critically interact with the barrage of forecasts that compete for their attention and resources and discriminate between worthy and unworthy ones.
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