Future Savvy: Quality in Foresight

One of the benefits of scenario-based future thinking is the ‘permission’ to think through alternative future outcomes without necessarily predicting them. ‘Predictors’ focus, by contrast, on isolating the highest probability future in order not to have to think through or plan for less likely outcomes.

Predictions of the dollar’s demise are as old as the greenback itself of course, but over recent weeks the specter of the dollar heading way way below its trading range — a dollar crunch — has entered the zone of the credible, or, in scenario terms, the ‘cone of plausible uncertainty.’ That means decision-makers with lots at stake are taking it seriously.

Like the British pound, the dollar has been under a cloud due to perceptions of economic fallout from the credit crunch and global recession, but particular questions about the US currency have recently surfaced, driven by reports [Robert Fisk's 'The Demise of the Dollar' story in The Independent (Oct 6)]  that “Gulf Arabs are planning – along with China, Russia, Japan and France – to end dollar dealings for oil, moving instead to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan, the euro, gold and a new, unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council” (Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar).

The subtext is far from merely financial. Practically, it would mean that on any day, the real cost of oil to US consumers and businesses would go up or down depending on the strength of the currency. This is something America is not used to. But, more deeeply, dropping dollar-denomination of oil is a direct shot across the bows of Washington’s say over oil affairs, and the hegemony of the dollar as the dominant global reserve currency.

De-dollarizing oil would not in itself push the US currency below its 25-year range. But it is portentous of the clear trend to a genuinely multi-power world, for better or worse, in which the dollar will get no favors. That will push the dollar down, at least while the news and fallout make their way through the financial and real economic systems.

Rumors of de-dollarization have been hotly denied, as further reported here, but as the Independent points out, denials are to be expected, and are always issued in these situations. They mean nothing. Even cub reporters know that.

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Scenario thinking

What’s particularly interesting to me is that a ’scenario’ of dollar demise has become not only plausible in the mainstream view of the future, but scenario thinking is being used as a way to consider the nature of this outcome, and how best to respond without predicting the outcome either way. As recently as directly pre-credit crunch, the media question would have been: ‘what is the best prediction for the dollar (or the housing market, or credit default swaps?) and that, rather then scoping out the implications of the lesser-likelihood, would have dominated the discussion.

So, what struck me forcefully in the Business Week video interview above, where BW Chief Economist Mike Mandel interviews the news magazine’s Economics Editor Peter Coy (see Coy’s underlying story here), is how the less-likely, non-predicted, but very significant outcome is actively addressed:

Says Coy: “It’s so hard to know what the dollar is going to do. We don’t argue that we know… what we do is we say, ‘it could happen’ and let’s take that possibility seriously, in the same way we should have taken the possibility of falling housing prices seriously…”

This is not formal scenario-building of course. But it is, fundamentally an adoption of the framework, saying in the classic ’scenarios’ way: “we can’t predict if it will happen or it won’t, but if it does it will have significant impact. So let’s just ask: ‘what if ‘ it does and explore the outcomes and our responses. What will the word look like? What would be the implications, the knock-ons and spinoffs? If it comes to pass, what would be wish we had done today?”

Perhaps failing to predict the credit crunch has dented predictors’ halos enough to cause a mini-zeitgeist-shift towards the only real way to cope with important uncertainty: exploring all outcomes that pass the plausibility and significance test, whether or not we actually believe they will happen.

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Apocalyptic predictions are designed to be wrong. The point of doing them, as with “1984,” “Brave New World,” “When the Wind Blows,” etc., is to raise consciousness to negative outcomes and engender action so that the prediction, by succeeding in purpose makes itself incorrect in fact. “The Age of Stupid” is this all over. See the trailer here:

There is also a documentary about how the movie was funded and made.

Set in 2055, post the environmental global climate change collapse, it features last-man-on-earth (Pete Postlethwaite) as an archivist in a tower refuge somewhere in the Arctic north of Norway sifting through records of human life before it was wiped out, trying to find out why people did nothing to stop the eco-catastrophe that was imminent. The plot device allows filmmaker Franny Armstrong, (director of McLibel, 2005, about environmentalists who successfully challenged McDonalds) to showcase a selection of real reportage and news clips from today to withering effect. Like any good scenario it gives granularity: dates, names, actions, timelines. It points fingers and mentally readies the reader-watcher to act.

By all accounts this is a punchier movie than Al Gore-fronted “An Inconvenient Truth (2006),” and punchy is what is required to effect the goals of a future-influencing forecasting, that is, an assault on the powers that be and/or on public complacency.

By the way, if you want to see the best activist consciousness-raising movie (ever!) see Pete Postlethwaite in the anti-Thatcherite “Brassed Off.”

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I’ve been quite careful not to use this blog as a “brag wall” for Future Savvy. I can say reviewers have all been glowing, without exception. But this review, below, which recently appeared in the St Andrews Management Institute’s Vector Magazine, I felt was worth reposting here because – more than just saying nice things – it also captures the essence of what the book is trying to do. Here it is:

Book reviews by SAMI fellows and associates
“Future Savvy” by Adam Gordon (American Management Association, 2009)

“Forecasts and predictions are ubiquitous. We are bombarded with views of the future on a plethora of subjects from myriad sources, with a diverse set of motivations and self-interests. Adam Gordon seeks to provide a practical users guide to the assessment and interpretation of all things about the future, with special emphasis on the cautions and ‘health warnings’ that need to be applied, so as not to be misled by forecasts. However, the author is careful not to veer towards over-cynical dismissal of all future projections; rather, he seeks to provide guidance to the reader on how to apply the necessary caveats, and in the author’s words “profit from change”.

The book covers a very broad field, from the basic issues of the misuse of data and statistics, covering the quality and validity of data as well as their misinterpretation, through technology forecasting, trend and horizon scanning to quantitative modelling and scenarios. The one theme common to all these activities is the need to be alert to bias, whether it be a deliberate motive to influence behaviour through a dire prediction; or a bias inherent in futurologists needing to see rapid and pervasive change in all areas of society – if it exists or not – and evangelising it.

The track record of much futurology is mixed. Well-known examples are quoted: television did not lead to the end of the cinema industry. Nor has space exploration led to people taking foreign holidays on other planets – yet! Bias may also lie in the beholder. The ‘Zeitgeist’ tendency, whereby we are all influenced by contemporary perceptions, affects not only how “experts” and professionals see the world, but also how the audience receives the views of the future – often with unprepared minds. The internal “official future” of an organisation can pose a real blind spot to its progress.

The weaknesses of much quantitative modelling are highlighted, with such forecasts only being as good as the assumptions on which they are based, but which are often not overtly stated. In contrast to the conceptual and practical errors inherent in much futures output, the role and advantages of scenario planning are emphasised as a tool for challenging assumptions and developing alternative futures: “It’s better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong”.

The penultimate chapter takes examples of relatively recent forecasts from a range of organisations, whose subjects range from US agricultural production to UK dementia sufferers. These are subjected to a form of ‘retro wind-tunnelling’ to illustrate the deficiencies in their construction and how they would have benefited from the application of methodologies described earlier in the book. The final chapter provides a summary checklist, or framework, to apply in evaluating forecasts and future predictions.

Adam Gordon has written a shrewd and perceptive book that deserves a wide readership, especially among managers in both the private and public sectors, as well as the familiar ‘general reader’. Those wishing a more detailed technical guide to the various forecasting and futurist methodologies will need to consult other standard works. Professionals in the fields of management and strategy consulting and scenario practitioners might well be familiar with many of the points made in the book. However, those with some savvy might do well to recommend the book to their clients.

Michael Owen, 20 April 2009

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There’s been a storm in the past few days over Amazon.com excluding “adult” books from its sales rankings. Among the almost 60,000 books affected was not just Erotica. Feminist books, Gay & Lesbian titles, and books in Health, Mind & Body, and Reproductive & Sexual Medicine also disappeared from the rankings

Amazon the new Wal-Mart? pic:Huffington Post

According to yesterday’s LA Times Amazon says the whole thing was a cataloging error. But when author Mark Probst had previously contacted Amazon for an explanation, he got this: “In consideration of our entire customer base, we exclude “adult” material from appearing in some searches and best seller lists.”

Aside: Everyone is trying to figure out what Twitter is good for, or how it will be used, and it has become clear that one application is to quickly aggregate mass protest, evidenced in the anti-Amazon outrage, see Twitter “Amazonfail.”

Author Maya Reynolds has been connecting the dots in the future of publishing, watching Amazon move via acquisitions such as Abe Books, Audible, BookFinder, BookSurge, Brilliance Audio, FillZ, GoJaba, Library Thing, Mobipocket and Shelfari.

She is among various industry watchers who claim, with fair evidence, that Amazon is following a “Wal-Mart” strategy – the well-documented essence of which is to gain enough retailer power to be able to pressure suppliers (telling them what to make or what to charge, or exacting special discounts) to achieve better retail prices and get more retailer power, in a reinforcing spiral which, inter alia, squeezes all the healthy mom-’n-pop-shop diversity and other balances of power out of the industry.

In a post of July 08 she paints the full dystopia scenario:
“1. First, the smaller presses, POD presses and e-publishers will disappear as Amazon’s margins squeeze them out of business. Amazon will help the process along by offering better terms to authors if they will use BookSurge’s POD press and Kindle’s e-book to publish. Even if authors don’t embrace Amazon initially, as their publishers go out of business, they will be forced to do so.
“2. Brick-and-mortar stores have two constraints which Amazon does not: (1) limited shelf space and (2) a limited geographic range. Bookstores carry books “on spec,” filling their shelves with stock they hope readers will seek. Amazon, on the other hand, has unlimited virtual shelf space and unlimited geographic reach. Amazon does not have to warehouse stock. They can wait until a book is actually ordered and the money is in hand before using a digital file and BookSurge to print the book. Because they cannot match the deep discounts Amazon offers, bricks-and-mortar bookstores–already under siege–will be squeezed out of existence.
“3. Like Wal-Mart, Amazon will continue to apply pressure on publishers to give more favorable terms. Wal-Mart’s suppliers used cheaper materials and out-sourced to cheaper overseas labor. As the publishing houses’ profit margins are squeezed, their cost-cutting efforts will take three directions: (1) Focus even more attention on signing best-selling authors whose work is guaranteed to sell; (2) Begin to pressure their mid-list authors to accept lower advances and lower royalty percentages; and (3) Sign fewer and fewer new authors because of the uncertainty and the expense of growing a new writer.

Where will they go?

“4. Mid-list authors and new authors, unable to either find a publisher or unwilling to accept the low royalties, will seek to self-publish. Where will they go? Since, by that time, most of the self-publishing houses will have gone out of business, they will go to Amazon’s BookSurge or to Amazon’s e-book division, Kindle. Amazon will welcome them.
“5. The next death on the food chain will be the publishers and agents themselves. First the mid-level publishers will die. Well-known agents and the larger houses will be protected for a period of time by their best-selling authors who are loyal to them. However, as those cash cows die off, so will the agents and larger houses. A new paradigm will emerge: Amazon as both publisher and retailer.
“6. Eventually Amazon will have so much power, they will be able to decide WHAT is worthy of being published. Welcome to the future of publishing.”

Is this the future of publishing? The logic of unregulated industry power suggests it is. But Future Savvy says response – regulation – is also likely. As with Microsoft and many before them, when Amazon gets too powerful, anti-trust regulators should be in business. But only if their hand is pushed. Articulate and persuasive dystopias such as Reynolds’ are the single most powerful mechanism by which the word is spread (spread it! forward it, tweet it!) so that enough consumers get to see and believe threatening future outcomes early enough, and pressure regulators to act.

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Microsoft - Computer Electronics Show 2009

Product prototype communication is a close cousin of scenario building. Typically the company creates their product or service in action, in the future, being used by happy customers, their “preferred future” scenario. Prototype communication doesn’t typically build in alternative scenarios, the litmus test of strategy-based scenario work. It’s more a kite-flying exercise, designed to put out a future-oriented message to stakeholders and the public, garner broad feedback, and (if you’re powerful like Microsoft) put up “this-is-the-future-of-the-industry” markers.

Nevertheless, with the caveat that they are one among many plausible outcomes, product showcase scenarios can be an eye-opening guide to what’s actually possible and what the future will be like.

A newly released Microsoft “Future of Computing” video, showcased at CES 2009 in Las Vegas in the past few days, is an example. The 10-minute piece, presented by Janet Galore, Program Manger: Strategic Prototyping, takes us through a scenario of interactive education in the future (when, exactly, is not said but the implication is it’s not too far off) showing how participants would find, use, and share information across devices and across platforms.

What we see is a tablet PC that can communicate seamlessly with other electronics and interact with Web info on the fly. Okay nothing new there. What’s interesting is how it’s all held together by surface computing, a smart desk with a screen, which allows information to be viewed in the process of collaboration, sharing, and filing.  In some futurist fantasies it is thought that communication is ideally invisible (my phone e-handshakes your phone without me doing anything, etc.) But actually humans mostly seem to prefer to see what’s happening, and to have the choice to interact with what is happening while it’s happening – not least so they know what machines have done and don’t have to pull their hair out before they find their precious work buried four subdirectories into the Temp folder… sheesh. But I digress.

The scenario focuses on organizing and sharing multiple inputs, therein making a pretty clear statement about the future: what will be really valuable is not access to information anywhere, anytime (an assumed, table-stakes factor), but a way to share and collaborate with the information in an productive way. It refreshingly assumes that whiz-bang graphics – they are there too – are the easy stuff, but that collaboration and teamwork are the hard things to get right, and the truly valuable service given the chaos of billions of voices and trillions of data objects that pertain in any human-work future.

The other real strength of the prototype and related scenario is its close attention to natural (or, at least, strongly socialized, conventional, classic) human ways of doing things, which are slow to change, and therefore will change slowly. The smart desk is something one can really see oneself sitting around, because this is what we already do. Also this future of computing envisages no stylus, no mouse, no magic wand to master. Rather, we move digital stuff around the desk with our hands. We point to it and we shift it. That is, digital capability accommodates and interlaces with Stone Age human and organizational patterns. That’s why this view of the future is persuasive.

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One of the questions I’m asked a lot is whether Future Savvy would have helped to predict the credit crunch. My response, as in this INSEAD interview, has been that the book gives readers the tools to judge the merits of predictions, so wouldn’t have directly helped predict the financial crisis, but it would have been a key resource in drawing attention to the poor view of the future that bankers and regulators were acting on.

In many ways, focusing on whether “this” or “that” is predicted, or not predicted, is to put the cart before the horse. The horse is the adequacy of our approach to anticipating outcomes and the quality of our foresight as a whole. When this is good, the cart – not missing important changes – will follow.

Credit: http://www.lewrockwell.com/blog

In this, it’s important to realize that many did predict the financial crisis (as many predicted 9/11 in various ways). Sticking with the financial crunch for now: it has generally been portrayed it as a “why-didn’t-anyone-see-it-coming” event. It wasn’t. Hats off to The Times for their October 12 piece: “10 People Who Predicted the Financial Meltdown”. Allowing for a fairly loose definition of “predicted,” the article shows that among those who foresaw the crunch were: Vince Cable, deputy leader of the Liberal Democrats (2003); US congressman Ron Paul (2003); Stephen Roach, senior executive at Morgan Stanley (2004); Christopher Wood – chief strategist of a broking firm in the Asia-Pacific Market (2005); and Nouriel Roubini, economics professor at NYU (2006)… and there were many others.

A different problem

So this reframes the problem entirely. It’s not that the predictions were not there. It was that not enough people believed them and, particularly, important decision-makers didn’t believe them or didn’t have the institutional capacity to respond. So there are two halves to the problem: the ability to see the full spectrum of what may happen, including unexpected outcomes; and the ability to act on what we see. Quality in foresight work – the raison d’etre of Future Savvy – makes it possible to see more outcomes more clearly, and to act with more confidence in choosing what to prepare for. (In the real world we can’t prepare for every outcome.)

There was a good letter published in the FT from eminent futurist Peter Schwartz on December 2, which describes this very well. It shows predictions for what they are (one-horse scenarios), and how decision-makers are typically bound into inaction or wrong action not only by working on the basis of a wrong prediction, but by the predictive mindset itself. This mindset – the habit or culture of picking “one right answer” in the face of a complex situation with many competing outcomes, prematurely closes alternatives and leaves us open to surprise. As Schwartz says, as scenario planners have always said (and he was one of the people who defined the field in the first place), a compelling set of alternative future scenarios encourages decision-makers to recognize unlikely and unpopular outcomes, along with expected outcomes, and therefore to be able to respond earlier and more effectively whatever happens.

Scenarios also contribute to the “act” side of the problem. In a well-done set for the banking industry, a financial-meltdown scenario would at least have been in play, institutionalizing the consideration of less unlikely, less popular outcomes in company and government forums, forcing serious consideration of necessary strategies and contingencies, and therein creating the ability to act early and effectively without having predicted the crisis.

The letter is well worth quoting in full:

Sir, The real question regarding the financial crisis is not, as the Queen asked: “Why did nobody see this coming?” In fact, any number of thoughtful people in academia, politics and business had been compiling the data and sounding warnings for several years.
The question we should be asking is: “Why didn’t decision-makers believe that a global financial meltdown was increasingly likely and then act on that belief?” Or, to put it another way: “What would it take to make decision-makers both believe and act?”

The problem is that decision-makers believe that they are forced to pick one right answer: the most likely scenario. Their approach to decision-making does not afford them the opportunity to consider apparently low probability but highly consequential scenarios. The answer, therefore, to the “believe” half of the question is a decision-making process that considers several scenarios: compelling stories about alternative futures that incorporate the analysis of “outliers” and describe three or four plausible paths forward.
Good scenarios force decision-makers to challenge their own assumptions and reconsider what is possible. As a result, they can take seriously those scenarios that seemed less likely at first, but whose plausibility increases over time.

The second part of the question – “What would it take to act?” – is much harder to address. Suppose that Ben Bernanke or Hank Paulson had come to believe a year or two ago that the house of cards was about to collapse and trigger cascading, global failures. What would they have done, given the realities of the complex interconnected systems at the heart of the problem? Perhaps if they had good scenarios with appropriate indicators to start with, they could have rehearsed different strategies and contingencies. Importantly, these decision-makers could have used these scenarios to persuade others on all sides of the issue also to recognise the complexity of the impending crisis in a more timely way. It’s never easy to convince everyone around you that the game they have been playing to their great benefit is about to change. But with a shared recognition of the magnitude of the risks and the ways they might unfold, they could have acted far earlier to prevent some of the dire consequences that have occurred, let alone what is to come.

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Last week I ran a one-day workshop (view program blurb – item C9 – here) “How to Build and Use Scenarios” in the pre-conference courses at the WFS annual meeting in DC. We had 38 attendees and by all accounts much was learned (including by me of course).

This was a fairly typical example of the Intro Workshop in Scenarios program that I run, so I’ve decided to post it on SlideShare, see link below. Let me know what you think.

What is different about this course at this venue, particularly, is that the attendees come from a wide spectrum of industries and sectors (from Nestle strategist to the Canadian military planners, to Mauri sustainability experts, and beyond), and have a very wide background/preparation in futures tools and methods. There were relative experts in the room, and some absolute novices. … nothing like a challenge for the facilitator!

Slides from the day are at http://www.slideshare.net/adgo/how-to-build-and-use-scenarios-day-workshop

some pix:

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I was interviewed at length about scenario building by a foresight firm in the UK a few weeks back. They took notes (more than I deserved, no doubt) and here they are, below.
In the notes, which are typed live and necessarily brief, I’m “AG”. The others are participants asking questions and making comments…

1. First, what do you use scenario planning for?
Initially stated everyone did scenario planning, every time you find yourself doing something unusual it implies you’ve done something wrong with scenario planning. We think about the future all the time, constantly making scenarios in head, if move to London think about what need to earn, where live, family, critical uncertainties. We run forward, think about various challenges, we rehearse the future.

CL wondered about ill thought through scenarios?

AG felt it was inevitable that people will disagree. End of day scenarios boil down to politics. Visionary scenario planning gets everyone talking – firstly need to find common threads (if not grounds), that most buy into – even if it is a low common denominator, thus creating a shared vision, then dystopias, but remember the end point is never total agreement.

RS Acknowledgment of importance of politics? Is that your experience of foresight?
AG believes he is a political animal, but no longer involved in protest. Belief is power is absolutely important when thinking about the future. He then amends it to power and money – as often groups without power have public opinions so they can shape the future. There is a danger that they only talk about market forces and technology and that’s it.
RS Is it a struggle working with other foresight groups – is that view not shared?
AG says they can give a shared opinion, but politics mostly overlooked by the groups

RS describes that we all have a political agenda (social inclusion, voices excluded) within this project – it makes it interesting to deal with those who have an economic/gov background, it’s difficult to pretend futures neutral.

2. Could you talk me through a brief overview of your scenario planning method? (How long does each stage take? What preparation is required for each stage? How many people are involved in each step?)

There is an underlying method – but each stage has some degree of flexibility and can use a variety of methods.

A. Handshaking stage
Firstly deciding what you’re doing, basic project stuff – who’s involved, what resources, what deliverables – key is choosing method and who’s involved, may have varying degree of democracy – heads or grass roots, be inter disciplinary or not, have a broad or narrow focus, and what type of input is required. Believes it needs to have mixed agenda. Note that relying totally on academics is bad.
Then you need to decide the dates your final scenarios will relate to – further in the future the more radical but less relevant to other people and harder to action. Most future scenarios are around 10 years ahead – as a rule not less than 5 or more than 20.

To decide the focus you must:
1) Drive management team towards understanding how much influence they have over the future, can they drive future or does external events influence them? Percentage, never exact but idea.
2) Based on the amount of control can decide if creating a visionary scenario or anticipatory (not good word) scenario building. Visionary trying to develop an idea, multiple stakeholders get shared ideal, easier if pressure group, one organisation, as they can develop enrich and jump on to focusing on how we would put this into practice. They create a vision and dystopia. Influence future (money, opinion etc).
In anticipatory, or “Businessy type scenario”, participants don’t mind how things turn out, what they want is to be successful in the world however it turns out. Within organisation goal is to anticipate broad set of possible worlds, particularly critical uncertainties. So they do have research scenarios and different takes on how things emerge, BUT no preferred future. Look at resource and competence so they may have preferences but can adapt. To same extent they look at legacy competencies but this is not a determining factor. Scope alternatives and plan.
The Handshaking stage takes a few meetings to do, small with key meeting, then larger with various stakeholders – perhaps half a day.
In terms of materials one could send out stimulating piece to encourage thought so not stone cold but which doesn’t colour the agenda. Could also have to read a synopsis of what the process is about and the sort of things to think about and expect.

B. Horizon scanning
There are 100s of ways of doing this. Basically need to go into world and do research on what’s going on in key dimensions, technology, markets – broad scan of world relevant to issue area, bring in people outside of own industry. Best tool in this area is “learning journey” – jazzy word for anthropology of own society, structured agenda for talking to people about concerns, what they know, what they’d like, focusing on future – so need to be carefully done to avoid reiteration of now or what they think you want to hear.
Note that you can commission this – but it is not market research.
No answer to how long, dependent on time and resources, but should budget third of total time.

C. Pulling it together
Mulch through the data gathered – preferably in funky creative meetings, collate, output into things like forces, drivers of change, trends, blockers of change, critical uncertainties. What comes out is a picture of world that’s relevant to us.
This activity could be whole group or just the scenario developing team – it’s to pull out what’s important.
The format could be something like workshop, sleep/gap, then another half day or so.

D. Separating critical from predetermined
This could require a Mini Delphi, talk to experts to find out what are the sorts of things in forces of change list that are predetermined – so things we know will happen in 2020, perhaps the number of students, or trends to sustainability.
The various issues will have lifecycles in being a key focus, they’ll always be there but the amount of interest will vary, eg sustainability. In the future sustainability will be less of a concern, but not less important, it will just be integrated into our expectations we won’t focus on it. An example relating to education is how we’ve shifted views on punishment; it was a stick, then detentions, then exclusion…
[Divergent conversation about the failure to correctly predict overpopulation – they just extrapolated – AG argues it was not a failed forecast, just bad forecasting - a failed forecast is interlocked bad assumptions. There was a discussion whether carbon credits will have the same results.]

E. Question all assumptions/Test lists
Note: This stage might highlight the need for more research or stakeholder engagement.
The goal is to end up with two lists that rank for importance. One is about predetermined things – things that we are sure about for our purposes – note that we may, or may not, need to talk about them. Then there are uncertainties (anything we can’t clarify with further research). They are sometimes called “strategic uncertainties”.

F. Create scenarios
These lists form basis of scenarios, they allow us to try out alternate resolutions of the unknowns. AG hates the 2 by 2 matrix approach (from Boston management), but it is sometimes a useful tool. Shell use a fork in the road approach, or possibly a roundabout, where there are clear alternatives. For example, they know sustainability will happen but they have various scenarios predicting the demand for resources. [RS comments that Shell also have a trilemma approach, so deal with three worries.]
More generally scenarios are structured round uncertainties. The van der Heijden approach is to list things and tell stories – NEEDS creative facilitators. He has a pack of cards which people develop stories around. Each group is given part of the puzzle to resolve. Basically you need judgement to choose how.
The groups then write stories and the facilitator ensures the scenarios cover the cone of plausible uncertainties. Note there must be multiple scenarios, a single story is not helpful.
The creation of scenarios will take a minimum of 2 days to talk through, write, draw or tell.

Note: Jump scenarios are conversations over a day. There is no learning journey and it’s hard work for the facilitator. The result is paragraphs rather than stories. These are good for management to emphasis the alternatives and broaden thinking

G. Check and test scenarios
Vital outside people criticise. What could and would work? This stakeholder analysis is meant to be a practical exercise.

H. Put them out
Visioning scenarios (including preferred outcome) get published, they need to get folks on board. Business ones tend to be more internal.
Then test existing strategic agenda within scenarios. They’re a test bed for strategy and choices. How would things work?
Or backcast using the scenarios – so how to reach or avoid scenarios.
AG keen to promote that there needs to be standards, just like testing a pram, you need to exhaust all the things that could happen before it gets its kite mark.
[There was a conversational aside over the time spent on this. AG worried not enough time spent using them and that politics will block change – “if broke don’t fix it”. People need to be desperate to be receptive.]

3. Do you use any tools for scenario planning? If so, can you briefly describe them?

Classic management tools – so getting people to communicate, being experienced based.

4. Are any of those tools online?

Nothing practical is online but there are resources and case studies (see his website). Although then amended that can do Delphi online. Note that learning journey is not market research, not supposed to be investigating people’s mental models – “good foresight is not predictive”.

5. What scenario planning tools would you ideally like to have available?

Something that follows stages explaining steps, timelines, who’s involved, explaining predetermined and uncertainties when listing – basically scaffolding.

6. If time was restricted for a scenario planning exercise, which parts would you keep because they’re the most important?

Would go through all stages (tick all boxes) but go lightly on some. However the less knowledge bought in the more focus on facilitation. The key is to get people to develop interesting motivating diverse stories appropriate to their needs.

7. What tools or approach would you recommend if a non-expert wanted to do scenario planning?

When asked AG said that don’t need a facilitator but would do better if had one. They focus the time and can support the whole process – not just when in workshops. Those involved aren’t experts and have a stake in the present so they’re going to struggle to change their minds.

When asked if it could be done alone AG said yes, BUT that it would be better if one could do at least step G, testing scenarios, with others.

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I was struck by this picture

which is produced by a group called Squint/Opera, as part of a set of images of how London population would adapt to raised sea levels. The images, set in the year 2090, are on exhibition at the Medcalf Gallery in Clerkenwell, and the full set can be found here.

The “Flooded London 2090″ images are, of course, a scenario of the future. They evoke a time long after the impact of global warming / a rising sea has past. People have adapted and London is a tranquil utopia. It is not all bad – the rat race gone – swept away with other forms of current (2008) worldly obsessions in a kind of Noah’s flood. The world has become a slower, less complicated place.

As a piece of futures work there are various things to say. First of course, this is a scenario not a prediction. Nobody can predict 2090. Yet, as a scenario, with that intrinsic license to explore the margins of plausibility, it fabulously fulfils one of the primary functions of scenarios: to evoke a mental and possibly even an emotional response. Most scenarios – for example about global warming – are backed up by data and spreadsheets and citations (often necessary and correct) but these images tell the story in a somehow more direct and therefore compelling way, and the old adage a picture is worth 1000 words was never more apt. As all classic scenario analysts, from Pierre Wack to Peter Schwartz to … etc, say: a good scenario should provide a gentle jolt to management – forcing them to consider unexpected events and outcomes and prepare themselves mentally and practically to respond, and these images do that.

Scenarios: the artistic function
Now the question I pose myself – and anyone out there reading – is what is the relationship between scenario’s and art? Is the picture of the future that jolts – whether in a written narrative form or by pictures or film – not jolting in the same way as art does and for the same reason. Isn’t this the classic defamiliarization function of art (possibly mixed with social critique. Here of course it is not merely a warming about global warming that is being communicated, but also commentary about the pace of life, stress, time-crunch, and how this may not be so in the future. Everyone sees the future as more, faster, complexity. But maybe it is not.) Anyway, these images are a scenarios, and they are art, and all good scenarios should work in part “artistically” to defamiliarize the world as art does. (For background on Schklovsky and defamiliarization in art see here)

Squint/Opera is an interestingly multi-disciplinary group. It is a film and media studio that makes visualisations about the built environment, in their terms: “combining humour and narration with imaginative design, innovative visual effects and illustrative techniques.” A scenario firm, in other words, with apologies to the scenario planning traditionalists.

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This is a how-to book: how to evaluate predictions about the future – how to assess which ones are credible and/or how credible they are (how likely the future will turn out similar to the prediction). It is not just a guide to bad forecasts, it is also about how to identify and extract what is valuable in any forecast. This benefits readers who are required to manage professional or  personal situations that depend on correctly anticipating change. Whatever we want to achieve – help a company be more profitable – solve the world’s problems – develop their career – success depends on a good reading of the future. There are many guides to the future (predictions) but no guides to the guides. This book fills that gap. It helps readers assess predictions so they can make better judgments about the future for themselves and their organizations.

Decision success always implies congruence between decisions and the world in which those decisions play out. If we decide today to launch a product, buy a house, study for a degree, build a new light rail system, or take any similar decision of significance, the environment of tomorrow will be a key factor in the success or failure of that decision. What we do will be tested by the future conditions that emerge. Where there is a good “fit” between the initiative and the environment it plays out in — “the right product at the right time” — we can expect success. If not, we should expect to fail. Our decisions are only as good as the view of the future they rest on. All opportunities and successes and profits are realized in the future. All threats, failures, and losses are in the future.

In a fast-moving world, we know that the future environment will be different to that of today in big or small ways. New technologies, market shifts, changes in legislation, or evolving social values damage or destroy the traditional good fit we have between ourselves and the world. To achieve “future fit” we therefore use forecasts to position ourselves and our organizations, creating (or renewing) the fit between our initiatives and environment. In some cases we may be strong enough also to influence future events and outcomes for our own future benefit, and forecasts help us do this too.

All enterprises benefit from narrowing down what they must adapt to and plan for – all effort spent preparing for a future that will not emerge is a waste of personal or organizational resources. Good forecasts are a key ingredient in limiting the vagaries of uncertainty, and therein working smarter not harder, avoiding surprises, exploiting new opportunities and plugging weaknesses in fitting in with the future, and where possible influencing the future to suit the organization. This is true not only of business. People and institutions of all types position themselves for success by anticipating and adapting to events, or shaping them. Whether it is an NGO raising money for developing-world children, an urban planner advocating a light rail system, a homeowner deciding to sell a house, or a student making a career choice, identical principles apply — a higher-quality reading of the future operating environment in which these decisions will play out is what separates winners from losers. We should all be vitally concerned with forecasts as we are all effectively betting significant resources on their validity.

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