Posted by Adam Gordon on Mar 4, 2010 in all, politics of the future, strategic foresight
The BBC has released a blueprint for its future, summarized in a 64-page ‘Director-General’s Report which can be downloaded here. The gist is the corporation plans to back off from many of its more commercial offerings, particularly closing digital radio stations such as 6Music and the Asian Network, and pruning its online presence. The money saved will go to funding more original content and shoring up the quality of the offerings not pruned.
.
The BBC futures document is a careful and thoughtful piece of work, making bold foresight-oriented moves: saying, essentially, what are we here for? To provide quality media in the public interest. So what do we need to do/make/change to achieve it, that is, to deliver on our core mission, in the years ahead?
.
To this end, the blueprint talks about “setting new boundaries:
• Recognising the lead role that commercial radio plays in serving popular music to 30-50 year-old audiences, through the proposed closure of 6 Music and the refocusing of Radio 1 and Radio 2
• Recognising the lead role that Channel 4 and other broadcasters can play in addressing the gap in public service television for younger teenagers, through the closure of targeted teen propositions
• Reducing spending on programmes from abroad by 20%, from £100m today to £80m in 2013, capping it thereafter at this level of 2.5p in every licence fee pound
• Setting a limit on what the BBC can spend on sports rights at an average of 9p in every licence fee pound
• Leaving room for local newspapers and others to develop in a digital world by keeping the BBC’s current pattern of local services, and not launching new services in England at any more local a level than today
• Focusing original content on BBC Online on the (five) content priorities only, and excluding whole categories of online activity such as web search, communications and non-content related social networking.”
Further in the document it talks about “a set of web-native activities that the BBC itself will not undertake, including:
• The BBC’s search activity will be limited to its own website and associated external links; it will not do general web search for all-web content
• It will not run its own general communications services such as email, webmail or instant messaging
• It will not create stand-alone social networking sites, with any social propositions on the BBC site only there to aid engagement with BBC content. The BBC will also ensure that its social activity works with external social networks
• There will be no specialist content for a specialist audience, such as business-critical information in specialist fields, legal, financial (including trading tools) or other professional content.”
.
From the beeb’s perspective, it makes perfect sense. It can’t be the best at everything to everyone. That just means it will be working at the limits of its reach in many areas, against focused competitors, which dilutes its brand, and of course spending public money on commercial services already relatively well catered to.
The politics of engagement
It’s business strategy 101, and if it were a business that would be that. But the BBC is a multi-stakeholder public service body, and therein lies the rub. Everyone has a say in its future. And different stakeholders have different ideas of what is ‘in the public interest’: many think commercial radio etc., is in their interest, so protest is mounting, particularly among younger users under banners that read ‘BBC turns it’ back on a generation’ and so on. Twitter is humming.
Good multi-stakeholder future work requires engagement and consultation, and the BBC is offering a consultative process — from now until May 25 — see the page at https://consultations.external.bbc.co.uk
The future? Let’s not mince words that are usually minced. The future is political. That is part of the reason prediction is done so poorly — people miss the fact or extent of contention over outcomes, even ones you would think are in everyone’s interest (mitigating climate change, for example.)
When there are many interested parties with different interests, and therefore contending claims on the future — different visions of the ‘ideal’ future — the flavor of the future (in total or in compromise) will belong to the interest with the stronger hand. So depending on the power of the stakeholders soon-to-be-unhappy, the BBC will be forced to bend or not. But in the hardball world of multistakeholder change, chances are the Director General has set his stall out a bit further than he need to, and will be able to ‘compromise’ to a position that is more or less the plan. Good futuring all round.
read morePosted by Adam Gordon on Nov 19, 2009 in all, decision-making, emerging technologies, failed predictions, foresight tools & methods, Future Savvy, Perils of Prediction, scenario planning, strategic foresight, technology change
In a recent Times article ‘The future was never going to be the C5‘ actor-comedian Ben Millar offers a familiar criticism of foresight work. Inter alia he says: “For all our achievements in art, science, and technology, the human race has always been spectacularly bad at predicting the future. Literature is littered with shockingly wide-of-the-mark utopias, dystopias, shiny suits, flying saucers and whole meals contained in a single pill. As a child of the Seventies, I was taught that as an adult in a world run by machines my main challenge would be how to spend my endless hours of leisure time…”
Yes, Ben. I’m sure you know this has all been said before ad nauseam. But more importantly, 40 years on many lessons have been learned, and it wouldn’t run foul of quality journalism standards to reflect this.
First, let’s be clear: nobody can predict the future. Anyone who says they can is a charlatan. Also, yes, unconscionably dreadful and irresponsible predictions have been made and are continually being made. But there are three problems with the ‘no-flying-car-so-there-we-can’t-predict-the-future’ argument:
(1) The kinds of predictions Millar cites are a product of a particular moment in Western thought and therefore foresight. The 1960s and early 70s were a time of Post-War American emergence, unleashing for a while a techno-futurist predictive rapture, most of which has indeed proved to be rubbish. There are still people, very famous talking-head futurists, promoting techno-rapture for the 21st century (caveat emptor) but as a whole the foresight field has moved on to become much more circumspect about what can be predicted.
Balancing techno-fantasy
Foresight practitioners are these days more likely to balance technology wowee with economic, social, and environmental friction; see systemic (often indirect or counter-intuitive) effects where once only simple cause-and-effect was seen; and create scenarios of key alternative outcomes rather than predict one.
(2) The second thing that is missed in gleefully deriding foresight work, is how many people and institutions get it right, or right enough. It’s axiomatic that in order to be successful a person or organization must have correctly assessed both key changes and rate of change in their operating environment. To take a famous case, as quoted in Future Savvy, while Nixon’s Vice President Spiro Agnew in 1972 erroneously forecast super-sonic passenger air travel, Herb Kelleher, founder of SouthWest Airlines, foresaw the low-cost air travel industry. Bingo. Billionaire. Similarly, behind every success one can find future thinking that, while sometimes latent, was present and correct.
(3) The purpose of foresight work is misunderstood. We cannot predict the future and it’s pointless to try. We can only assess signals of change, trends, and potential for surprises and reversals, including challenging our all-too-easily calcified mental models, and take this into a process of understanding alternative outcomes and pre-considering best strategic actions. In other words, actively stimulating the investigation and analysis of future conditions in order to create the basis of better decision-making today.
In fact sometimes the ‘strategic conversation’ that results from poor predictions is instructive to managers. As I say to clients: the goal of foresight work is better decisions not better predictions.
Back-street abortionists
The reality is that there is good and bad foresight work. Yes, some futurists are the technical and moral equivalent of back street abortionists. But the good work remains, and quality foresight is a critical advantage to decision-makers. The key thing is to be able to tell good foresight work from bad.
Simplistic trashing of foresight work en bloc ignores the weight of case evidence that people and organizations can improve their management of future uncertainty and/or create a situation where they manage the future better than competitors. Further, it encourages managers to fly blind into changing environments, often resulting in spectacularly poor decisions that deeply and widely punish their dependent stakeholders.
read more